TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................... ii

STATEMENT OF INTEREST................................................................ 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE............................................................... 2

PERTINENT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS...... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background............................................................... 2

B. Procedural Background.......................................................... 4

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred in Dismissing Trujillo’s Lawsuit

For Failure to Satisfy the ADEA’s Charge-Filing Requirements........ 6

CONCLUSION...................................................................................... 17

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

ADDENDUM

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Alvarado v. Board of Trustees,

848 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1988).......................................................... 8, 11

Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co.,

773 F.2d 857 (7th Cir. 1985).............................................................. 8

Downes v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,

41 F.3d 1132 (7th Cir. 1994).............................................................. 7

EEOC v. K-Mart Corp.,

796 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986).............................................................. 7

EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd.,

767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014)................................................. 8-10

Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki,

552 U.S. 389 (2008)................................................................. 8, 14-15

Hamm v. Members of Board of Regents of the.State of Florida,

708 F.2d 647 (11th Cir. 1983)..................................................... 11-12

Hendrick v. Almar Inc.,

No. 09-139, 2009 WL 3152084 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2009).................. 10

Holender v. Mutual Industries North Inc.,

527 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2008)............................................................. 15

Jones v. UPS, Inc.,

502 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2007)........................................................ 15

Kaplan v. Int’l Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees,

525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.1975)............................................................. 8

Scales v. Sonic Industries, Inc.,

887 F. Supp. 1435 (E.D. Okla. 1995)................................................ 10

Sedlacek v. Hach,

752 F.2d 333 (8th Cir. 1985)......................................................... 15-16

Steffen v. Meridian Life Insurance Co.,

859 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1988)..................................................... 7, 8, 15

Tamayo v. Blagojevich,

526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008).......................................................... 13

Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp.,

270 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2001)........................................................ 15

Statutes, Regulations, and Rules

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,

29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq............................................................... passim

29 U.S.C. § 626(d).................................................................. 1, 6-7, 13

29 U.S.C. § 626(e)........................................................................ 6, 13

29 C.F.R. § 1626.3................................................................................. 6

29 C.F.R. § 1626.6............................................................................... 6-7

29 C.F.R. § 1626.8............................................................................... 7. 9

29 C.F.R. § 1626.18.............................................................................. 13

29 C.F.R. § 1626.22(a)............................................................................ 8

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a).............................................. 1

Other Authority

https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm....................... 1

STATEMENT OF INTEREST

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“Commission” or “EEOC”) is charged by Congress with interpreting and enforcing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and certain other federal antidiscrimination laws. Like most of the statutes the EEOC enforces, the ADEA requires employees alleging discrimination to file charges with the EEOC before bringing suit against an employer, and the statute obligates the Commission to notify employers of those charges and to attempt to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice through informal methods. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)-(2). Because the Commission typically receives some 80,000 charges annually, see https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/all.cfm, charge-processing errors sometimes do occur. Here, although the plaintiff filed a charge, the Commission misidentified the employer and therefore never notified the true employer of the plaintiff’s charge. Holding that such notice is required, the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s ADEA action. That ruling, if allowed to stand, not only would harm the plaintiff but also could undermine enforcement of the antidiscrimination laws. The Commission therefore offers its views to this Court. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(a).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE[1]

Did the district court err in dismissing Trujillo’s suit under the ADEA for failure to satisfy the ADEA’s charge-filing requirements?

PERTINENT STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

Pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions are included in the addendum to this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Humberto Trujillo, a former store manager, alleges that he was terminated because of his employer’s decision to replace older employees with younger ones in an effort to attract younger buyers. Short Appendix (“SA”) 1.[2] After his termination, Trujillo filed a charge with the EEOC, alleging age discrimination and retaliation. See Dkt. 43-1, at 3.[3] The charge listed the name, address, and phone number of the store where Trujillo worked — Ashley Furniture HomeStore, South Cicero Avenue, in Burbank, Illinois. Id.; SA 1. The legal name of Trujillo’s employer is Rockledge Furniture LLC, but the charge did not use that name. SA 1, 5-6; Dkt. 43, at 2; Dkt. 43-1, at 3. Significantly, however, Rockledge Furniture LLC is registered in Illinois as doing business under the name “Ashley Furniture HomeStore – Rockledge.” Dkt. 43, at 2; Dkt. 43-5, at 10.

Instead of investigating the Illinois address and phone number listed on Trujillo’s charge, the EEOC used its “Digital Charge System” to provide electronic notice of the charge to a Texas-based company that also appeared to use the name Ashley Furniture HomeStore. Dkt. 43-2, at 9; SA 1-2. That company responded that Trujillo had never been one of its employees. SA 2. The EEOC investigator later contacted Trujillo’s attorney and requested additional information about the employer so that the EEOC could “serv[e] his charge [on] the correct Respondent.” Dkt. 43-2, at 19; SA 2. The attorney promptly responded with the legal name of Trujillo’s employer — Rockledge Furniture LLC — and supplied one of Trujillo’s pay stubs containing Trujillo’s name as well as the legal name and address of the company. SA 2; Dkt. 43-2, at 17-19. Nevertheless, the EEOC dismissed the charge on the ground that Trujillo was never an employee of the Texas-based company, and it notified Trujillo of his right to bring an ADEA suit. SA 2; Dkt. 43-1, at 2.

B. Procedural Background

Trujillo filed suit against Rockledge Furniture LLC, alleging age discrimination and retaliation in violation of, inter alia, the ADEA. See Dkt. 1. In an amended complaint, three additional plaintiffs were added. SA 5 n.1. The defendant moved to dismiss Trujillo’s ADEA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the district court granted the motion. SA 8-13.

The district court explained that “a party not named in the [EEOC] charging document is not normally subject to subsequent civil suit.” SA 9. The court acknowledged that Trujillo’s EEOC charge was filed against “Ashley Furniture HomeStore” and that one of Rockledge’s assumed names — as registered with the state of Illinois — was “Ashley Furniture HomeStore – Rockledge.” SA 10-11 (citation and emphasis omitted); cf. SA 12 (noting these names were “almost identical”). The court also observed that Trujillo’s charge “listed a Rockledge-owned location by address and phone number.” SA 11. The court nonetheless determined that Trujillo’s charge was insufficient because it “did not accurately identify Rockledge either by its registered actual or assumed names.” SA 11. And “[e]ven though Trujillo supplied additional information [to the EEOC after filing his charge] identifying Rockledge as the employer,” Trujillo was barred from bringing suit because “Rockledge [n]ever had actual notice of the charge.” SA 10. Notice to the employer and an opportunity to conciliate, the court stated, are the two purposes of the charge-filing requirement. SA 9. And, the court added, notice to the employer is “required.” SA 10.

The district court explained that this Court has recognized an exception to the general requirement that a defendant be named in the EEOC charge when the defendant had actual notice of the charge. SA 11. The court concluded, however, that this exception did not apply in this case because Rockledge Furniture was never notified of Trujillo’s charge. SA 11-13.

The plaintiffs filed another amended complaint, but the district court again dismissed Trujillo’s ADEA claims. SA 1-3. The court concluded that he “fail[ed] to allege any new facts that singularly or collectively show how Rockledge was either appropriately named as a party in the EEOC charge, or how they had notice of the EEOC charge.” SA 2. Finding no just cause for delay, the court entered final judgment on Trujillo’s claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). SA 15-16. Trujillo later moved for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but the district court denied the motion. Short Appendix 1-4 (7th Cir. No. 19-1651). Trujillo filed appeals from the final judgment and the denial of his post-judgment motion, and this Court consolidated the appeals on April 10, 2019.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Erred in Dismissing Trujillo’s Lawsuit

For Failure to Satisfy the ADEA’s Charge-Filing Requirements.

The district court erred in dismissing Trujillo’s suit under the ADEA for failure to satisfy the ADEA’s charge-filing requirements. Trujillo’s charge, alone and as clarified by his response to the Commission’s follow-up inquiry, provided the Commission with ample information to identify his employer and process his charge. That the Commission made a mistake in processing his charge does not affect Trujillo’s ability to proceed with his lawsuit in federal court.

1. As a general rule, employees seeking to challenge alleged age discrimination and retaliation must file a “charge” with the Commission and wait 60 days before filing suit under the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). If the Commission dismisses such a charge, it must notify the person aggrieved, and the person can file a civil action “against the respondent named in the charge” within 90 days of receiving the notice. Id. § 626(e).

The Commission’s regulations define an ADEA “charge” to mean a “statement filed with the Commission” alleging that “the named prospective defendant” has violated — or is about to violate — the ADEA. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.3. As defined by the Commission, at a minimum, a charge must be in writing, “name the prospective respondent,” and generally allege the discriminatory acts. Id. § 1626.6. A charge “should” — but need not — also contain, among other things, the “full name and address of the person against whom the charge is made.” Id. § 1626.8(a)(2), (b).

Upon receiving a charge, the ADEA requires the Commission to serve notice on “persons named in such charge as prospective defendants” and to “seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.” 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2). “‘The purpose of the charge-filing requirement’” is therefore “‘to provide the EEOC with sufficient information to notify [the] employer that it has been charged with discrimination and to provide the EEOC with the opportunity to investigate . . . [and] to eliminate any unlawful practice through informal conciliation.’” Downes v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534, 542 (7th Cir. 1988)); see also EEOC v. K-Mart Corp., 796 F.2d 139, 141 (6th Cir. 1986) (noting the “function” of a charge is “to place the EEOC on notice that [the person claiming to be aggrieved] believes that an employer has violated the [statute]”). Accordingly, in determining whether an individual has satisfied the charge-filing requirements, the focus should be on the information the individual provided to the Commission, not on what, if anything, the EEOC actually did with the information. See, e.g., Steffen, 859 F.2d at 544 (“The EEOC’s failure to act on a charge . . . does not bar a person from maintaining an ADEA action.”).

Consistent with this authority, courts “liberally construe” the requirement that employees adequately identify their employer in their EEOC charge so as not to “frustrate claimants with needless procedural roadblocks.” EEOC v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.22(a) (EEOC’s ADEA regulations should also be “liberally construed”). Similarly, courts have held that EEOC charges “must be construed with utmost liberality since they are made by those unschooled in the technicalities of formal pleading.” Alvarado v. Bd. of Trs., 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting Kaplan v. IATSE, 525 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1975)) (evaluating whether charge adequately named an employer); see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 406 (2008) (“Documents filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to the extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the employee’s rights and statutory remedies.”); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 864 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1985).

The only respect in which the district court found Trujillo’s actions before the EEOC to be deficient was Trujillo’s asserted failure to adequately inform the EEOC that he was pressing claims against his employer, which uses the legal name Rockledge Furniture LLC. SA 10-11. Under the standards just described, however, Trujillo’s charge — standing alone or when coupled with his follow-up communications with the EEOC — adequately identified his employer.

Although Trujillo’s original charge did not state the legal name of his employer (Rockledge Furniture LLC), the document used the name under which the employer operated (Ashley Furniture HomeStore), which is “almost identical” to the trade name the employer had registered with the state of Illinois (Ashley Furniture HomeStore—Rockledge). Dkt. 43-1, at 3; Dkt. 43-5, at 10; SA 1; SA 12 (district court decision noting these names were “almost identical”). Moreover, Trujillo correctly identified the address and phone number of the Ashley Furniture HomeStore at which he worked, thus distinguishing his employer from other employers operating stores with the same name. Dkt. 43-1, at 3; SA 1. The district court’s conclusion that his charge was nonetheless insufficient thus rests on the kind of “hypertechnical reading[]” of the charge that courts have rejected. Simbaki, 767 F.3d at 481; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1626.8(a)(2), (b) (noting that a charge “should” — but need not — contain the “full name” of the “person against whom the charge is made”).

Most pertinent here, courts have explained that where an employee uses only the company’s trade name in a charge, that may suffice, at least where, as here, other information would allow correct identification of the employer. In Simbaki, for example, two employees filed charges against an employer identified by its trade name. The trade name, however, was used by two distinct entities, and so the court had to decide which entity — or entities — were at issue in the charge. The court held that the charge should be interpreted to identify one of those entities — but not the other — based on “multiple indications in the charges” that the employees were referring to the entity in question, including the charge’s use of the entity’s address and its identification of the owner of the entity. 767 F.3d at 481-82. Here, as in Simbaki, the Trujillo charge’s use of a close variant of Rockledge’s trade name (Ashley Furniture HomeStore), together with its inclusion of the store’s address and phone number, left no question as to which Ashley Furniture HomeStore was at issue in the charge. See also, e.g., Hendrick v. Almar Inc., No. 09-139, 2009 WL 3152084, at *1 (D. Me. Sept. 28, 2009) (charge using trade name satisfied administrative pleading requirement); Scales v. Sonic Indus., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 1435, 1437-38 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (charge using trade name “Sonic Drive-in” was sufficient notice to employer, Sonic Industries).

Other decisions have rejected analogous hypertechnical readings of charges. For example, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a plaintiff’s “quite natural” identification of his employer as “Montgomery Community College,” rather than the legal name “Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College,” accomplished the goals of the charge-filing requirement. See Alvarado, 848 F.2d at 460-61. Similarly, here, Trujillo’s quite natural decision to name the store where he worked — Ashley Furniture HomeStore — along with its Illinois address and phone number accomplished the goals of the charge-filing requirement. At a minimum, that information would have enabled the Commission to serve notice on the store and begin investigating the allegations in the charge. And, tellingly, the defendant does not argue that Rockledge Furniture LLC and the Burbank, Illinois, Ashley Furniture HomeStore are legally distinct entities or that any EEOC notice sent to the Illinois store would not have put Rockledge on notice of the charge. Cf. Dkt. 43, at 2 (operative complaint) (stating that Rockledge “owned” and “operated” the “Ashley Furniture HomeStore” at which Trujillo worked).

In any event, even if it were not clear from the charge exactly which entity Trujillo meant to proceed against, he remedied any confusion when, in response to the EEOC’s inquiry, his counsel supplied one of Trujillo’s pay stubs with the legal name and address of Rockledge Furniture LLC. SA 2, 6; Dkt. 43-2, at 17-19. That information unquestionably identified Rockledge Furniture as the entity against which Trujillo sought to assert his allegations. And the defendant has never suggested that such information may not be considered in evaluating whether Trujillo adequately identified Rockledge as his employer during the EEOC proceedings. Cf., e.g., Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 650 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that courts must look at “the scope of an EEOC investigation which could have reasonably grown out of this administrative charge” in evaluating whether defendants were adequately identified during the EEOC proceedings).

2. As just explained, Trujillo’s original charge, coupled with the follow-up information he provided to the EEOC, satisfied all of the ADEA’s charge-filing requirements. Trujillo therefore should have been allowed to proceed with his ADEA lawsuit.

The district court reached a contrary conclusion based both on a hypertechnical reading of Trujillo’s charge and on the court’s apparent conclusion that Trujillo was barred from bringing an ADEA suit because the EEOC had not notified Rockledge of his EEOC charge. Indeed, the court acknowledged that Trujillo “supplied additional information [to the EEOC after filing his charge] identifying Rockledge as the employer,” but the court held that this information was not sufficient because “Rockledge [n]ever had actual notice of the charge.” SA 10. In the court’s view, such notice is “required.” Id.

The court erred in determining that a precondition to a private ADEA lawsuit is that an employer receive actual notice of the EEOC charge.[4] That this was error follows directly from the governing statutory text, which imposes only two pertinent requirements on an employee who wishes to file an ADEA action: (1) he must file a charge with the Commission and wait 60 days before filing suit; or (2) if the Commission notifies him that it has dismissed his charge, he must file his civil action within 90 days of receiving the Commission’s notice. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), (e); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1626.18. Although the ADEA obligates the Commission to notify the pertinent employer of charges filed against it and to seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practices by informal methods, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2), Congress did not make the Commission’s compliance with those requirements a precondition to suit by an employee.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (2008), confirms this reading of the statute. In Holowecki, the Court agreed with EEOC’s conclusion that, on the facts of that case, an “Intake Questionnaire” that an employee had submitted to the EEOC, coupled with a supporting affidavit, should be considered an ADEA charge. Id. at 404-06. In reaching that conclusion, the Court rejected an argument that “the definition of charge, and hence an employee’s ability to sue,” should be “condition[ed] . . . upon the EEOC’s fulfilling its mandatory duty to notify the charged party and initiate a conciliation process.” Id. at 403. The Court explained that “[t]he statute requires [an] aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual’s right to sue upon the agency taking any action.” Id. at 403-04. The Court thus allowed the plaintiff to pursue her ADEA action even though EEOC never notified the employer of the charge; the employer first learned of the allegations when the plaintiff filed suit. Id. at 407.

As Holowecki stated, where, as here, the Commission fails to provide employers with notice of a charge, both the plaintiff and the employer lose the intended benefits of the charge-filing requirements. 552 U.S. at 407. That “result is unfortunate, but, at least in this case, unavoidable.” Id. It does not make the charge insufficient nor does it prevent the plaintiff from challenging the alleged discrimination in court.

Other courts before and after Holowecki have agreed that plaintiffs should not be penalized for EEOC’s faulty charge processing. For example, where EEOC provided confusing information about the sufficiency of the charging party’s filing and then refused to treat the filing as a charge, this Court stated that “[t]he EEOC’s failure to act on a charge . . . does not bar a person from maintaining an ADEA action.” Steffen, 859 F.2d at 544. Similarly, the Third Circuit, construing Holowecki, concluded that a plaintiff could proceed with her lawsuit because she had filed a document that constituted a charge even though EEOC did not treat it as one. Holender v. Mutual Indus. N. Inc., 527 F.3d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Jones v. UPS, Inc., 502 F.3d 1176, 1185 (10th Cir. 2007) (A plaintiff “should not be penalized for the EEOC’s negligence in handling a charge.”); Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting “reluctan[ce] to condition an action for discrimination on the EEOC’s performance of its duties,” adding EEOC’s inaction will not vitiate a plaintiff’s claim); Sedlacek v. Hach, 752 F.2d 333, 335 (8th Cir. 1985) (“The action or inaction of the EEOC and its failure to attempt conciliation cannot affect a complainant’s substantive rights under [the law].”). The district court’s decision to charge Trujillo with EEOC’s mistake cannot be reconciled with this authority.

Accordingly, the Commission urges this Court to reverse the dismissal of
Trujillo’s ADEA lawsuit. Because the charge, either alone or in conjunction with the clarifying information Trujillo supplied, sufficed to allow the Commission to process Trujillo’s charge, the Court should find that he satisfied the ADEA’s charge-filing requirements. Moreover, the decisions of this Court and others dictate that the burden of the Commission’s administrative error should not be borne by Trujillo. His right to have his ADEA claims heard in court should be restored.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES L. LEE

Deputy General Counsel

JENNIFER S. GOLDSTEIN

Associate General Counsel

SYDNEY A.R. FOSTER

Assistant General Counsel

s/ Barbara L. Sloan

BARBARA L. SLOAN

Attorney

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of General Counsel

131 M Street N.E., 5th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20507

(202) 663-4721

barbara.sloan@eeoc.gov

29 U.S.C. § 626. Recordkeeping, investigation, and enforcement.

. . . .

(c) Civil actions; persons aggrieved; jurisdiction; judicial relief; termination of individual action upon commencement of action by Commission; jury trial.

(1) Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter: Provided, That the right of any person to bring such action shall terminate upon the commencement of an action by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to enforce the right of such employee under this chapter.

. . . .

(d) Filing of charge with Commission; timeliness; conciliation, conference, and persuasion; unlawful practice.

(1) No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. . . .

. . . .

(2) Upon receiving such a charge, the Commission shall promptly notify all persons named in such charge as prospective defendants in the action and shall promptly seek to eliminate any alleged unlawful practice by informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.

. . . .

(e) Reliance on administrative rulings; notice of dismissal or termination; civil action after receipt of notice.

Section 259 of this title shall apply to actions under this chapter. If a charge filed with the Commission under this chapter is dismissed or the proceedings of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the Commission, the Commission shall notify the person aggrieved. A civil action may be brought under this section by a person defined in section 630(a) of this title against the respondent named in the charge within 90 days after the date of the receipt of such notice.

. . . .

29 C.F.R. § 1626.3 Other definitions.

For purpose of this part, the term . . . charge shall mean a statement filed with the Commission by or on behalf of an aggrieved person which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in actions in violation of the Act . . . .

29 C.F.R. § 1626.6 Form of charge.

A charge shall be in writing and shall name the prospective respondent and shall generally allege the discriminatory act(s). Charges received in person or by telephone shall be reduced to writing.

29 C.F.R. § 1626.8 Contents of charge; amendment of charge.

(a) In addition to the requirements of § 1626.6, each charge should contain the following:

(1) The full name, address and telephone number of the person making the charge;

(2) The full name and address of the person against whom the charge is made;

(3) A clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices;

(4) If known, the approximate number of employees of the prospective defendant employer or members of the prospective defendant labor organization;

(5) A statement disclosing whether proceedings involving the alleged unlawful employment practice have been commenced before a State agency charged with the enforcement of fair employment practice laws and, if so, the date of such commencement and the name of the agency.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the charge either a written statement or information reduced to writing by the Commission that conforms to the requirements of § 1626.6.

(c) A charge may be amended to clarify or amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received. A charge that has been so amended shall not again be referred to the appropriate State agency.

29 C.F.R. § 1626.18 Filing of private lawsuit.

(a) An aggrieved person may file a civil action against the respondent named in the charge in either Federal or State court under section 7 of the ADEA.

(b) An aggrieved person whose claims are the subject of a timely pending charge may file a civil action at any time after 60 days have elapsed from the filing of the charge with the Commission (or as provided in § 1626.12) without waiting for a Notice of Dismissal or Termination to be issued.

(c) The right of an aggrieved person to file suit expires 90 days after receipt of the Notice of Dismissal or Termination or upon commencement of an action by the Commission to enforce the right of such person.

. . . .

29 C.F.R. § 1626.22 Rules to be liberally construed.

(a) These rules and regulations shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes and provisions of this Act and any other acts administered by the Commission.

. . . .

[1] The Commission takes no position on any other issue in the case.

[2] Except where noted, “SA” citations are to the Short Appendix attached to plaintiff’s opening brief filed in No. 18-3349.

[3] “Dkt.” citations are to the docket entry number in the district court record. Page numbers in Dkt. citations are the page numbers in the header appended by CM/ECF.

[4] As the district court explained, SA 2, 11-12, this Court has recognized an exception to the requirement that a plaintiff identify a defendant in an EEOC charge. Under that exception, a plaintiff need not name a defendant in her charge if the defendant nonetheless had adequate notice of the charge. See, e.g., Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1089 (7th Cir. 2008). Although adequate notice to a defendant may therefore be sufficient to establish that a plaintiff may proceed with her ADEA action, such notice is not required, as explained above. This brief does not take a position on whether this Court’s notice exception applies here, nor is it necessary for this Court to decide that issue.