STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This action was initiated pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345. The district court entered judgment on August 31, 2015. RE-T.3 (ROA.1390).[1] On October 29, 2015, the Commission filed a timely notice of appeal. RE-T.2 (ROA.1395). This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Whether the district court erred in granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment when there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Chambers was able to perform her job with reasonable accommodation, that River Region rejected Chambers’s requests for reasonable accommodation out of hand and fired her, and that River Region failed to prove, as a matter of law, that accommodating Chambers would result in undue hardship.

2. Whether the district court erred in relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation where Chambers sought only temporary short-term disability benefits and where Chambers could perform her job with reasonable accommodation.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case & Course of Proceedings

The Commission sued River Region on September 30, 2012, alleging in the complaint that River Region violated the ADA by failing to provide Chambers with a reasonable accommodation, including additional leave or a light duty modification to her job, and by terminating her. ROA.18-27. River Region moved for summary judgment on May 29, 2015. ROA.802. The Commission responded on June 15, 2015. ROA.835. The district court issued an opinion and order granting River Region’s Motion for Summary Judgment on August 27, 2015. RE-T.4 (ROA.1381-89).

B. Statement of the Facts

Beatrice Chambers worked for River Region Medical Center and its predecessor hospitals in various capacities beginning in 1975. ROA.842, 843; ROA.1150. At the time she was fired in October 2011, she was a Licensed Practical Nurse II/Technician (LPNII/Tech) in the Gastroenterology Lab (GI Lab), a job she had held since 2007. ROA.699-700. Although Chambers was certified as an LPN, the LPN license was not required for the GI Lab job. ROA.1034. Director of Surgical Services Sandra Agnone, who was also a registered nurse, supervised the GI Lab beginning in 2010. ROA.1035; ROA.1042. Agnone explained that River Region “used their LPNs as a tech role, so the job could have been interchangeable between a tech or an LPN.” RE-T.23 (ROA.1033).

Throughout her 35-plus years with the hospital, Chambers was an excellent employee and consistently received positive performance reviews. Agnone testified that Chambers “was a very good employee” who “had a great attitude. She knew how to do GI. She knew the scopes. She was very good at her [customer service] skills.” ROA.1035-36; see also ROA.952 (March 2011 performance evaluation stating Chambers “does a great job,” is “very proficient,” “physicians love working with her,” and “very knowledgeable regarding decontamination of equipment”). Chambers testified that she “liked everything about the job” and “I think I did a good job.” ROA.887.

The GI Lab contained three procedure rooms and a workroom for washing equipment. ROA.931. Three LPNII/Techs staffed the GI Lab with additional hospital staff. ROA.933; ROA.1034. Chambers worked closely with LPNs Patricia DeShazer and Lorraine Wilson (ROA.870), who “had the exact same job duties and responsibilities” and shared the daily workload. RE-T.10 (ROA.1113). Wilson stated, “We all worked in close proximity to each other and it was our normal practice to do things as a team.” RE-T.10 (ROA.1121). Duties included assisting with gastroenterological procedures, preparing the procedure room, manually washing scopes and operating ultrasonic washers, stocking supplies, and communicating with nurses to ensure patients were prepared for their procedures. ROA.855-58; ROA.934-35.

Chambers’s job was not physically demanding. RE-T.10 (ROA.1114). In the GI Lab, Chambers was not required “to go into the patient’s room to give direct patient care.” Once Chambers moved to the GI Lab, she “no longer had to get the patients up out of bed.” ROA.864. Chambers testified that, “I can’t remember having to lift more than 10 pounds” as an LPN in the GI Lab. ROA.937. See also ROA.935. Wilson stated that, based on her 18 years in the GI Lab, “there was little to no lifting, let alone heavy lifting, required of a GI Lab LPN.” RE-T.10 (ROA.1114). According to Wilson, moving patients into the GI Lab on wheeled gurneys and positioning them during procedures were the most physically demanding duties of the LPNs assigned to the GI Lab. RE-T.10 (ROA.1114). Wilson reported that she assisted in transporting patients “[o]n occasion, but rarely.” RE-T.10 (ROA.1114-15). Instead, two Registered Nurses were assigned to the GI Lab and transported patients “ninety-nine percent” of the time during Chambers’s tenure in the GI Lab. RE-T.10 (ROA.1115); ROA.937. Additionally, there were dedicated workers in the hospital known as “transporters” whose job was to transport patients from one part of the facility to another. RE-T.11 (ROA.1158); ROA.1154. When the LPNs pushed equipment, it was on wheels and easily moved, “comparable to pushing a baby stroller.” RE-T.10 (ROA.1118-19).

Wilson stated that the heaviest items that the LPNs had to lift were buckets full of scopes for procedures, which weigh no more than ten pounds. RE-T.10 (ROA.1119). Additionally, positioning patients for procedures did not usually require lifting, pulling, or pushing more than ten pounds because most patients moved themselves into the necessary position. RE-T.10 (ROA.1117-18). Chambers, Wilson, and DeShazer did not have to “lift a heavy person.” ROA.929-30. Instead, they would “use a draw sheet to pull the patient” or turn patients “from side to side” for procedures. ROA.929-30; ROA.932; RE-T.10 (ROA.1117-18). The LPNs were required to stock their own supplies, but this did not require any heavy lifting. RE-T.10 (ROA.1119). Although the job description states that lifting and pushing much heavier weights is required, Wilson said that the document “does not accurately reflect, and, in fact, greatly overstates the physical demands of the LPN job within the GI lab,” so much so that the LPNs “often laughed at the description due to its inaccuracy.” RE-T.10 (ROA.1119); see also ROA.937-938.

Chambers began experiencing muscle weakness and severe shoulder pain in early 2011. ROA.898-99; ROA.1055; ROA.1082; RE-T.10 (ROA.1121). Following a May 2011 MRI, Chambers’s orthopedic surgeon, William Porter, recommended surgery to repair several problems, including a torn rotator cuff. ROA.1087; ROA.1057-59; ROA.1063; ROA.1084-85.

Chambers approached Agnone in May about having the surgery at the beginning of June because her shoulder pain was worsening and Dr. Porter had recommended surgery. ROA.900-01. Agnone refused to approve Chambers taking leave in June. ROA.901. Chambers continued to do her job despite the pain. ROA.902. GI Lab employees “assisted Ms. Chambers with duties that required pushing or pulling that caused her to experience additional pain in her left shoulder.” Re-T.11 (ROA.1157-58). Chambers took no leave for her shoulder injury prior to the surgery. ROA.902.

In mid-June, when Chambers asked Agnone a second time if she could approve her taking leave to have the surgery, reporting that her pain had increased, Agnone “seemed okay with it.” ROA.903. Chambers was scheduled for surgery on July 21, 2011, and had no further conversations with Agnone about it. ROA.904.

Chambers underwent shoulder surgery on July 21. ROA.1089 (Operative Report). She was approved for leave for the surgery and recovery under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) from July 21 to October 12, 2011. ROA.1008; ROA.998 (Employee Handbook stating FMLA will be granted for a period of up to 12 weeks). HR Generalist Patricia Watson oversaw Chambers’s FMLA leave. ROA.1292. Chambers used accumulated sick leave and short-term disability benefits with two different companies to replace her salary, one through River Region and the other through a policy purchased by Chambers. ROA.1171-72.

Chambers’s shoulder surgery was successful. RE-T.22 (ROA.1064). Dr. Porter testified that Chambers was in less pain following surgery than she was before the procedure. ROA.1065. Dr. Porter stated that he had performed “hundreds if not thousands” of the type of shoulder surgery he performed on Chambers, that most patients “do very well” after such surgery, and that he assumed Chambers would make a full recovery following the surgery. ROA.1064. Dr. Porter stated that Chambers’s recovery and physical therapy were going well in the weeks following the surgery, she was steadily improving, and felt that her prognosis “was good.” RE-T.22 (ROA.1068-69).

Chambers’s recovery proceeded as expected. Agnone, who was also a nurse, testified that she knew Chambers had undergone a “rotator cuff repair” and was familiar with the recovery time for that type of surgery. ROA.1042. At some point in August, Agnone asked Chambers if she could come back to work on light duty in a clerical job at a desk. ROA.890-93. Dr. Porter recommended that Chambers not return to work at that time. ROA.892-93, 917. Dr. Porter’s September 1, 2011, exam notes state that Chambers “is doing well, but not well enough to go back to work yet. . . . I am going to start her on some physical therapy and see her back in a few weeks. She should be ready by then.” RE-T.13 (ROA.1099).

On September 29, 2011, Dr. Porter noted: “Her shoulder is improving. Therapy is helping.” RE-T.14 (ROA.1103). Dr. Porter directed Chambers to continue physical therapy and hold off returning to work until her visit scheduled for October 28, 2011. ROA.1070. Dr. Porter testified that he thought her prognosis was “good,” meaning that she should be able to go back to work. RE-T.22 (ROA.1068-69). Chambers kept the hospital informed of her progress while she was on medical leave. ROA.1042; ROA.703; RE-T.21 (ROA.907) (“Each time I went for my follow-up appointment, I turned [Dr. Porter’s Certificate to Return to Work] in.”). According to DeShazer and Wilson, the GI Lab staff covered for Chambers while she was out on leave without difficulty and could have done so for two additional weeks. RE-T.10 (ROA.1121); RE-T.11 (ROA.1158).

Chambers testified that she believed that Agnone was displeased with her for taking the medical leave of absence. RE-T.21 (ROA.895). In addition to forcing Chambers to delay the necessary surgery, Agnone asked Chambers if she was ready to come back to work only a week after the procedure, when Chambers had her staples removed and was turning in a medical form to Agnone. ROA.891. Chambers testified that she told Watson that she believed Agnone did not like her based on “her attitude toward me.” RE-T.21 (ROA.895). Because Agnone was “rude” and used “a tone of voice” with her regarding her leave whenever she submitted Dr. Porter’s forms after a follow-up appointment, Chambers submitted them to Watson, instead, after Watson offered to email them to Agnone for her. ROA.889, 907.

Watson informed Chambers by letter dated September 30, 2011, that her twelve weeks of FMLA leave would expire on October 12, 2011, and that she could request an extension of leave. RE-T.8 (ROA.1016); ROA.706. When Chambers met with Watson on October 7, 2011, Watson gave her the form to use to request additional medical leave and told her to take it to Agnone for signature. RE-T.21 (ROA.909); ROA.911; ROA.706; RE-T.9 (ROA.725) (Employee Activity Request). Chambers told Agnone that she was “asking for two weeks extension,” until November 1, 2011. ROA.914. Chambers explained that she requested two additional weeks because her next appointment with Dr. Porter was October 28. ROA.913. According to Chambers, when Agnone asked her if Dr. Porter was going to let her come back, Chambers told her, “I’m hoping he does without any restrictions.” RE-T.21 (ROA.895). Agnone “threw [the form] back” at Chambers and said, “I can’t sign this.” RE-T.21 (ROA.894-95).

Chambers returned to Human Resources and told Watson that Agnone refused to sign the form. ROA.916. Chambers recalled that Watson told her “to go to Dr. Porter’s office and let him know that I would have to come back to work. So that’s what I did.” RE-T.21 (ROA.909-10). Chambers obtained a Certification to Return to Work dated October 7, 2011, from Dr. Porter after informing him that she needed to go back to work as soon as her FMLA leave expired on October 12th. RE-T.12 (ROA.1018) (Certificate to Return to Work); ROA.1071-72.

Dr. Porter cleared Chambers to return to “light work” with “limited use of left arm.” RE-T.12 (ROA.1018). Dr. Porter signed and sent to HR a Certification of Fitness for Duty with the following restrictions: “No lifting, no pulling, no pushing anything greater than 10 pounds.” RE-T.16 (ROA.1020). Dr. Porter explained that when he released Chambers to “light work,” “I just didn’t want her doing any heavy lifting with that arm, lifting anything heavy. . . . Just take it easy with that arm when she went back to work.” ROA.1071. In Dr. Porter’s view, light duty meant the “[s]ame duties, just not picking up anything heavy with that shoulder. . . . Same job.” RE-T.22 (ROA.1072-73). Dr. Porter testified that, “I assumed that she’d be on light work until I saw her again on October 28.” RE-T.22 (ROA.1072). Dr. Porter also sent River Region a “Certification of Health Care Provider” recommending light duty, but also indicating that Chambers could perform the essential functions of her job. RE-T.15 (ROA.1107). Porter testified that he checked “no” in answer to whether Chambers was “unable to perform any one or more of the essential functions of the employee’s job” because “[s]he probably could do some of the things at work without hurting her shoulder.” ROA.1075. Chambers left the form with Watson and left the HR office, telling Watson, “See you on the 13th.” ROA.919. Chambers testified that by that she meant “[t]hat I would be back at work on the 13th.” ROA.942.

Watson testified that, when she told Agnone that Chambers’s “doctor was returning her with limited duty,” Agnone “wanted to know what that limited duty entailed.” RE-T.24 (ROA.1164). Watson stated that she “needed clarification so that we could make sure that we weren’t violating anything prescribed by the doctor.” Id. However, no one from River Region contacted Dr. Porter to clarify what “limited use of left arm” meant. RE-T.22 (ROA.1072). Agnone testified that she did not recall meeting with HR Vice President Hal Harrington about possible accommodations to Chambers’s restrictions. RE-T.23 (ROA.1044). Nor did Agnone ask Harrington or Watson when Chambers would be able to return to work without restriction. Id.

Watson called Chambers on October 12, 2011, and told her that Agnone had been to HR “talking to my supervisor” and that Agnone “was not going to let you come back to work. As a matter of fact, she has already hired somebody in your place as of today.” ROA.921. Chambers testified that she had no response, because she was “in a state of shock.” ROA.921.

Watson, who processed Chambers’s termination, testified that Chambers was terminated for “personal illness, unable to return from leave.” ROA.1163; ROA.1150 (Personnel Action Form). Watson testified that Harrington said that Chambers’s absence “was causing a hardship in the department.” ROA.1163. Harrington stated in Chambers’s termination letter dated October 14, 2011: “In accordance with our Leave of Absence policy, eligible employees may be granted up to twelve weeks of leave under the guidelines of the Family and Medical Leave Act. Leave status, beyond FMLA, may be granted without obligation or guarantee of your position or a position of equivalent status. Your FMLA expired on October 12, 2011. At this time, we are unable to grant you additional leave of absence. As a result, your employment with River Region Health System will be terminated effective October 14, 2011.” RE-T.14 (ROA.757).

Agnone testified that she had a conversation with HR, and discussed that Chambers’s “FMLA [was] exhausted. We’re in a hardship with employees. I need to get the position filled, so we need to do what we have to do.” ROA.739. The HR Employment Manager at the time, Anita Oliphant, stated in a declaration that, “After Chambers had exhausted her Family and Medical Leave in October 2011, River Region was not able to grant any additional leave of absence, as the company could no longer impose Chambers’s job responsibilities among the other LPNIIs in the GI Lab.” ROA.727.

On October 12, 2011, Agnone created a request to post a new position for an LPNII to replace Chambers, “who was unable to return from leave of absence.” ROA.1141-33. Chambers was officially terminated on October 14, 2011, (ROA.757), and the job posting was approved on October 17, 2011. ROA.1152; ROA.1144. Chambers received notice from Principal Financial Group, River Region’s employee benefits manager, that River Region had reported to the company that Chambers’s “termination reason” was “disability.” RE-T.20 (ROA.1022).

Watson testified that although, at the time of her termination, Chambers had accumulated 245 hours of sick leave (RE-T.18 (ROA.1174)), Chambers was not allowed to use them to extend her leave of absence because “general leave is not automatic” and “they were unable to grant additional leave.” ROA.1166-67. Further, although Agnone testified that in August 2011, she could have placed Chambers in a clerical position “until Dr. Porter released her” “indefinitely if need be” (ROA.1040), she did not offer to place Chambers in the clerical job prior to terminating her. RE-T.21 (ROA.923, 924).

It took the hospital more than a year to hire another GI Lab technician. ROA.1121. Chambers’s position was open from the date of her termination in October 2011 until January 2013. ROA.1039. The remaining staff “shared the same responsibilities we performed while Ms. Chambers was away on leave.” ROA.1121. DeShazer stated that the GI Lab used floaters from other areas of the hospital. ROA.1158.

Because River Region refused to provide a light duty accommodation or permit Chambers to use her accumulated leave to extend her leave for just two weeks, on October 13, 2011, Chambers applied for short-term disability benefits with private insurer American Public Life Insurance Company. RE-T.5 (ROA.1028). Chambers listed “Lt Rotator Cuff Tear” as the “medical condition or injury causing disability,” and indicated “unknown” as the “anticipated return date” to work. Id. She checked the “no” box for all listed “other income sources and amounts of income which you are receiving or may be entitled to receive during this disability,” including Social Security Disability. Id. On the physician portion of the application signed and dated October 14, 2011, Dr. Porter listed “L Rotator Cuff Tear” for the “diagnosis resulting in patient’s temporary total disability (including complications)” RE-T.6 (ROA.1030) (emphasis on form). Under “Treatment,” he listed the surgery necessary as “L Rotator Cuff Repair” performed “July 21, 2011.” Id. In the “Prognosis” section, he listed the dates “of temporary total disability (unable to work)” as: “From 7/21/11” through “unknown” and stated “unable to determine at present time” for the “anticipated length of disability.” Id.

Chambers made a full recovery less than two weeks after she was terminated. Dr. Porter released Chambers without restriction on October 28, 2011 (RE-T.19 (ROA.1110); ROA.1026; ROA.1182), and did not see her again for treatment. ROA.1078-79. Chambers testified that she did not suffer from shoulder pain again. ROA.900, 940. Chambers’s short-term disability benefits were discontinued after October 28, 2011, because she was released to work without restriction on that date. RE-T.7 (ROA.794).

C. District Court Decision

The district court granted River Region’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that because Chambers “applied for disability benefits from her insurance provider” around the date of her termination “with her doctor claiming that she was ‘temporarily totally disab[led]’ for an indefinite period,” “this fact precludes Chambers from now arguing she was qualified to perform her job absent explanation.” RE-T.4 (ROA.1382). The court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999), which states that a “court should require an explanation of any apparent inconsistency with the necessary elements of an ADA claim” when a plaintiff’s prior sworn statement asserts she is “totally disabled.” RE-T.4 (ROA.1386-87) (citing Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807). The district court stated the rule articulated in Crossley v. CSC Applied Technologies, LLC, 569 F. App’x 196, 200 (5th Cir. 2014), that the “explanation must be sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that, assuming [the plaintiff’s] good-faith belief in her statement on her benefits application, she nevertheless could perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation.” RE-T.4 (ROA.1387) (quoting Crossley) (emphasis in Crossley decision).

The district court determined that the Commission did not provide an explanation for the apparent inconsistency between Chambers being temporarily totally disabled and a qualified individual with a disability. The district court noted that “[t]he EEOC has pointed out that Porter, in his deposition, has testified that Chambers was able to return to work prior to her termination, but has offered no explanation for the discrepancy between this testimony and Porter’s statements on Chambers’s disability claim form. Absent an explicit explanation, the Court cannot assume one exists that can resolve the apparent contradiction.” RE-T.4 (ROA.1389). The court said that “[t]he only explanation that the EEOC offers is the fact that Chambers applied for total disability benefits after her termination on October 12,” an explanation the Fifth Circuit rejected in Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 2000). RE-T.4 (ROA.1388).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews a district court’s award of summary judgment de novo. EEOC v. LHC Group, Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate only if “‘there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence, and draws all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. A party is not entitled to summary judgment on an issue as to which it bears the burden of proof unless undisputed evidence compels a finding in the party’s favor. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The district court erred in granting summary judgment to River Region because there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that Beatrice Chambers was a qualified individual with a disability and that River Region denied her a reasonable accommodation for that disability. There is evidence that, at the time she was fired after she attempted to return to work following shoulder surgery and related medical leave, Chambers was recuperating from a successfully performed, routine surgery from which her doctor expected her to recover fully by the end of October 2011. Chambers requested two additional weeks of leave or to return to her job with a light duty modification immediately. There is evidence that her coworkers were not overburdened by her twelve weeks of approved medical leave following surgery and could manage if she took two additional weeks of leave. There is evidence that Chambers’s job was not physically demanding such that the light duty modification prescribed by her doctor was reasonable, particularly given that she was able to perform the job satisfactorily despite having an injured shoulder prior to the surgery when her pain was worse. River Region rejected both accommodation requests, failed to establish that accommodating Chambers would result in undue hardship, and instead terminated Chambers two weeks before she was cleared to work without restriction.

The district court ignored the extensive evidence that Chambers was qualified within the meaning of the ADA, and relied on Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 (1999), to hold that the Commission failed to offer a sufficient explanation of how Chambers could be a qualified individual with a disability at the same time she submitted an application for short-term disability benefits stating that she was temporarily totally disabled from her surgery until a date “unknown.” The Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland does not support the district court’s decision and instead reinforces the Commission’s position that Chambers was qualified under the ADA. Cleveland holds that sworn statements of total, permanent disability made in obtaining long term disability benefits under the Social Security Act are not necessarily inconsistent with assertions of coverage under the ADA. The district court’s conclusion that Cleveland forecloses the Commission’s action, in which Chambers applied for short-term disability benefits, represented that she was temporarily totally disabled, and was awarded only two weeks of benefits before being cleared to work without restriction, misapplies Cleveland and should be reversed.

There is no actual or apparent inconsistency in the Commission’s claim that Chambers is qualified within the meaning of the ADA, notwithstanding assertions on her application for short-term disability benefits that she was temporarily totally disabled until a date “unknown.” Being a “qualified individual” under the ADA and “disabled” within the meaning of the short-term disability policy are not mutually exclusive. Unlike the ADA, short-term disability benefit programs do not take potential reasonable accommodations into account. Nothing on Chambers’s short-term disability benefits application mentions the ability to work with reasonable accommodation. In light of this difference between short-term disability benefit programs and the ADA, and the absence of any other inconsistent statements by Chambers, the Commission’s claim cannot be read as inconsistent with Chambers’s application for short-term disability benefits.

Even if Chambers’s representations that she was temporarily totally disabled until a date “unknown” on her application could be interpreted as inconsistent with the Commission’s claim that she was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, the Commission offered a “sufficient explanation” in the form of “a particularized showing that reasonable accommodations were possible,” which is all that is required by Cleveland and this Court. Chambers requested and was denied a short additional leave of absence, as well as a limitation on the use of her left arm until her shoulder fully healed. Both were manifestly reasonable accommodations. She applied for short-term disability benefits only after she sought and was refused accommodation and was told not to return to work. The district court should have accepted this explanation as sufficient and allowed the case to proceed to trial to allow a jury to decide the factual questions that are in dispute.

ARGUMENT

I. The Commission offered sufficient evidence to support a finding that River Region failed to reasonably accommodate and instead terminated Chambers, a qualified individual with a disability, in violation of the ADA.

The Commission adduced sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment on its claims that River Region violated the ADA when it refused to accommodate Chambers’s disability and fired her immediately after her FMLA leave ended. Specifically, it was undisputed that Chambers had a disability resulting from the injury to her shoulder and the surgery she underwent to repair it. The evidence further showed that she could perform the essential functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation, that a reasonable accommodation was available, and that River Region knew she needed an accommodation but failed to provide it. See Mzyk v. N.E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 397 F. App’x 13, 15 n.3 (5th Cir. 2010). Additionally, the evidence does not support a finding that defendant established, as a matter of law, that accommodating Chambers would have resulted in an undue hardship.

The Commission also offered substantial evidence that Chambers was a qualified individual. Under the ADA, an individual is qualified if she can perform the essential functions of a job with or without reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Reasonable accommodation may include part-time or modified work schedules, job restructuring, or reassignment to a vacant position. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). “To defeat an employer’s motion for summary judgment, the employee ‘need only show that an accommodation seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.’” Medrano v. City of San Antonio, 179 F. App’x 897, 901 (5th Cir. 2006) (internal citation omitted). And it is well-settled that leave can be a reasonable accommodation. See, e.g., Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 151 F.3d 591, 601 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a reasonable jury could find a short leave of 2-4 weeks to be a reasonable accommodation); Garcia-Ayala v. Lederle Parenterals, Inc., 212 F.3d 638, 647 (1st Cir. 2000) (request for leave does not necessarily mean that the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of her job).

There was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Chambers was qualified within the meaning of the ADA because she could have performed the essential functions of her job had she been granted two weeks of additional leave to recover fully, or permitted to return to work immediately after her FMLA leave expired to light duty or with some limited, short-term modification to her regular job duties until her shoulder fully healed.

Chambers testified that after she learned her FMLA leave would end on October 12, 2011, she asked for two weeks of additional leave, not indefinite or unlimited leave. RE-T.9 (ROA.725); ROA.913, 914. The Commission offered evidence that two weeks of additional leave would have allowed Chambers to return to her job fully healed from her surgery. Chambers was steadily convalescing from a successfully performed, routine surgery from which her doctor expected her to make a complete recovery. ROA.1064; RE-T.22 (ROA.1068-69). Dr. Porter’s notes regarding Chambers’s follow-up appointments document steady progress without setbacks or complications. See RE-T.14 (ROA.1103); ROA.1070. Chambers testified that she asked for two weeks because she was hoping to go back to work after her October 28 appointment, which she told Agnone, a nurse familiar with the surgery she had undergone. ROA.915. Both of Chambers’s coworkers confirmed that it had not been difficult to cover for Chambers when she was out on FMLA leave and that two additional weeks of leave would not have been a burden. RE-T.10 (ROA.1121); RE-T.11 (ROA.1158). Although Chambers had accrued 245 hours of sick leave at the time of her termination, Agnone rejected her request out of hand, throwing the form back at Chambers, and subsequently instructing HR to terminate her. RE-T.21 (ROA.894-95).

After Agnone rejected Chambers’s request for additional leave, Dr. Porter cleared Chambers to return to work on October 13, 2011, the day after her FMLA leave expired, with instructions to limit the use of her left arm and avoid lifting, pulling, or pushing more than ten pounds. RE-T.16 (ROA.1020). Dr. Porter testified that Chambers needed to “take it easy with that arm when she went back to work,” perform the “same duties, just not picking up anything heavy with that shoulder . . . same job.” RE-T.22 (ROA.1072-73). Dr. Porter checked the box on the “Certification of Health Care Provider” form indicating that Chambers could perform the essential functions of her job. RE-T.15 (ROA.1107). Chambers and a coworker testified that the job was not physically demanding and did not require lifting or pushing more than ten pounds. See supra pp.4-6. The Commission also offered evidence that the RNs performed the more physically demanding tasks in the GI Lab, and Chambers’s job was in practice that of a technician, and included duties such as washing scopes and prepping the GI Lab for procedures. See supra pp.3, 4-6. The Commission also offered evidence that there were multiple employees in the GI Lab at all times who shared duties. See supra pp.4-5.

Additionally, Chambers performed her job satisfactorily with an injured shoulder during the months prior to her surgery, even though she was in greater pain that she was at the time of her termination. Chambers’s shoulder was nearly fully healed at the time her FMLA leave ended and any modification to her job would have been minimal and short term. She was cleared to return to work without restriction on October 28, 2011, two weeks after she was fired. See supra p.18. Agnone testified that approximately two months prior to Chambers’s termination, she could have placed Chambers in a clerical job “indefinitely.” ROA.1040. The hospital took more than a year to replace Chambers. ROA.1039.

An employee’s request for a reasonable accommodation “triggers the employer’s obligation to participate in the interactive process of determining one.” Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996). “[W]hen an employer’s unwillingness to engage in a good faith interactive process leads to a failure to reasonably accommodate an employee, the employer violates the ADA.” Cutrera v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. St. Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 2005). River Region “had a duty to work with [Chambers] toward a reasonable accommodation” and “‘to engage in [an] interactive process so that together they can determine what reasonable accommodations might be available.’” LHC Grp., 773 F.3d at 700 (quoting EEOC v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., LP, 570 F.3d 606, 622 (5th Cir. 2009)). Thus it was River Region’s responsibility to accommodate Chambers or prove it could not do so without incurring undue hardship. Instead, Agnone rejected Chambers’s request for an additional two weeks of leave instantaneously, ignored Dr. Porter’s release of Chambers to work with limited use of her left arm, and fired her on the last day of her FMLA leave. This was a violation of the ADA.

“When an employer does not engage in a good faith interactive process, that employer violates the ADA—including when the employer discharges the employee instead of considering the requested accommodation.” Chevron, 570 F.3d at 621; Cutrera, 429 F.3d at 113 (“An employer may not stymie the interactive process of identifying a reasonable accommodation for an employee’s disability by preemptively terminating the employee before an accommodation can be considered or recommended.”); Nelson v. Hitchcock Ind. Sch. Dist., No. 3:11-CV-00311, 2012 WL 6681917, at *4 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (The employer’s “silence following [the plaintiff’s request for accommodation] is sufficient for a jury to conclude that [the defendant] refused [the plaintiff’s] requested accommodations without giving them the consideration that the ADA requires.”).

Just as Agnone threw Chambers’s leave request form at her when Chambers approached her for approval of the leave, stating she could not sign it, in Chevron, the disabled employee’s supervisor refused to discuss the medical release the employee submitted, saying, “No. We just can’t take this. This isn’t going to work.” 570 F.3d at 622. The supervisor in Chevron “remained silent” when the employee gave him a second medical release, “made no comment on the requested accommodations,” suspended her without pay, and then terminated her. Id. at 611, 622. This Court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the employer, holding that “a jury reasonably could find that [the employer], instead of engaging in the interactive process that the ADA requires, simply refused to consider [the disabled employee’s] request for accommodation. Id. at 622.

The only “reason” the hospital gave for not granting Chambers’s leave request was that extensions of leave are not “automatic,” and that the GI Lab employees would be overworked. See supra pp.14-16. Even if true, that medical leave extensions are not automatic does not explain why Chambers’s request for leave could not be granted. Similarly, the hospital’s assertion that providing additional leave, a job modification, or light duty would be a burden on other employees does not establish undue hardship. The mere assertion of a burden without specific proof of its adverse impact on the operations of the employer is insufficient to establish undue hardship. See U.S. Airways v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 402 (2002) (“[T]he defendant/employer then must show special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances.”); Medrano, 179 F. App’x at 901 (quoting Barnett, 535 U.S. at 402)).

Here, there was considerable evidence that either of the accommodations Chambers requested could have been implemented with no hardship, much less undue hardship, to River Region. The record evidence of the GI Lab staff’s ability to perform all duties of the lab without difficulty during Chambers’s original three-month leave at a minimum casts doubt on any assertion of hardship. Additionally, Agnone’s testimony that she was willing to offer Chambers a clerical position indefinitely undermines the notion that permitting Chambers to extend her leave by two weeks or return to her job with some modifications would have been an unreasonable accommodation or an undue hardship. That Chambers was performing her job satisfactorily in the months in 2011 prior to her surgery, despite being in greater pain from her shoulder injury than post-surgery, further refutes any claim of undue hardship. Accordingly, the hospital failed to prove, as a matter of law, that accommodating Chambers would have resulted in undue hardship.

II. The district court’s holding that Chambers’s assertion of temporary total disability on a short-term disability benefits application was inconsistent with the EEOC’s ADA lawsuit and renders her unqualified is not supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland.

Despite the substantial evidence that Chambers was qualified, the district court held that Chambers was not a qualified individual with a disability because she represented in an application for short-term disability benefits with a private insurer that she was “temporarily totally disabled” until “unknown.” RE-T.4 (ROA.1388-89). The court relied on Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 526 U.S. 795 (1999), to reason that the Commission failed to explain sufficiently how Chambers could be a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA but temporarily totally disabled for purposes of receiving short-term disability benefits. RE-T.4 (ROA.1387). The district court’s decision, purporting to rely on Cleveland, that Chambers was not qualified is erroneous. Indeed, far from supporting the district court’s decision, Cleveland supports reversal.

Courts, including the Supreme Court, have recognized that when a disabled individual seeks disability-related benefits and asserts in that context that she is “totally disabled” without reference to reasonable accommodation, this does not necessarily preclude her ability to establish that she is a qualified individual for purposes of the ADA. In Cleveland, the Supreme Court ruled that a claim for long-term, permanent disability benefits to the Social Security Administration under the Social Security Act does not give rise to any “negative presumption” against the assertion of an ADA claim. In that case, plaintiff Carolyn Cleveland suffered a stroke, which damaged her concentration, memory, and language skills. She returned to work for several months but was fired. She sought SSDI benefits from the Social Security Administration, stating “I was terminated . . . due to my condition and I have not been able to work since. I continue to be disabled.” She also stated that she had “worked for three months” following the stroke, but was terminated because she “could no longer do the job” in light of her condition, and “I am unable to work due to my disability.” 526 U.S. at 798. These statements suggested that Cleveland was “permanently” unable to work, and were in tension with her ADA action arguing that she was in fact a qualified individual with a disability. The Cleveland Court accepted the explanation that the plaintiff’s statements to the SSA “were made in a forum which does not consider the effect that reasonable accommodation would have on my ability to work” and that the statements were true at the time she made them, and remanded the case for trial. Id. at 807. The Court emphasized that, in most cases, a claim for disability benefits ‘can comfortably exist side by side’ with an ADA claim.” Id.

Cleveland does not support the district court’s grant of summary judgment. There is no actual or apparent inconsistency in the Commission’s claim that Chambers is qualified within the meaning of the ADA and the assertion on her application for short-term disability benefits that she was temporarily totally disabled. Cleveland addresses statements of legal significance regarding the ADA versus the Social Security Act and suggests that the holding is limited to precisely those circumstances. Given that Cleveland holds that assertions of total and permanent disability under the Social Security Act are not categorically inconsistent with assertions of coverage under the ADA, the district court’s use of Cleveland to disallow the Commission’s case where Chambers applied for short-term disability benefits, represented that she was temporarily totally disabled, and was awarded only two weeks of benefits before being cleared to work without restriction misapplies Cleveland and was improper.

The Cleveland Court explained that it was not addressing situations involving “directly conflicting statements about purely factual matters” such as “‘The light was red/green,’” or “‘I can/cannot raise my arm above my head.’” Id. at 802. “An SSA representation of total disability differs from a purely factual statement in that it often implies a context-related legal conclusion, namely, ‘I am disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act.’” Id. No such legal conclusion was involved in Chambers’s situation, and it makes no sense to apply Cleveland to bar an ADA claim where the employee applied for short-term disability benefits. Further, there is no factual conflict. Dr. Porter’s cursory notation on Chambers’s short-term disability application that she was “temporarily” totally disabled from “July 21, 2011” through “unknown,” and Chambers’s statement that her “anticipated return date” to work was “unknown” are entirely consistent with the Commission’s claim that Chambers could perform the essential functions of her job at the time of her termination with reasonable accommodation. This is particularly so in light of Chambers’s nearly simultaneous submission of Dr. Porter’s note to River Region stating that she was able to do her job by limiting the use of her left arm, as well as Dr. Porter’s “Certification of Health Care Provider” indicating Chambers could perform the essential functions of her job. RE-T.12 (ROA.1018); RE-T.15 (ROA.1107). Neither Chambers nor Dr. Porter asserted in the short-term benefits application that Chambers was unable to work even with accommodation; the application makes no mention of reasonable accommodation. See RE-T.5 (ROA.1028); RE-T.6 (ROA.1030). And unlike in Cleveland and the other cases relied upon by the district court, these cursory statements on the short-term disability benefits application lack any factual detail regarding Chambers’s medical condition that could be read to negate the evidence detailed above that Chambers could have performed her job with reasonable accommodation and was therefore qualified under the ADA.

The Social Security Act defines “disability” as an impairment so “severe” the individual cannot work in any job in the national economy and meets this definition for at least one year. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 797, 801 (citing Social Security Act). Short-term disability benefits are by definition short-term (typically six months or less) income replacement for missed work due to conditions that are by definition of a short duration. Congress enacted the ADA to eradicate widespread discrimination against individuals with disabilities and, among other things, to enable individuals with disabilities to move off government benefit rolls and to return to work. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a); H.R. Rep. No. 485, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. Pt.2, at 32-34 (1990) (1990 House Report), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314-15. Consequently, a person is a qualified individual with a disability if she can perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation. Cf. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 801 (“The Social Security Act and the ADA both help individuals with disabilities, but in different ways” thus the two statutes have different definitions of “disability”). Unlike the scenario in Cleveland, the district court was not faced with “a plaintiff’s previous sworn statement asserting ‘total disability’ or the like.” 526 U.S. at 807.[2]

The district court also erred when it rejected the Commission’s explanation for why Chambers was covered by the ADA as a qualified individual notwithstanding the statements she and Dr. Porter made on her short-term disability benefits application. Cleveland instructs that when an ADA “plaintiff's sworn assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for example, unable to work, will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA case” that she can perform the essential functions of her job, the “ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the apparent contradiction . . . Rather, she must proffer a sufficient explanation.” Id. at 806. The “sufficient explanation” required by the Cleveland Court “must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff’s good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless ‘perform the essential functions’ of her job, with or without ‘reasonable accommodation.’” Id. at 807. In applying Cleveland, the Fifth Circuit has held that, “an employee’s specific factual statements that she was unable to perform her essential job duties at the time of the adverse employment action entitle the employer to summary judgment, at least absent a particularized showing that reasonable accommodations were possible.” Crossley v. CSC Applied Techs., 569 F. App’x 198, 199 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bell v. Hercules Liftboat Co., LLC, 524 F. App’x 64, 68 (5th Cir. 2013)) (emphasis added).

Even if Chambers’s and Dr. Porter’s representations on her short-term disability applications “appear to negate” the Commission’s claim that Chambers was a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA, the Commission made “a particularized showing that reasonable accommodations were possible.” As the Commission argued to the district court, being a “qualified individual” under the ADA and “disabled” within the meaning of the short-term disability policy are not mutually exclusive. Chambers requested and was denied additional leave and a light duty modification to her job and applied for short-term disability only after she sought and was refused accommodation and was told not to return to work.

Dr. Porter’s statement that Chambers’s return to work date was “unknown” is in harmony with her requests to return to work with reasonable accommodation, either after two weeks of additional leave or immediately with a light duty modification to her regular job. Dr. Porter’s progress notes for her post-surgery exams consistently predicted a return to work by the end of October. Chambers requested only two weeks of additional leave despite the fact that she had hundreds of hours of accrued sick leave.[3] The district court should have accepted this explanation as sufficient and allowed a jury to decide the remaining factual questions that are in dispute. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807 (explanation must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror’s concluding the plaintiff could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, despite earlier statement on disability application); see also EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, 216 F.3d 373, 380 (4th Cir. 2000) (EEOC adequately reconciled employee’s disability claim with her contention that she could have continued working had her employer reassigned her to a workstation that minimized the negative effects of her osteoarthritis to defeat the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the “qualified individual” of the ADA claim); Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 1997) (“When a defendant in an ADA action relies on such representations as the basis for contending that a plaintiff is not a ‘qualified individual,’ the plaintiff is free to come forward with additional evidence that shows she could perform the essential duties of a desired position with or without reasonable accommodation notwithstanding the fact that she might have been deemed disabled under some other statutory or contractual framework.”); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 333-35 (2d Cir. 2000) (reversing summary judgment for the employer and stating that Cleveland gives ADA plaintiffs “wide latitude to overcome apparent conflicts” between their disability benefits applications and their statements alleging discriminatory discharge).

The Commission’s case bears no resemblance to the Fifth Circuit decisions relied upon by the district court in granting summary judgment. In Crossley, 569 F. App’x at 197, the plaintiff was an aircraft mechanic whose Post Traumatic Stress Disorder left her unable to travel away from her home in San Angelo, Texas. She was fired after she declined reassignment to another site when the company reduced personnel at the San Angelo site. Id. In her application for total disability benefits to the Department of Veterans Affairs, she stated her disability prevented her “from securing or following any substantial gainful occupation.” Id. at 198. She later sued under the ADA. The Fifth Circuit pointed out that Crossley “filed an application with the Department of Veterans Affairs requesting total disability benefits due to her inability to secure or perform any occupation.” Id. at 199. “Crossley provides no evidence that she could perform an essential function of her job—travel.” Id. at 199-200. Moreover, the “[t]he benefits application stated that in order to support her claim for [total] disability, Crossley would have to show that her disability was sufficient, without regard to other factors, to prevent her from obtaining or keeping any substantially gainful employment,” and Crossley’s doctor stated on the application that she was “unemployable” due to her disability. Id. at 200. Because the only accommodation for her inability to travel was indefinite leave until a job opened up in San Angelo, and Crossley did not apply for jobs that came available in San Angelo despite being eligible for rehire, the court ruled she was not a qualified individual under the ADA. Id.

Nor does Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters support the district court’s conclusion that summary judgment was warranted. In Reed, the plaintiff was an offshore helicopter pilot with a back injury that left her unable to fly without a copilot, which was disallowed under federal and company regulations. 218 F.3d 477, 478 (5th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff took more than a year of leave, and was eventually terminated. Id. at 481. She applied for disability benefits with a private company and with the Social Security Administration. On the private insurer application, her doctor stated she had “severe back pain” dating back to January 1994 and said Reed was incapable of flying. Id. at 479. On the application for SSDI, Reed stated she was “totally disabled and unable to work,” and added in a supplemental application that she “could not sit, stand or walk for long periods or perform basic household chores,” and that she could not “drive, walk for exercise, or use public transportation because her back was so unstable that it made her ‘totally unpredictable.’” Id. And, Reed stated, she was unable to perform “all of the physical demands necessary to fly a helicopter.” Id.

Reed challenged her termination under the ADA, and this Court affirmed summary judgment for the employer, holding that these “specific factual statements” were inconsistent with Reed’s claim that she could fly a helicopter. Id. at 480. Reed’s only explanation was that the statements did not take into account any potential reasonable accommodation for her position. “Reed gives no explanation as to how her statements were consistent with her claim that she could fly a helicopter, pass the necessary physical exams, and obtain the required certification, with or without accommodation.” Id. Additionally, this Court observed, Reed “presents no affirmative evidence that she was able to function as a pilot” on the date of her termination. Id. Only placing her on indefinite leave whenever she was unable to fly would have worked as an accommodation, and she had already taken more than a year of leave when she was fired. Id. at 481.

Crossley and Reed had chronic medical conditions, applied for permanent disability benefits, and stated in detail on their applications the depths of their impairments and inability to work. Both plaintiffs offered “purely factual” statements that directly contradicted one another and could not be reconciled with any amount of explanation. Moreover, in those cases, no reasonable accommodation existed that would have enabled the plaintiffs to perform the essential functions of the respective job—Reed was a helicopter pilot who could not fly and Crossley was a mechanic who could not travel to her employer’s other worksites when it was consolidating its business operations. See Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615, 621 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding employer was not required to accommodate a firefighter unable to fight fires after a severe lower back injury).

This Court explained in Tullos v. City of Nassau Bay, 137 F. App’x 638, 647 (5th Cir. 2005), that “[t]o determine whether the plaintiff’s receipt of disability benefits renders him unqualified for purposes of an ADA claim, we would need to evaluate the specific assertions he made to obtain those benefits, along with his explanation of any inconsistencies.” In contrast to the detailed, lengthy factual assertions made in obtaining permanent disability benefits in Crossley and Reed, the only statements in Chambers’s short-term benefits application that could conceivably require explanation are the “unknown” notations in response to the date Chambers could return to work. In this context, “unknown” could simple be a response to the uncertainty of whether or when River Region would provide an accommodation that would have allowed Chambers to return to work. It does not create any unexplainable inconsistency as existed in Crossley or Reed.

Chambers was recovering from routine shoulder surgery at the time of her termination. She expected to be, and was, fully healed within a matter of weeks, and the Commission offered “a particularized showing that reasonable accommodations were possible.” Crossley, 569 F. App’x at 199. That is what this Court has required. See Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 485 (5th Cir. 2001) (because the plaintiff’s disability benefits application contained no specific assertions resisting his explanation that he could perform his job with reasonable accommodation and he testified that certain accommodations would have permitted him to work at his old position, he explained any factual inconsistencies sufficiently to survive summary judgment).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

P. DAVID LOPEZ

General Counsel

JENNIFER S. GOLDSTEIN

Associate General Counsel

LORRAINE C. DAVIS

Assistant General Counsel

s/Julie L. Gantz

JULIE L. GANTZ

Attorney

Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission

Office of General Counsel

131 M St. N.E., 5th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20507

(202) 663-4718

julie.gantz@eeoc.gov

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation and typeface and type style requirements set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 28.1(e)(2) and Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(5) and (a)(6). I certify that this brief was prepared with Microsoft Office Word 2010 and uses Palatino Linotype, size 14 point. I further certify that the entirety of this brief contains 9,141 words, as determined by the Microsoft Word 2010 word count function.

s/ Julie L. Gantz_______________

JULIE L. GANTZ

Attorney

Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission

Office of General Counsel

131 M St. N.E., 5th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20507

(202) 663-4718

julie.gantz@eeoc.gov

Dated: February 10, 2016

[1] “RE-T.[#]” refers to the tabbed material in the EEOC’s Record Excerpts. “ROA.[#]” refers to the paginated, certified Record on Appeal.

[2] Indeed, if an individual’s application for short-term disability benefits due to a temporary inability to work could be viewed as an admission that she was not qualified under the ADA, an employer would never have to provide leave as a reasonable accommodation. Yet “‘allowing a medical leave of absence might, in some circumstances, be a reasonable accommodation.’” Reed v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., No.12-2758, 2014 WL 1978990, at *3 (E.D. La. 2014) (quoting Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 2008)). Short-term disability benefits and limited leave under the ADA achieve the same purpose in allowing a temporarily disabled individual to recover from a medical condition and return to work. The contention that Chambers’ application for short-term disability benefits renders her unqualified is particularly weak given that she applied for benefits only after River Region refused the additional two weeks of leave she requested, ignored her request to return to work with minor modifications, and then fired her. See DeRosa v. National Envelope Corp., 595 F.3d 99, 101, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2010) (plaintiff applied for SSDI only after his employer withdrew an existing accommodation that had allowed him to work and then terminated his employment; court of appeals held that the plaintiff adequately reconciled his statement in his SSDI application that he could not work with his contention, in his ADA lawsuit, that he could have continued working with accommodation).

[3] Moreover, Chambers’ statement that the date she anticipated returning to work was “unknown” is consistent with the fact that she had no job to return to because she had been fired the day before she filled out the application.