No

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... i

STATEMENT OF INTEREST................................................................................................ 1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES............................................................................................. 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................................. 2

Statement of Facts.......................................................................................................... 2

District Court Decision................................................................................................... 5

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................... 6

I. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Huri’s Hostile

Work Environment Claim for Failure to Exhaust

Administrative Remedies........................................................................................... 6

II. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Huri’s

Retaliation Claim for Failure to State a Claim.................................................. 13

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................... 20

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES page(s)

Adam v. Miller Brewing Co.,

709 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2013)......................................................................................... 10

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662 (2009)......................................................................................................... 17

Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co.,

773 F.2d 857 (7th Cir. 1985).............................................................................. 6, 10, 12

Baloch v. Kempthorne,

550 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2008)..................................................................................... 15

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 554 (2007)........................................................................................................ 17

Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago,

647 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2011) ........................................................................... 17, 19, 20

Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,

548 U.S. 53 (2006)....................................................................................... 14, 15, 16, 19

Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc.,

288 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 2002)....................................................................................... 12

Chaib v. Indiana,

744 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2014)......................................................................................... 15

Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co.,

31 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1994)........................................................................................... 13

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837 (1984)........................................................................................................... 9

Huri v. Circuit Court of Cook County, et al.,

No. 11-3675, District Court Docket No. 55,

Memorandum Opinion (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2012)............................................... passim

Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll.,

535 U.S. 106 (2002)........................................................................................................... 9

EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods.,

486 U.S. 107 (1988)........................................................................................................... 9

EEOC v. Shell Oil Co.,

466 U.S. 54 (1984)................................................................................................... 7, 9, 11

Ellis v. Houston,

742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014)......................................................................................... 20

Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89 (2007)........................................................................................................... 18

Farrell v. Butler Univ.,

421 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2005)......................................................................................... 10

Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr.,

619 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2010)......................................................................................... 18

Hobbs v. City of Chicago,

573 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2009).................................................................................. 15, 16

Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook,

678 F.3d 560 (7th Cir. 2012)........................................................................... 12, 15, 17

Knox v. Indiana,

93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996)......................................................................................... 19

Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013)....................................................................................... 18

McCauley v. City of Chicago,

671 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011)......................................................................................... 17

McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp.,

92 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996)........................................................................................... 11

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57 (1986)........................................................................................................... 12

Philbin v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc.,

929 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1991)....................................................................................... 8, 9

Stutler v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs.,

263 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2001)......................................................................................... 14

Swanson v. Citibank, N.A.,

614 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2010)................................................................................... 17, 18

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A.,

534 U.S. 506 (2002)......................................................................................................... 17

Tamayo v. Blagojevich,

526 F.3d 1074 (7th Cir. 2008)....................................................................................... 17

Thompson v. Mem’l Hosp. of Carbondale,

625 F.3d 394 (7th Cir. 2010)......................................................................................... 11

STATUTES

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.............................................................................................................. 1

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).............................................................................................................. 15

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) ....................................................................................................... 6, 7, 9

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)............................................................................................................. 6

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a).......................................................................................................... 7, 9

REGULATIONS

29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3)............................................................................................................ 8

29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).......................................................................................................... 8, 10

RULES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a)............................................................................ 1

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)................................................................................ 17

31 Fed. Reg. 10269 (July 29, 1966) ......................................................................................... 8

42 Fed. Reg. 42022-23, 42027 (Aug. 19, 1977)...................................................................... 8

42 Fed. Reg. 47828-29, 47833 (Sept. 22, 1977)...................................................................... 8

Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e)...................................................................................................... 16

Appellant’s Brief in Hobbs v. City of Chicago, No. 07-3591 (7th Cir.)............................ 16

Statement of Interest

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the agency charged by Congress to interpret, administer, and enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Under the express authority Congress conferred on it, the EEOC adopted a regulation that speaks to a key issue in this appeal—whether the EEOC charge that Plaintiff Fozyia Huri filed before initiating this lawsuit satisfied Title VII’s charge-filing requirements. The district court held the charge was inadequate to exhaust administrative remedies for Huri’s hostile work environment claim, but in so holding the court applied a standard that conflicts with the regulatory requirement that a charge need only “describe generally” the challenged practice. The district court also erred in dismissing the retaliation claim. The court applied a standard for assessing retaliation claims that has been rejected by the Supreme Court. The court also held Huri to a standard of pleading beyond what this Court and the Supreme Court have held is appropriate. Because of the importance of these issues to Title VII’s implementation, and pursuant to Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the EEOC offers its views to this Court.

Statement of the Issues[1]

1. Did the district court err in dismissing Huri’s hostile work environment claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies where Huri complied with the EEOC’s regulation requiring that her charge “describe generally” the alleged discriminatory practices?

2. Did the district court err in dismissing Huri’s retaliation claim for failure to state a claim?

Statement of the Case

Statement of Facts

In her Second Amended Complaint, Huri presented the following allegations. Huri alleged that in June 2000, she began working for the Office of the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Cook County as a Child Care Attendant in the Children’s Advocacy Rooms. District Court Docket No. (“R.”) 28 at 3 (Second Amended Complaint). Huri alleged that she is a Muslim of Saudi Arabian national origin, and that at all relevant times she wore a hijab (Islamic head scarf) covering her hair. Id. at 1-2. Huri also alleged that in 2002 the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court appointed Sylvia McCullum to be Executive Director of the Children’s Advocacy Rooms and that, around that time, McCullum learned that Huri was Muslim, not Christian. Id. at 4.

Huri further alleged that for a period of eight years, McCullum treated Huri in a manner that was both hostile and disparaging to Huri’s religious faith. Huri alleged that from 2002 until November 2010, when Huri was transferred to another unit, McCullum “repeatedly made false criticisms of Plaintiff; made false allegations of misconduct against Plaintiff; and subjected Plaintiff to different rules than Plaintiff’s co-workers; screamed at Plaintiff; and subjected Plaintiff to greater scrutiny than Plaintiff’s co-workers.” Id. at 5. During the same period of time, Huri alleged, McCullum repeatedly told Huri that McCullum was a “good Christian” and that another Child Care Attendant, Pauline, was a “good Christian” and a “good church-going Christian.” Id. McCullum also told Huri that the Chief Judge was a “good Christian” and stated that another Child Care Attendant, Gwen Jones, “should work with a ‘good Christian,’ not with Plaintiff, because Plaintiff was ‘evil.’” Id. Huri alleged that these comments and incidents “created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff.” Id.

Huri alleged that on one specific occasion in December 2009, McCullum asked several Child Care Attendants, including Huri, to hold hands. Id. Once they did, “McCullum prayed out loud in the name of Jesus Christ.” Id. Huri contends that “[b]eing involuntarily drawn into a Christian prayer circle created a hostile work environment” for Huri. Id.

Huri alleged that she complained about these incidents to the Office of the Chief Judge, but the “misconduct continued” and “McCullum informed Plaintiff that the Office of the Chief Judge . . . was not interested in Plaintiff’s complaints” and “was tired of Plaintiff’s complaints.” Id. at 5-6. After that, Huri alleged, “McCullum retaliated against Plaintiff by repeatedly making false criticisms of Plaintiff; making false allegations of misconduct against Plaintiff; subjecting Plaintiff to different rules than Plaintiff’s co-workers; screaming at Plaintiff; and subjecting Plaintiff to greater scrutiny than Plaintiff’s co-workers.” Id. at 6.

Huri filed a charge with the EEOC on May 13, 2010, using EEOC “Form 5,” a form the EEOC published for that purpose. R.28-2 at 1. Huri included all of the information the form requests and signed the charge under oath. Id. Huri indicated on the charge form that the discrimination was based on her religion, her national origin, and retaliation, and was “continuing.” Id. In the space the EEOC form provides for “the particulars” of the charge, Huri alleged that she had been “subjected to harassment because of [her] religion and national origin” and had “filed internal complaints” but “the harassment continued.” Id. Huri further alleged that she believed she had been “retaliated against for engaging in protected activity” in violation of Title VII. Id.

Huri was unrepresented by counsel at the time she filed her initial charge. After securing private counsel, Huri filed a second charge on January 10, 2011, alleging additional acts of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, including a written reprimand she received on January 7, 2011. R.28-2 at 3-5. Huri then filed this lawsuit on May 31, 2011. R.1. She filed a Second Amended Complaint on November 10, 2011 referencing both her first and second charges. R.28.

Count I of Huri’s Second Amended Complaint alleges that, based on the facts recited above, the defendant subjected her “to religious and national origin harassment, and retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as amended.” R.28 at 7. Huri also alleged that after she was transferred to the Court Reporters’ Office in November 2010, similar forms of hostile work environment based on religion and national origin, and of retaliation, continued in the new location with Huri’s new supervisors. Id. at 6-7. In addition, Huri alleged that the Administrator of the Court Reporters’ Office “denied [Huri] time off for an Islamic religious observance.” Id. at 7. Huri alleged that, as before her November 2010 transfer, she complained repeatedly to the Office of the Chief Judge about the mistreatment she was experiencing, “but the hostile work environment and retaliation has continued.” Id.

Defendants moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, arguing that Huri’s hostile work environment claim was outside the scope of her EEOC charge and that her retaliation claim was not adequately pled. R.29.

District Court Decision

On April 25, 2012, the district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Huri’s hostile work environment claim on the ground that “Huri failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.” R.55 at 7. The court stated that, “[i]n general, a plaintiff cannot pursue Title VII claims in federal court ‘that were not originally included in the charges made to the EEOC.’” Id. at 5 (citations omitted). The court acknowledged that Huri’s charges contained what the court described as “limited references . . . to alleged harassment,” but stated that they “presented no allegations that would suggest that her work environment included harassment that was so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her employment.” Id. at 6-7 (citation omitted). Stating that Huri’s EEOC charges “did not include . . . allegations regarding her work performance or work environment,” the court concluded that “[t]he alleged hostile work environment is not referenced in the EEOC Charges and is not like or reasonably related to the allegations in EEOC Charges. Thus, Huri failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in regard to the hostile work environment claim.” Id. at 7.

The court also dismissed Huri’s retaliation claim. R.55 at 10. The court acknowledged that “an adverse employment action for the purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim is defined more broadly than for a discrimination claim” and includes conduct that “would discourage other employees from complaining” about Title VII violations. Id. at 9 (citation omitted). The court noted that Huri alleged that after she complained about discrimination based on her religion, she was subjected to “false allegations of misconduct” and “stricter scrutiny than her co-workers” and “was yelled at by supervisors.” Id. at 9-10. The court nevertheless dismissed Huri’s retaliation claim, stating: “Huri has not alleged facts that plausibly suggest that she was subjected to harassment severe enough to cause a significant change in her employment status. Nor has Huri alleged facts to show under the general standard for a Title VII retaliation claim that she suffered harassment that would discourage employees from complaining about employer conduct that violates Title VII.” Id. at 10.

ARGUMENT

I. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Huri’s Hostile Work Environment Claim for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies.

“A [Title VII] plaintiff must file a timely charge with the EEOC encompassing the acts complained of as a prerequisite to filing suit in federal court.” Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773 F.2d 857, 863 (7th Cir. 1985); see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC before pursuing a Title VII claim in court). Huri satisfied this statutory prerequisite here. Prior to filing her lawsuit alleging a hostile work environment based on her religion and national origin, Huri filed two EEOC charges alleging harassment on those same bases. The district court nevertheless dismissed Huri’s hostile work environment claim on the ground that Huri’s charges did not include detailed “allegations regarding her work performance or work environment” or detailed facts to “suggest that her work environment included harassment . . . so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her employment.” R.55 at 6-7. The district court erred, because Title VII and its implementing regulations do not require a charge to contain that level of detail.

Title VII “prescribes only minimal requirements pertaining to the form and content of charges of discrimination.” EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 67 (1984). The act specifies that “[c]harges shall be made in writing under oath or affirmation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b). With respect to the content of such charges and any other aspects of their form besides “in writing” and “under oath,” Congress expressly left the details to the EEOC, stating: “Charges . . . shall contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires.” Id. To this end, Congress directed the EEOC to promulgate procedural regulations to implement Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (EEOC has “authority . . . to issue . . . suitable procedural regulations” to carry out provisions of Title VII).

The EEOC’s regulation indicates the information a charge should contain. The regulation first states that “[e]ach charge should contain . . . [a] clear and concise statement of the facts, including pertinent dates, constituting the alleged unlawful employment practices.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(a)(3). The regulation further provides that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (emphasis added). As this Court noted in Philbin v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1991): “In § 1601.12(b), the EEOC relaxed the requirements [of § 1601.12(a)] by declaring that notwithstanding § 1601.12(a) a charge was sufficient if it was . . . precise enough to identify the parties and generally describe the complained of practices.”[2] Id. at 323 n.2.

In ruling that Huri’s charge was not sufficient to allow her to pursue a judicial claim of hostile work environment, the district court improperly demanded more detail than the “general description” standard set out in EEOC’s regulations. The court cited nothing from Title VII, the Commission’s regulations, or case law to support or explain its conclusion that an EEOC charge must contain a heightened level of detail. These authorities instead demonstrate that the district court erred.

As the Supreme Court noted in Shell Oil, Title VII has never required aggrieved individuals to set out detailed facts in their charge. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 62 n.11 (expressly rejecting the interpretation of some earlier courts that Title VII required aggrieved individuals “to ‘set[] forth the facts upon which [the charge is] based’”) (citations omitted). Rather, as noted above, Congress expressly tasked the EEOC with responsibility for prescribing the contents of a charge of discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), and the EEOC adopted a regulation providing a charge is sufficient if it “describe[s] generally the action or practices complained of.” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b).

Because Title VII’s statutory language does not resolve the “precise question” at issue in this case—i.e., the statute does not specify the level of detail required in an administrative charge—this Court should defer to the EEOC’s regulation. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see also EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988). Indeed, this Court acknowledged as much in Philbin, stating that this Court is “bound to give substantial weight to EEOC’s interpretation of the statute that it administers.” 929 F.2d at 324 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. 837). Such deference is particularly appropriate for the EEOC’s procedural regulations. See Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 120 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (deference to EEOC “particularly appropriate” because the EEOC regulation in question involves a “technical issue of agency procedure”).

Section 1601.12(b) is a reasonable procedural regulation that satisfies the dual purposes behind Title VII’s charge-filing requirement: to provide an employer with notice of the general allegations leveled against it and to provide the EEOC with an opportunity to settle disputes through informal measures before private parties resort to litigation. See Adam v. Miller Brewing Co., 709 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2013); Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 863. An EEOC charge that “describe[s] generally” the conduct being challenged fulfills these dual purposes.

EEOC’s regulatory standard also furthers the remedial purposes of Title VII. As this Court has stressed, enforcement of the statute depends on lay persons who are unschooled in the law and often file their charges unrepresented by counsel. See Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 864 (citation omitted). Consequently, “to effectuate the remedial purposes of Title VII,” this Court applies a “liberal” standard in determining whether a plaintiff’s judicial claims are encompassed by her EEOC charge. Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 864; see also Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2005) (scope of EEOC charge is construed under “a liberal standard”).

Under the EEOC’s regulatory standard, Huri’s allegation of “harassment” in her EEOC charge was sufficient to allow her to proceed with her judicial allegation of hostile work environment. Huri checked the boxes on the charge form indicating she was alleging discrimination on the basis of her religion, national origin, and retaliation, and that the alleged discrimination was “continu[ing].” R.28-2 at 1. In the narrative portion of the charge, she stated:

During my employment, I have been subjected to harassment because of my religion and national origin. I filed internal complaints, however, the harassment continued.

Id. Huri’s charge further explained that she believed this conduct constituted discrimination based on her religion/national origin in violation of Title VII. Id.

These general allegations satisfy Title VII’s charge-filing requirements because although Huri’s charge did not detail all of the specific incidents that she believed comprised the harassment, that level of detail is not required in an administrative charge. As this Court has noted, a “Title VII plaintiff need not allege in an EEOC charge each and every fact that combines to form the basis of each claim in her complaint.” McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 92 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted); cf. Shell Oil, 466 U.S. at 68 (emphasizing that, in assessing whether a charge contains sufficient information, courts should be mindful that “a charge of employment discrimination is not the equivalent of a complaint initiating a lawsuit”).

In holding the allegations of Huri’s charge somehow insufficient, the district court cited only Thompson v. Memorial Hospital of Carbondale, 625 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir. 2010), for the principle that a hostile work environment claim requires “allegations that would suggest that her work environment included harassment that was so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her employment.” R.55 at 6-7. Thompson, however, addressed a district court’s grant of summary judgment after the parties had had the opportunity to develop the facts in discovery. Id. As the EEOC regulation, Shell Oil, and McKenzie set out, an EEOC charge is not required to allege a level of detail that would withstand summary judgment, but need only “describe generally” the challenged conduct.

If the court’s statements can be construed as holding that the allegation of “harassment” does not encompass a judicial claim of hostile work environment, the court is legally incorrect. “Hostile work environment” is a form of harassment which, if sufficiently severe or pervasive, is prohibited under Title VII. See Cerros v. Steel Techs., Inc., 288 F.3d 1040, 1045 (7th Cir. 2002) (a “hostile environment claim falls under the general rubric of harassment at the workplace”); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67 (1986) (hostile work environment is an actionable form of harassment). Thus, Huri’s statement in her EEOC charge that she was subjected to harassment based on her religion and national origin necessarily encompassed her claim of hostile work environment based on religion and national origin. See Jajeh v. Cnty. of Cook, 678 F.3d 560, 567 (7th Cir. 2012) (claim of hostile work environment was properly raised in judicial complaint even though complaint did not use phrase “hostile work environment” but, instead, alleged plaintiff “was subjected to severe harassment because of his religion and national origin in violation of Title VII”). To the extent the district court’s ruling was influenced by the absence of “an exact correspondence between the words of the EEOC charge and the judicial complaint,” the court erred. Babrocky, 773 F.2d at 865-66 (Title VII does not require “‘such specific articulation and miniscule particularity’”) (citation omitted).

After concluding that Huri’s hostile work environment claim was “not referenced in the EEOC Charges,” the district court further concluded that her charge allegations were “not like or reasonably related to the allegations in the EEOC Charges.” R.55 at 7. Given that Huri explicitly mentioned “harassment” in her charge, this case does not involve a “like or reasonably related” issue—her complaint set out the precise issue alleged in her charge. Even if the “like or reasonably related” analysis were relevant here, however, it would not support the district court’s holding. See Cheek v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 1994) (judicial claim is “like or reasonably related” to the allegations of an EEOC charge when the claim and the charge “describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals”) (emphasis in original). Huri’s complaint describes the same conduct and implicates the same individuals as she addressed in her charge.

Because Huri’s charge satisfied Title VII’s exhaustion requirements for her hostile work environment claim, the district court’s judgment should be reversed.

II. The District Court Erred in Dismissing Huri’s Retaliation Claim for Failure to State a Claim.

Huri’s Second Amended Complaint was sufficient to state a claim of retaliation under Title VII. Huri alleges in her complaint that she complained about her workplace mistreatment but was told by her immediate supervisor that the Chief Judge was not interested in her complaints. She further alleges that after having made these unavailing complaints, the mistreatment continued. Her complaint specifies the alleged retaliation, which includes being treated less favorably than non-Muslim employees, being screamed at, being subjected to false accusations of misconduct, and being subjected to false criticisms.

Despite these allegations, the district court dismissed Huri’s retaliation claim. The court offered two reasons for the dismissal. The court stated, first, that “Huri has not alleged facts that plausibly suggest that she was subjected to harassment severe enough to cause a significant change in her employment status.” R.55 at 10; see also id. (“‘[r]etaliatory harassment by co-workers or a supervisor’” can be sufficient to support a retaliation claim when “‘it is severe enough to cause a significant change in the plaintiff’s employment status’”) (quoting Stutler v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrs., 263 F.3d 698, 703 (7th Cir. 2001)). The district court next ruled that Huri did not meet the broader adverse action standard for Title VII retaliation claims, because her complaint did not “allege[] facts to show . . . that she suffered harassment that would discourage employees from complaining about employer conduct that violates Title VII.” R.55 at 10.

The district court did not explain why it assessed Huri’s retaliation claim as one grounded in “harassment,” when the record shows that Huri alleged a range of retaliatory acts. R.28 at 7; R.39 at 5-6. More critically, the district court erred by assessing Huri’s retaliation claim under a standard more stringent than that set out by the Supreme Court in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). To the extent that the district court required more—namely, a showing of a significant change in employment status—the court erred.

Title VII bars an employer from discriminating against any of its employees because the employee “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To prevail on a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must prove that (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action taken by the employer; and (3) either there is a causal connection between the first two elements or she performed her job satisfactorily and was treated less favorably than a similarly situated employee who did not complain of discrimination. Jajeh, 678 F.3d at 569-70, 573; Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d 454, 463 (7th Cir. 2009).

The issue in this case centers on the second prong: a plaintiff must show that the employer took an action that was “materially adverse,” which means that the act “must be such that it would ‘dissuade a reasonable employee from making or supporting a claim of discrimination.’” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68. Actionable retaliation is not limited to employer conduct that results in a significant change in the plaintiff’s employment status. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 64. As this Court recently confirmed, the “materially adverse” showing “is lower than that required for a discrimination claim.” Chaib v. Indiana, 744 F.3d 974, 986-87 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68); see also Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1198 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (an adverse action in the retaliation context “encompass[es] a broader sweep of actions than those in a pure discrimination claim.”). The district court therefore erred in dismissing Huri’s retaliation claim on the ground that she did not allege facts suggesting her complaints were followed by retaliation “severe enough to cause a significant change in her employment status.” R.55 at 10.

In one post-Burlington Northern decision, this Court assessed a retaliatory harassment claim under the old, “severe enough to cause a significant change” in employment status standard. Hobbs, 573 F.3d at 464. The plaintiff in Hobbs had presented separate retaliation and retaliatory harassment claims, id., which Huri did not do before the district court in this case, R.28 at 7; R.39 at 5-6. Moreover, the Hobbs plaintiff argued the retaliatory harassment claim using sex discrimination case law, not Burlington Northern, and did not explain to this Court that Burlington Northern set out a new standard for assessing all retaliation claims.^{^[3]} See Appellant’s Brief in Hobbs, No. 07-3591 (7th Cir.), Docket No. 12 at 15, 30-32.

On appeal in this case, Huri apparently has sought to show the district court’s error by arguing, in part and for the first time, that she is alleging retaliatory harassment “pervasive enough to cause a significant change in her employment status.” Huri Brief at 22. Although this language tracks the district court’s decision, it is not the correct legal standard. Burlington Northern supplies the only applicable standard.[4]

Applying the Burlington Northern standard, Huri satisfied her pleading requirements. The Supreme Court has held that a Title VII plaintiff need not plead specific facts in her complaint establishing each separate element of her prima facie case. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-13 (2002) (plaintiff not required to plead elements of prima facie case of employment discrimination to defeat motion to dismiss); see also Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 647 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (Title VII retaliation plaintiff is “not required to plead with precision legal theories or detailed facts”); Jajeh, 678 F.3d at 567 (Title VII plaintiff “not required to plead with precision legal theories or detailed facts”) (citation omitted). Rather, at the pleading stage, Huri was required only to provide the defendants “sufficient notice to enable [them] to begin to investigate and prepare a defense.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1085 (7th Cir. 2008) (plaintiff not required to plead evidence to support her Title VII claim of discrimination based on sex and retaliation); Jajeh, 678 F.3d at 566 (“Under the notice-pleading standard of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Granted, “[a] ‘formulaic recitation of the cause of action’” is “insufficient to state a claim under [Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554 (2007)] and [Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)].” McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). Where a plaintiff’s claim is relatively uncomplicated and straightforward, however, the complaint need only “give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). A complaint that identifies who discriminated against plaintiff, the type of discrimination that occurred, and when the discrimination took place is sufficient to satisfy Twombly/Iqbal. See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 405; see also Hatmaker v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 619 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2010) (Title VII complaint must “allege facts sufficient to show that the case is plausible”) (citing Twombly and Iqbal); Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1028 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that the pleading standards in Title VII cases are different from the evidentiary burden a plaintiff must subsequently meet” at later stages of litigation.).

Assuming Huri’s factual allegations are true, as the district court must, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), Huri’s complaint provided sufficient details to support her retaliation claim and defeat Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Huri identified herself as a Muslim of Saudi Arabian national origin and asserted that, at all relevant times, she wore a hijab covering her hair. R.28 at 2-3. She alleged that from 2002 through 2010, McCullum, the director of the unit for which Huri worked, repeatedly subjected Huri to anti-Muslim comments, forced her to join a Christian prayer circle, screamed at Huri, and subjected Huri to false criticisms, false allegations of misconduct, different rules, and greater scrutiny than McCullum subjected Huri’s co-workers. Id. at 5.

Huri further alleged that she repeatedly complained to the Office of the Chief Judge “about the religious comments, the prayer circle, and the other oppressive terms and conditions of her employment,” but McCullum’s misconduct continued and McCullum informed Huri that “the Office of the Chief Judge . . . was not interested in Plaintiff’s complaints and was tired of Plaintiff’s complaints.” Id. at 5-6. And Huri alleged that following her complaints to the Office of the Chief Judge, “McCullum retaliated against Plaintiff” by repeatedly engaging in the same conduct of false criticisms, false allegations of misconduct, screaming at Huri, and subjecting her to greater scrutiny and different rules than her co-workers. Id. at 6.

Huri also alleges that in November 2010 she was transferred to the Cook County Circuit Court Reporters’ Office. Id. She alleges that her new supervisors in that office subjected her to similar forms of retaliation that she details in her complaint, including, among other things, denying her time off for an Islamic religious observance. Id. at 6-7. Huri further alleges that from November 2010 to the present, the retaliation continued. Id. at 7.

A reasonable employee in Huri’s position may well have found this conduct to be materially adverse. This Court has observed that “context is a crucial consideration in Title VII retaliation actions.” Benuzzi, 647 F.3d at 665; see also Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 69 (legal standard focuses on “perspective of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position” and is based on “general terms rather than specific prohibited acts” because “an ‘act that would be immaterial in some situations is material in others’”) (citation omitted). Workplace retaliation occurs in “forms [that] are as varied as the human imagination will permit,” and for this reason, “[t]he law deliberately does not take a ‘laundry list’ approach to retaliation.” Knox v. Ind., 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (pre-Burlington Northern case). The cumulative mistreatment Huri alleged in her complaint sets forth a plausible claim that she was subjected to conduct that might well deter a reasonable person in plaintiff’s position from complaining of unlawful conduct. See Benuzzi, 647 F.3d at 665 (whether written warning citing “petty misdeeds” was materially adverse best left to jury); Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014) (reversing summary judgment on retaliation claim based on pattern of undesirable reassignments and repeated personnel reports of false, trivial, or unsubstantiated allegations following complaints about racial harassment). Huri’s complaint alleged conduct that falls within the Burlington Northern standard, and the district court erred in dismissing her Title VII retaliation claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we urge this Court to reverse the district court’s judgment and remand this case for further proceedings.

Respectfully submitted,

P. DAVID LOPEZ

General Counsel

CAROLYN L. WHEELER

Acting Associate General Counsel

JENNIFER S. GOLDSTEIN

Acting Assistant General Counsel

s/ Susan R. Oxford

SUSAN R. OXFORD

Attorney

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

131 M Street, N.E., Room 5SW26H

Washington, D.C. 20507

(202) 663-4791; susan.oxford@eeoc.gov

[1] The EEOC’s brief takes no position on any other issue in this appeal.

[2] The sentence in subsection (b) specifying what is sufficient content for a charge has remained essentially unchanged since the EEOC adopted this regulation in 1966. See 31 Fed. Reg. 10269 (July 29, 1966) (adding this language to what was then codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.11). The EEOC initially published its procedural regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations without notice and comment, but re-adopted them in 1977 through formal notice and comment, at which time EEOC re-numbered the section addressing the content of charges from § 1601.11 to § 1601.12. See 42 Fed. Reg. 42022-23, 42027 (Aug. 19, 1977) (proposed regulations); 42 Fed. Reg. 47828-29, 47833 (Sept. 22, 1977) (final regulations).

[3] In any event, because Hobbs may be read to conflict with Supreme Court precedent, this Court may wish to consider expressly overruling it under the procedures set out in Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e).

[4] Because Huri also invoked the Burlington Northern standard, see Huri Brief at 22-25, waiver is not at issue.