This case is about Walmart’s decision to fire Marlo Spaeth, an employee with Down syndrome, rather than provide her a simple scheduling accommodation. Spaeth worked successfully at Walmart for fifteen years, relying on a fixed, predictable schedule that allowed her to take the same bus home each day and have dinner with her sister at the same time each evening. Walmart, however, unilaterally changed Spaeth’s longstanding schedule and fired her due to the resulting attendance infractions despite her repeated requests for accommodation. Even when Spaeth’s sister requested her reinstatement and specifically invoked Spaeth’s right to a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Walmart doubled down on its illegal conduct and upheld the termination.

A jury agreed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) that Walmart’s actions violated the ADA. After hearing poignant testimony that Spaeth experienced depression, confusion, and distress because of the termination, the jury also agreed with EEOC that Spaeth should be awarded compensatory damages. And the jury agreed that Walmart did not simply misunderstand Spaeth’s disability but instead acted with reckless indifference to her rights under the ADA, warranting a punitive damages award. There is no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict.

The district court, however, abused its discretion by subsequently denying almost all of EEOC’s requested injunctive relief. The evidence at trial showed that senior Walmart managers continue to believe that the company’s policies forbid the sort of schedule accommodation Walmart improperly denied Spaeth. Injunctive relief is needed to ensure that similar violations do not recur.

Statement of JURISDICTION

The jurisdictional statement presented in the brief of Defendant Wal-Mart Stores East, LP (Walmart) is complete and correct as to its appeal. As to EEOC’s cross-appeal, this case arises under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), (3)). After EEOC prevailed at trial, the district court granted in part and denied in part EEOC’s motion for injunctive relief on February 22, 2022. R.266.[1] The court entered judgment on March 22, 2022. R.274.

On April 19, 2022, Walmart filed a timely motion for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to remit damages under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59. R.277. The district court denied this motion on November 7, 2022. R.283. Walmart filed a timely notice of appeal on December 7, 2022, and EEOC filed a timely notice of cross-appeal on January 5, 2023. R.289, R.295; see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B), 4(a)(3), 4(a)(4)(A). This Court consolidated the appeals. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

Statement of the Issues

1. Did the jury reasonably find that Walmart was aware of Spaeth’s need for a scheduling accommodation where Walmart managers testified they knew of Spaeth’s disability and associated limitations, Spaeth repeatedly requested her prior schedule, and Spaeth’s sister invoked Spaeth’s Down syndrome and right to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA?

2. Did the jury reasonably find that Walmart acted with reckless disregard to Spaeth’s ADA rights so as to sustain its punitive damages award where there was ample evidence that Walmart’s managers knew of the law’s requirements and Spaeth’s need for accommodation but nevertheless rejected her repeated accommodation requests, terminated her, and refused to reinstate her?

3. Did the district court properly exercise its discretion in declining to remit the $150,000 compensatory damages award, where the jury heard evidence that Spaeth’s termination caused depression and distress and where this Court has upheld comparable awards based on similar facts?

4. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying almost all of EEOC’s requested injunctive relief where Walmart still employs the managers who discriminated against Spaeth and those managers continue to believe that the company’s policies do not permit long-term schedule accommodations?

Statement of the Case

A. Factual Background

1. Spaeth’s Down syndrome and fifteen-year employment history with Walmart.

Marlo Spaeth was born with Down syndrome, EEOC-App.4, a “genetic disorder which varies in severity, but causes lifelong intellectual disability and developmental delays,” Reeves ex rel. Reeves v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 759 F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Individuals with Down syndrome “have cognitive delays” and are typically in the developmental range of a four- to eleven-year-old. EEOC-App.73-74.

Among other limitations, Spaeth’s Down syndrome limits her ability to adjust to change and new routines. Dr. David Smith, a Down syndrome specialist, testified that “[f]or people with Down syndrome it’s especially important to have some routine. . . . And if you take away that routine, that often causes a great deal of stress for them.” EEOC-App.75. Spaeth’s sister and current legal guardian Amy Jo Stevenson explained that Spaeth “doesn’t have the mental faculties to process change. So it’s extremely difficult to change the habits and routines.” EEOC-App.9. When confronted with change, Spaeth “will shut down and try to ignore that we’re trying to change something” or will “get[] frustrated, stressed” and say she’s “too hot.” EEOC-App.9-10. Spaeth is also unable to drive because of her Down syndrome. EEOC-App.8.

In 1999, Spaeth began working at a Walmart store in Manitowoc, Wisconsin, as a sales associate. EEOC-App.5, 18. Spaeth’s mother came with her to the initial interview and to her new-hire orientation and helped with completing paperwork. EEOC-App.19-21. Spaeth was assigned to the domestics department, completing tasks like folding towels, putting away rugs, and tidying items in the aisles. EEOC-App.19, 26. Walmart managers testified that it was immediately obvious to them that she had Down syndrome when they met her. EEOC-App.20, 46, 98; Walmart-App.243.

From the beginning, Walmart took Spaeth’s limitations into account when selecting the managers to whom she would be assigned and the tasks she would perform. HR Coordinator Karen Becker testified that she selected department managers who would be patient with Spaeth and take the time to teach her how to do the job. EEOC-App.20. Becker also explained that, because of Spaeth’s disability, Walmart limited the tasks it assigned her; for example, it chose not to train her to use the cash registers, which required associates in Spaeth’s department to work at unpredictable times. Walmart-App.55.

Spaeth needed a consistent schedule that allowed her to use public transportation, and she generally worked 12:00 to 4:00 p.m. on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday. EEOC-App.7-8, 22-23. The bus did not run on Saturday afternoons and Sundays, and while it ran later on weekdays Spaeth “couldn’t comprehend” how to navigate a different bus schedule on her own. Walmart App.36-37, 49. Becker testified that she knew this original schedule was set based on Spaeth’s inability to drive and the resulting need to rely on public transportation. EEOC-App.22-23. This schedule worked “[p]erfectly” for Spaeth’s routine: she “[w]orked her shift. Caught the bus at the same time to come home, ate dinner, watched the same shows at night every day.” EEOC-App.8-9.

Spaeth worked at Walmart for over fifteen years and earned positive annual performance evaluations and steady raises. See EEOC-App.25-31 (documenting positive performance evaluations and reviewing strong attendance history); EEOC-App.181 (Spaeth was a “pleasure to see every day” and “is here when scheduled”); EEOC-App.180 (describing Spaeth as a “[v]ery hard worker”). Spaeth took great pride in her work at Walmart: “[s]he identified, ‘I’m Marlo, I work at Walmart.’ And in her eyes Walmart needed her.” Walmart-App.24.

2. Walmart changes Spaeth’s shift schedule and she and her sister repeatedly request a schedule accommodation.

Walmart used a computerized scheduling system to generate shift schedules. Walmart-App.224. When Spaeth first started working at Walmart, managers could manually adjust these computerized schedules and did so to allow Spaeth to work her regular schedule. Walmart-App.59, 176, 225. But in 2014, Walmart issued a company-wide directive informing managers that they “were to allow the schedules to be generated and run them as they were generated and not make adjustments to them unless it was a specific business need.” Walmart-App.177; see Walmart-App.225-26. Under this new system, if an employee’s listed availability did not match the shift schedule generated by the computer, that employee would not receive any scheduled hours. Walmart-App.224. Spaeth’s availability form, completed in 2006, listed her available hours as 12:30 to 4:00 p.m. EEOC-App.24, 176. Because the shifts generated by the computer fell between 1:00 to 5:30 p.m., Spaeth “was not getting any hours with the availability” she had listed. Walmart-App.227.

Walmart told Spaeth she would need to work a 1:00 to 5:30 p.m. shift instead of her prior 12:00 to 4:00 p.m. shift. Walmart-App.178, 322-23. Spaeth had difficulty adjusting to this new schedule because of her Down syndrome. She complained to Stevenson that “her hours on her time slip weren’t noon to 4:00 so they were wrong” and worried “she was going to miss her bus if she stayed at work that late.” EEOC-App.11-12. Stevenson called Becker to ask her to “switch [Spaeth’s schedule] back to noon to 4:00” because Spaeth “was getting too hot, she wasn’t able to eat, and she was missing her bus to get home.” EEOC-App.12-13. Stevenson told Becker that “[b]ecause Marlo has Down syndrome she just couldn’t handle working—she couldn’t physically handle working that late” and “asked her to have the hours changed back to noon to 4:00 to restore the order.” EEOC-App.13. Stevenson believed Becker had restored Spaeth’s prior schedule following this call, but instead Spaeth incurred a series of attendance infractions due to leaving her shift early. EEOC-App.13; Walmart-App.179-81, 338-41.

Walmart began disciplinary procedures to address Spaeth’s attendance. At that time, Spaeth’s direct supervisor was an assistant manager named Julia Stern. Walmart-App.43. Above Stern were two co-managers—Bonnie Popp (Ohlsen at the time of trial) and Robin Castro—and above them was store manager Jason Radue, who was subsequently replaced by Kent Abitz in 2015. Walmart-App.42-43. At the regional level was Market Human Resources Manager Lee Spude, who oversaw the Manitowoc store and around twenty others in the region. Walmart-App.43-44, 264-65.

On December 17, 2014, Stern discussed Spaeth’s attendance with her. Walmart-App.185. Stern documented this discussion in an email to higher-level managers, including Castro and Radue. Walmart-App.322-23. In the email, Stern reported that Spaeth said “she only works 12-4” and expressed “concern[] that if she did not eat supper on time that she would get sick, and that she wanted to talk to her sister about her schedule.” Walmart-App.322. Stern responded that Spaeth “should be able to work the shifts that are generating as it would not be fair to adjust the shift times for her and not for other associates” and that “if she does not want the shifts that are available then they should be given to someone who will appreciate the hours and is productive.” Walmart-App.322.

A month later, Stern held a coaching session with Spaeth about her attendance. Following that session, Stern emailed Castro, Radue, and Ohlsen and forwarded both this email and the December 17 email to Becker. Walmart-App.322-23. Stern reported that Spaeth “wanted to know why she can’t just work noon to 4 like she used to” and “said she was afraid she would miss the bus.” Walmart-App.323. According to Stern, Spaeth sat and stared with her head down during these discussions, as though she might be crying. EEOC-App.99.

On February 16, Ohlsen filled out a new employee-availability form that she had Spaeth sign. EEOC-App.107. This new form listed Spaeth’s available hours as 12:00 to 6:00 p.m. EEOC-App.175. Ohlsen agreed that it was not Spaeth’s idea to change her end time to 6:00 p.m. and that Ohlsen told Spaeth she had to sign the form to get hours.[2] EEOC-App.108, 112.

Stern testified that, each time she spoke with Spaeth about her attendance, Spaeth said she wanted to work noon to 4:00 like she used to. EEOC-App.94. Castro agreed that such statements amounted to a request for a schedule accommodation according to Walmart’s policies, EEOC-App.51, which provide that associates can request accommodation verbally or in writing, can do so on their own or through a family member, and need not “include any specific words such as disability, reasonable, or accommodate.” EEOC-App.196. Once an associate requests an accommodation, the manager must “provide the associate a request for accommodation packet as soon as reasonably possible, certainly within two days.” EEOC-App.222. That manager “cannot approve or deny associates’ requests for accommodation” but must instead “forward all accommodation requests to HR personnel since they are the only group authorized to process and resolve” accommodation requests. EEOC-App.198. HR personnel, in turn, cannot deny an accommodation request on their own but instead “must obtain agreement of the Accommodations Service Center”—a nationwide center for all of Walmart operating out of Walmart’s headquarters—before proceeding with a denial. EEOC-App.131-32, 226.

Walmart managers agreed that the company’s policies dictated these procedures but testified that no one took any steps to consider a potential accommodation for Spaeth after she repeatedly asked to return to her prior schedule. EEOC-App.47-48, 53-54, 97-98, 118, 154-55. No one offered Spaeth the request-for-accommodation paperwork, which could only be printed by the personnel office rather than independently by an employee. EEOC-App.35-36, 47-48, 98; Walmart-App.255-56. Nor did any Walmart manager escalate Spaeth’s request for a schedule change to the relevant HR personnel or to the Accommodations Service Center. EEOC-App.48, 66-67, 117.

3. Walmart fires Spaeth and refuses to reinstate her.

On July 10, Walmart terminated Spaeth, purportedly based on attendance infractions. EEOC-App.13; Walmart-App.212. Castro, Ohlsen, Spude, and Abitz authorized the termination. Walmart-App.109, 329; EEOC-App.234. When Castro and Stern informed Spaeth of the firing, she broke down crying and they had to call another manager to help soothe her. Walmart-App.212-13, 251-52. When a Walmart manager escorted her out of the store, she said, “I don’t understand.” EEOC-App.119.

Spaeth returned home crying and informed her stepsister and roommate Barbara Barnes what had happened. EEOC-App.83. Barnes and Spaeth called Stevenson to inform her of the termination, but Spaeth was crying and “couldn’t really talk on the phone” so Barnes relayed what had happened. EEOC-App.13-14. Stevenson called Walmart to request a meeting. EEOC-App.15. On July 16, Spaeth, Stevenson, Spaeth’s mother (then her legal guardian), and several Walmart managers met to discuss the termination. EEOC-App.17, 52; Walmart-App.26. Stevenson invoked Spaeth’s right to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA and asked for her to be reinstated under her prior schedule. EEOC-App.17. Walmart managers understood Stevenson to have asserted that Walmart “should have ac[c]om[m]odated [Spaeth] with her schedule due to ADA rules.” EEOC-App.248-49; see also Walmart-App.324 (Castro informed Spude that Stevenson alleged that “[a]ccording to the ADA act [Walmart] should have changed Marlo’s schedule when Marlo asked”); R.247 at 719 (Spude testimony that Spaeth’s rights under the ADA “were put into question by her family” during the meeting).

After the meeting, Spude instructed Castro to cease further communication with Spaeth’s family and contact Walmart’s legal hotline. Walmart-App.324. Abitz opened an investigation into allegations of disability discrimination. EEOC-App.231, 237. Abitz testified that the investigation focused on whether Spaeth violated Walmart’s attendance policy. Walmart-App.260. Abitz never interviewed Spaeth or Stevenson during the investigation and never discussed a potential schedule accommodation with any Walmart managers. Walmart-App.262-63; EEOC-App.128-29. Abitz ultimately recommended upholding Spaeth’s termination. EEOC-App.129.

Spude oversaw Abitz’s investigation and also upheld the decision to terminate Spaeth. Walmart-App.280; EEOC-App.152. Spude testified during his deposition, as Walmart’s 30(b)(6) deponent, that the investigation “considered . . . whether or not a modified schedule [was] an option of any kind” but that a final decision “never came to fruition because Walmart decided not to reinstate Spaeth and “an associate who is not reinstated has no need for a schedule of any kind.” EEOC-App.81-82. At trial, however, Spude testified contradictorily that “at no point” during the investigation did Walmart interpret the issue as “an accommodation request.” EEOC-App.162.

Denise Morgan, an ethics manager at Walmart’s national headquarters, signed off on this investigation and upheld the termination. EEOC-App.71, 235. Morgan determined that Walmart had been too lenient in its treatment of Spaeth and “should have . . . terminated [her] at 7 [absences].” EEOC-App.235 (Executive Summary). The only follow-up action she deemed appropriate was to counsel certain Walmart managers on the need to be even stricter in applying the company’s attendance policy. EEOC-App.235.

Stevenson “repeatedly” called Walmart to find out the company’s decision on reinstatement. Walmart-App.20. Walmart eventually informed Spaeth that it would not reinstate her. EEOC-App.61.

Following Spaeth’s termination, Walmart promoted Spude to Regional People Director of Region 53, which comprises 114 stores (including the Manitowoc store) and approximately 30,000 associates. EEOC-App.140, 149; Walmart-App.264. Morgan remains ethics manager at Walmart’s national headquarters. EEOC-App.71 (deposition testimony read at trial). Abitz remains store manager of the Manitowoc store. EEOC-App.122. And Stern, Ohlsen, and Castro all continue in managerial roles at different Walmart stores in Wisconsin. EEOC-App.65, 85-86, 100, 102.

B. District Court Proceedings

EEOC brought this case alleging that Walmart violated the ADA by denying Spaeth a reasonable accommodation, discharging her, and failing to reinstate her because of her disability or need for accommodation. R.1 at ¶ 22.

1. Jury trial

During the four-day jury trial, EEOC presented the evidence outlined above that Spaeth repeatedly requested a return to her prior work schedule and that Stevenson specifically invoked Spaeth’s Down syndrome and right to a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. The jury also heard evidence that Walmart’s managers knew Spaeth had Down syndrome, were familiar with her limitations, and observed confusion as Spaeth attempted to adjust to her new work schedule.

During the trial, Walmart managers testified that the company’s policies did not permit long-term schedule modifications and that Walmart never granted such accommodations in practice. EEOC-App.86, 127, 130, 153; Walmart-App.238. They also testified that they believed Walmart’s company-wide directive regarding computer-generated shift scheduling required them to obey those schedules with no exceptions for individual employees’ circumstances. EEOC-App.114; Walmart-App.177. Counsel for Walmart also asserted during closing argument that “[t]he idea that Walmart is going to give somebody a permanent fixed schedule is not something that they do.” EEOC-App.172.

The jury returned a verdict for EEOC on all claims. EEOC-App.282. The jury’s special verdict form reflects its findings that Walmart was aware Spaeth needed an accommodation due to her disability; could have accommodated her without undue hardship; and yet failed to provide a reasonable accommodation, terminated her, and declined to reinstate her in violation of the ADA. EEOC-App.282-83 (Questions 2-6). The jury awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages, EEOC-App.283, although the court reduced the punitive damages award to $150,000 to comply with the statutory cap. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D).

2. Denial of EEOC’s motion for injunctive relief

EEOC filed a motion requesting reinstatement and injunctive measures for a five-year period applicable to: (1) Walmart as a whole; (2) Walmart’s Region 53; and (3) Spaeth specifically. EEOC-App.285-87. The district court granted EEOC’s request that Spaeth be reinstated and that Walmart be required to contact her guardian regarding future coaching, disciplinary, or accommodation issues. SA.25. But the court denied EEOC’s remaining requests for relief. SA.25. On appeal, EEOC is not pursuing any relief as to Spaeth, who declined reinstatement, and is not pursuing its request to enjoin Walmart from engaging in retaliation. The remaining requests challenged on appeal are listed below. EEOC-App.285-86.

Applicable to Walmart as a whole:

(1) Enjoin Walmart from denying reasonable accommodations to

disabled employees in the absence of undue hardship on the ground that the accommodations are indefinite, long-term, or permanent; and

(2) Require Walmart to modify its accommodation policies to

clarify that indefinite, long-term, or permanent accommodations are available to disabled employees in the absence of undue hardship.

Applicable to Walmart’s Region 53:

(3) Enjoin Walmart from failing to provide reasonable

accommodations to employees with disabilities in violation of the ADA;

(4) Require Walmart to provide notice to its employees of the

verdict and injunction and to specifically inform them of the right to contact EEOC without fear of retaliation;

(5) Require Walmart to notify EEOC within ninety days of any

request for accommodation of an employee’s disability and document the steps Walmart took to address the request;

(6) Require Walmart to provide certain training to its managers

and supervisors regarding the obligation to grant schedule accommodations under the ADA and to remind them that a request for a schedule accommodation cannot be denied at the store level; and

(7) Require Walmart to document and evaluate adherence to

Walmart’s EEO policies during the annual review process for certain managers.

In denying almost all of EEOC’s requested relief, the district court recognized that the propriety of injunctive relief turns on “whether the employer’s discriminatory conduct could possibly persist in the future” and that it is the employer that “has the burden of proving that the discrimination is unlikely to continue or that the claimant’s case is somehow different from the norm.” SA.17 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The district court, however, then inexplicably placed the burden on EEOC to demonstrate likelihood of recurrence, finding injunctive relief unwarranted because “EEOC has not shown that the proven illegal conduct may be resumed.” SA.18 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In concluding that Walmart’s illegal conduct was unlikely to recur, the district court relied heavily on its belief that “Walmart’s existing policies” were likely to prevent similar violations in the future. SA.18-19. EEOC pointed to the testimony of Walmart managers insisting that the company’s policies do not permit long-term schedule accommodations. R.252 at 11-14. And Walmart did not appear to dispute that the directive to obey computer-generated shift schedules emanated from a company-wide policy that extended beyond the Manitowoc store. EEOC-App.113, 134; Walmart-App.177. The district court, however, did not discuss this evidence or explain why it was unpersuasive.

The district court’s denial of the requested relief also rested in large part on its misperception that EEOC sought “for the most part, directives that Walmart obey the law,” which the court deemed disfavored. SA.17; see id. at SA.21. The district court did not identify which of EEOC’s requested provisions it believed to be obey-the-law injunctions or why those provisions should be so characterized. The district court also did not analyze whether the factors this Court applies when considering whether an obey-the-law injunction is warranted were present.

3. Denial of Walmart’s post-trial motions

The district court entered final judgment on March 22, 2022. R.274. Walmart filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to remit damages under Rules 50 and 59. R.277. The district court denied this motion. SA.1-9.

The district court first rejected Walmart’s argument that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law or a new trial based on the purported lack of “evidence showing that Walmart was aware that Spaeth’s difficulty adjusting to her new schedule was linked to her Down Syndrome.” SA.3. The court explained that EEOC “presented evidence that Spaeth’s limitations and need for an accommodation were obvious,” including testimony by Walmart managers “that they were aware that Spaeth needed extra support when changes were made to her routine and worked alongside her when she learned new tasks.” SA.4. The court also noted that, prior to Spaeth’s termination, Stevenson had “advised [Becker] that Spaeth could not handle the new schedule because of her Down Syndrome” and, post-termination, had “met with Walmart managers, asking for reinstatement of Spaeth’s position and a schedule accommodation due to Spaeth’s Down Syndrome.” SA.4. The court emphasized that it “was the jury’s responsibility to assess credibility and resolve conflicts in the evidence regarding the obviousness of Spaeth’s need for an accommodation” and that “the jury’s findings” in this respect “were reasonable.” SA.5.

The district court next held that Walmart was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to punitive damages. SA.5. The district court acknowledged Walmart’s argument that its conduct was “based on a good faith misunderstanding of [Spaeth’s] disability” but concluded that “the jury was entitled to reject Walmart’s assertions that it misunderstood its ADA obligations and wanted to help Spaeth.” SA.5. The court explained that “it was not unreasonable for the jury to conclude that Walmart knew that Spaeth’s attendance problems were disability-related, was aware that Spaeth had a federally protected right,” and nonetheless “rejected her request for a reasonable accommodation,” establishing the requisite reckless indifference to sustain the punitive damages award. SA.5-6.

Finally, the district court rejected Walmart’s motion to remit the compensatory damages award to $15,000. SA.7-8. The court found the award to be “supported by ample evidence,” pointing to testimony that Spaeth “experienced distress and confusion immediately following her termination,” exhibited symptoms of memory loss, and was “diagnosed . . . with depression and prescribed anti-depressant medication, which [she] continued to take at the time of the trial.” SA.7-8. The court also rejected Walmart’s argument that the award grossly exceeded those in comparable cases. SA.8.

StandardS of review

This Court reviews the district court’s denial of Walmart’s motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo but with deference to the jury’s interpretation of the facts. Hall v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 298 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2002). Once a jury has ruled against it, the movant “assumes a herculean burden” of showing that “no rational jury could have found for [the nonmovant], even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 213 F.3d 365, 372 (7th Cir. 2000). “Because witness credibility is often crucial in discrimination suits,” this Court “appl[ies] a stringent standard in reviewing the jury’s verdict,” taking “particular[] care[] . . .

to avoid supplanting [its] view of the credibility or weight of the evidence for that of both the jury (in its verdict) and . . . the judge (in not interfering with the verdict).” Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chi., 95 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Although this Court reviews the entire record, “it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury [was] not required to believe.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).

This Court reviews the district court’s denial of Walmart’s motion for a new trial “for clear abuse of discretion.” Emmel, 95 F.3d at 636. This “extremely deferential” standard permits reversal only when the verdict is “against the manifest weight of the evidence,” meaning that “no rational jury could have rendered the verdict.” Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 928-29 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). The district court “cannot grant a new trial just because it believes the jury got it wrong” or “because the evidence was sharply in conflict.” Id. at 928 (citation omitted).

This Court reviews the district court’s denial of Walmart’s motion to remit compensatory damages for abuse of discretion. EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2013). Because “[e]valuating issues as subjective and elusive as emotional damages is a task [left] in the first instance to the common sense and collective judgment of juries,” this Court “defer[s] to their judgment unless the award is ‘monstrously excessive’ or unless ‘there is no rational connection between the award and the evidence,’ and . . . also consider[s] whether the award is comparable to those in similar cases.” Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chi. Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 388-89 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Finally, this Court reviews the district court’s denial of injunctive relief for abuse of discretion. EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1990). This standard permits reversal when the district court applied the wrong legal standard or clearly erred in assessing the evidence. See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 572 U.S. 559, 563 n.2 (2014) (“A district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”) (citation omitted).

SUMMARY OF Argument

Marlo Spaeth loved her job at Walmart. She successfully worked there for fifteen years until Walmart unilaterally changed the longstanding schedule on which she relied because of her Down syndrome and then ignored her repeated requests to restore her prior schedule, terminated her, and refused to reinstate her. After a four-day trial, a jury found that Walmart’s actions violated the ADA, and awarded $150,000 in compensatory damages and $125 million in punitive damages, which the district court reduced to the statutory cap. Walmart now attacks the jury verdict on several fronts. Each should be rejected.

First, the jury reasonably disbelieved Walmart’s argument that it had no idea that Spaeth required an accommodation due to her Down syndrome. Stevenson and Spaeth made Walmart aware of the need for accommodation by repeatedly requesting a schedule modification, with Stevenson specifically invoking the ADA and linking the request to the precise limitations of Spaeth’s Down syndrome. And Walmart’s post-termination investigation makes clear that it understood these requests to be ones for a scheduling accommodation under the ADA. Walmart nonetheless insists these straightforward accommodation requests were insufficient because neither Stevenson nor Spaeth supplied a doctor’s note. But Walmart never requested such medical corroboration, and an employer cannot evade its obligation to engage in the interactive process by ignoring an accommodation request until the employee divines the need to provide medical information the employer never sought. In any event, Walmart agrees medical corroboration is not required where the need for accommodation is obvious. Here, Walmart managers knew of Spaeth’s Down syndrome and her difficulty adjusting to changes in routine generally and to her new schedule specifically. This was more than enough evidence for the jury reasonably to find that Spaeth’s need for an accommodation was obvious.

Second, there is no basis to upset the jury’s finding that Walmart acted with the requisite mental state to sustain a punitive damages award. Walmart claims it simply failed to appreciate that Spaeth needed an accommodation, but the jury found otherwise, concluding instead that Walmart refused Spaeth’s repeated accommodation requests, terminated her, and refused to reinstate her, despite knowing of her need for accommodation and what the ADA requires. This provides ample basis to conclude that Walmart acted in the face of a perceived risk that its conduct would violate the ADA.

Third, the district court acted well within its discretion by declining to remit the $150,000 compensatory damages award. The jury heard detailed testimony from Spaeth and two family members that the termination left her sad, distressed, and confused. And a physician diagnosed Spaeth with depression that he concluded stemmed from the termination and prescribed her medication she continued to take at the time of trial. Given this, Walmart’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the award is unavailing.

This Court should affirm the judgment in all respects but one: it should reverse the district court’s near-complete denial of EEOC’s request for injunctive relief. The district court improperly placed the burden on EEOC to show that the violations here were likely to recur, rather than on Walmart to show that they were unlikely to recur. And the court ignored abundant evidence that Walmart is likely to repeat its violations, including evidence that senior managers still employed by Walmart continue to understand the company’s policies to forbid the sort of long-term scheduling accommodation Walmart improperly denied Spaeth here. The district court also applied the wrong legal standard by subjecting all of EEOC’s requested injunctive provisions to a more stringent standard of scrutiny based on the misperception that they amounted to obey-the-law injunctions.

Argument

I. This Court should affirm the jury’s verdict and award of punitive and compensatory damages.

A. The jury reasonably found that Walmart was aware Spaeth needed an accommodation due to her disability.

The ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate the known limitations of employees with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Employers and employees share responsibility for ensuring reasonable accommodation, such that the process is an interactive one and requires participation by both parties. See Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996). The employee typically has the “initial duty” under this process to, “at most,” “indicate to the employer that she has a disability and desires an accommodation.” EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 803 (7th Cir. 2005). An employee need not use any magic words to fulfill this duty; instead “if it appears that the employee may need an accommodation but doesn’t know how to ask for it, the employer should do what it can to help.” Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996). And employees need not make accommodation requests themselves but can do so through family members or others. See, e.g., Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999) (son requested). Even absent an affirmative request for accommodation, an employer’s awareness is established where the employee’s disability and need for an accommodation are obvious. Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Ekstrand v. Sch. Dist. of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2009).

Once aware of the disability and need for accommodation, the employer is obligated to participate in a flexible, interactive process with the employee. Sears, 417 F.3d at 804. Through this process, “the employer and the employee must work together . . . to determine the extent of the disability and what accommodations are appropriate and available.” Id. An employer’s failure to engage in the interactive process “is not an independent basis for liability” but “is actionable if it prevents identification of an appropriate accommodation for a qualified individual.” Spurling v. C&M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1062 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the jury found that Walmart was “aware that Marlo Spaeth needed an accommodation due to her disability,” so as to trigger Walmart’s obligation to engage in the interactive process. EEOC-App.282 (Question 2). The jury instructions—which Walmart agrees were “proper[],” Walmart Br. 20—provided two paths for the jury to find the requisite awareness. EEOC-App.272. First, Walmart’s awareness could be established if Spaeth, or those acting on her behalf, “ma[d]e [Walmart] aware of any medically necessary accommodation.” EEOC-App.272. Second, if Spaeth’s “need for an accommodation [was] obvious,” this alone would suffice to establish Walmart’s awareness and require it to engage in the interactive process. EEOC-App.272. There was ample evidence for the jury to find Walmart’s awareness under either theory.

1. Stevenson and Spaeth made Walmart aware of the need for an accommodation by repeatedly requesting one.

The jury reasonably could have found that Walmart was aware of the need for accommodation because Stevenson and Spaeth repeatedly requested a schedule modification. To begin, Stevenson twice expressly requested accommodation from Walmart—once before and once after Spaeth’s termination. In her conversation with Walmart’s HR coordinator Karen Becker prior to Spaeth’s termination, Stevenson specifically invoked the limitations of Spaeth’s Down syndrome and requested a schedule accommodation based on these limitations. She explained that “[b]ecause Marlo has Down syndrome she just couldn’t handle working—she couldn’t physically handle working that late . . . .” EEOC-App.13. Stevenson further “told [Becker] that it was a problem for Marlo to be working past 4:00; that she couldn’t do that. She was getting too hot, she wasn’t able to eat, and she was missing her bus to get home. And that we needed to switch it back to noon to 4:00 like it had been.” EEOC-App.12-13.

In her second conversation with Walmart managers following Spaeth’s termination, Stevenson invoked the ADA in requesting an accommodation for Spaeth. Stevenson presented an ADA fact sheet and stated “this is the law, this is the Americans with Disabilities Act, Marlo has rights under this [A]ct, and she’s been asking for a reasonable accommodation.” EEOC-App.16-17. And Stevenson again reiterated the accommodation request by asking Walmart to “give [Spaeth] her job back and her hours of noon to 4:00, four days a week.” Walmart-App.20.

Indeed, there is no doubt that Walmart understood Stevenson to be requesting a reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Walmart opened an investigation into allegations of “disability discrimination” following this conversation, EEOC-App.231, based on its understanding that Stevenson asserted that Walmart “should have ac[c]om[m]odated [Spaeth] with her schedule due to ADA rules,” EEOC-App.248-49; see also Walmart-App.324 (Castro email to Spude explaining that Stevenson alleged that “[a]ccording to the ADA act, [Walmart] should have changed Marlo’s schedule when Marlo asked”); EEOC-App.147 (Spude testimony agreeing that Spaeth’s rights under the ADA “were put into question by her family”). Moreover, Spude testified as Walmart’s 30(b)(6) deponent that the company did in fact consider whether to grant Spaeth the accommodation following this conversation but ultimately decided to uphold her termination instead. EEOC-App.81-82 (answering “yes” to question of whether “Walmart consider[ed] returning . . . Spaeth to her noon to 4:00 schedule as an accommodation” after this meeting but explaining that the decision “never came to fruition because it was decided that she would not be reinstated”).[3] In light of Stevenson’s specific invocations of Spaeth’s Down syndrome and the clear evidence that Walmart understood Stevenson to be making an accommodation request, Walmart’s claim that it “had no reason to think” that the requests for Spaeth’s prior schedule “had anything to do with her disability” is confounding. Walmart Br. 4.

It cannot reasonably be disputed that Stevenson’s actions “ma[d]e [Walmart] aware” of the need for accommodation. EEOC-App.272. Walmart’s own policies acknowledge that an employee’s family member can make an accommodation request. See EEOC-App.196 (providing that “[r]equests for accommodations can be made on an associate’s behalf by someone else” like “[a] family member”). And a family member need not use any “magic words” or specifically invoke the ADA to make such a request, although Stevenson did so here during the post-termination meeting. See Taylor, 184 F.3d at 314 (holding that employee’s son put employer on notice of need for accommodation by informing employer of employee’s diagnosis and need for assistance; emphasizing that “it would be especially inappropriate to insist that [the employee’s] son must have specifically invoked the ADA or used the words ‘reasonable accommodation’”).

It was not only Stevenson who requested a schedule modification. Instead, every time Spaeth was counseled about her attendance, she asked to work noon to 4:00 like she used to. EEOC-App.94 (Stern agreeing that Spaeth made this request “every time” Stern spoke with her about her schedule); Walmart-App.323 (Spaeth “wanted to know why she can’t just work noon to 4 like she used to”); EEOC-App.51 (Spaeth asked Stern and Castro if she could go back to noon to 4:00 schedule); EEOC-App.106 (Ohlsen was aware that Spaeth asked to return to prior schedule).

Walmart claims that it understood Spaeth’s requests for her prior schedule “to be ‘just a comment like anyone else would make that they wanted to go back to their original shift,’” rather than an accommodation request tied to her disability. Walmart Br. 24 (citing Walmart-App.189). But Spaeth did not invoke ordinary complaints that “anyone else would make” when making these requests. Instead, she expressed a “concern[] that if she did not eat supper on time that she would get sick,” a complaint about being “too hot,” a desire “to talk to her sister about her schedule,” and a fear that “she would miss the bus.” Walmart-App.185, 322-23; EEOC-App.50, 106. The jury reasonably could have concluded that non-disabled associates simply seeking to return to a preferable shift would not cite concerns about getting too hot during the winter in Wisconsin, getting sick when eating dinner an hour or two later than usual, missing public transportation that ran well into the evening, or needing to speak with their siblings about their work schedule. And Stevenson put Walmart on notice about the link between these complaints and Spaeth’s Down syndrome long before Spaeth’s termination by referencing many of these same concerns when requesting a schedule change from Becker. Walmart-App.32; EEOC-App.12-13 (telling Becker in pre-termination accommodation request that Spaeth was getting too hot, was not able to eat, and was missing her bus).

Moreover, Walmart trained managers to be alert to the possibility “that an Associate may be having difficulty due to a disability, even if the Associate does not express that specifically” and to always keep in “mind . . . [the] potential need for an accommodation.” EEOC-App.194; see also EEOC-App.197 (“An associate can request an accommodation by casually mentioning that some medical condition or limitation impacts her ability to perform her job.”). Consistent with that training, Castro agreed that Spaeth’s request for her prior schedule amounted to a request for a schedule accommodation “[a]ccording to [Walmart’s] policy.” EEOC-App.51. Based on this evidence, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Walmart managers did in fact understand Spaeth to be requesting an accommodation due to her Down syndrome but nonetheless were tired of having to “cater to [her] needs,” EEOC-App.253, or believed it “would not be fair to adjust shift times for her and not for other associates,” Walmart-App.322.

Walmart claims that Stevenson and Spaeth’s repeated express accommodation requests fell short because they were unaccompanied by medical evidence that Walmart never requested. E.g., Walmart Br. 27-28. In Walmart’s view, unless the need for accommodation is obvious, even an express accommodation request fails when not accompanied at the outset by corroborating medical evidence. See, e.g., Walmart Br. 21 (asserting that “EEOC must show either that Walmart had received medical evidence of this link [between Spaeth’s accommodation request and her disability], or that the link was obvious”) (internal quotation marks omitted). But this is not what the jury instructions say. Instead, the instructions state that, where the need for accommodation is not obvious, the employee or those acting on her behalf must simply “make their employer[] aware of any medically necessary accommodation.” EEOC-App.272. The instructions do not state that the employee must provide medical corroboration to do so. The instructions correctly state the law, and, in any event, Walmart did not challenge them in its opening brief on appeal and has thus forfeited any argument otherwise. See United States v. Banas, 712 F.3d 1006, 1010 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) (arguments not raised in appellant’s opening brief are forfeited).

Walmart appears to agree that it never requested any medical corroboration from Spaeth or her family. EEOC-App.37-38, 117. Nonetheless, Walmart argues that it was free to disregard Stevenson and Spaeth’s accommodation requests because they failed to divine the need to provide medical corroboration that Walmart never asked for. This is not the law. Instead, this Court’s precedent makes clear that the onus is on the employer to request any corroboration it believes necessary, rather than on the employee to foresee the need to provide corroboration at the outset.[4] Indeed, an “employer cannot expect an employee to read its mind” and know that the employer needs further corroboration it never requested. Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1285. Nor can the employer “shield itself from liability by choosing not to follow up on an employee’s requests for assistance, or by intentionally remaining in the dark.” Sears, 417 F.3d at 804; see also Spurling, 739 F.3d at 1061 (employer must ask for clarification if it has doubts or confusion rather than “turn[ing] a blind eye”). Rather, “the employer must ask for clarification” where it needs more information about “the precise nature of the disability or desired accommodation,” Sears, 417 F.3d at 804, as the jury instructions here properly recognize, EEOC-App.272 (“If an employer has a question regarding a request for reasonable accommodation, the employer must undertake to find out an answer to the question.”).

It would be especially problematic to require an employee like Spaeth who suffers from a cognitive impairment to foresee the need to provide medical corroboration that the employer never sought. Instead, it makes particular “sense to place the burden on the employer to request additional information” where an employee’s disability makes it difficult to “effectively relay[] medical information about . . . her condition,” as Spaeth’s disability did here. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 315; see also Cloe v. City of Indianapolis, 712 F.3d 1171, 1178 (7th Cir. 2013) (suggesting that “special circumstances, like a severe cognitive disability or mental illness” bear on the employee’s initial duty to trigger the interactive process), overruled on other grounds by Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016); Bultemeyer, 100 F.3d at 1286 (employer should have asked for clarification rather than “plac[ing] the whole burden of the interactive process on the shoulders of [plaintiff], who is admittedly suffering from mental” illness). Such a requirement does not, as Walmart suggests, require the employer to make “baseless assumptions” about the limitations of disabled employees. Walmart Br. 22. Instead, putting the onus on the employer to request clarification in response to an initial accommodation request serves “precisely . . . the purpose of allowing both parties to act upon information instead of assumptions.” Sears, 417 F.3d at 805.

Walmart’s own policies also reflect its understanding that the company cannot play a game of “gotcha” by declining to request corroboration and then denying an employee’s accommodation request on that basis. Walmart’s policies provide that the company must take action in response to an accommodation request immediately, even in the absence of medical evidence, and that the onus is on Walmart to request additional information if needed. See EEOC-App.201 (instructing managers that “[a]ssociates do not have to present medical documentation up front . . . in order for you to be obligated to forward their requests for accommodation to your HR manager”); EEOC-App.200 (manager should not “[w]ait until the associate brings in appropriate medical documentation” to begin processing reasonable accommodation request but should instead “immediately notify the [HR] manager and assist with the facilitation of the process as needed”); EEOC-App.222 (Walmart senior managers must “ask for medical information, if necessary, within three days of receiving a request for accommodation”).

The cases Walmart cites are not to the contrary. Walmart Br. 21-23. First, this Court’s decision in Ekstrand v. School District of Somerset, 583 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2009), does not stand for the proposition that an employer can disregard an accommodation request entirely until the employee surmises the need to provide medical evidence. In Ekstrand, a teacher with seasonal affective disorder requested a number of accommodations during the interactive process, including a classroom with windows. Id. at 973-74. The employer engaged in the interactive process “in good faith” for months, promptly taking “accommodating steps to resolve” almost all of plaintiff’s requests. Id. at 977. The employer only declined plaintiff’s request for a classroom with windows, which was unaccompanied by medical evidence. Id. at 976-77. Absent such evidence, this Court agreed that the employer had no reason to know that this particular accommodation “was the key to [plaintiff’s] improvement” as compared to the other accommodations it had already provided. Id. at 977. This Court thus simply concluded that the employer did not “act[] unreasonably” by declining to provide the requested accommodation prior to receipt of corroborating evidence, not that the employer had free license to refuse entirely to engage in the interactive process from the outset. Id.; see also id. at 976 (framing question as when “an employer may be required under the ADA’s reasonableness standard to provide” a requested accommodation) (emphasis added).

Nor do this Court’s decisions in Wells v. Winnebago County, 820 F.3d 864 (7th Cir. 2016), or Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co., 47 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1995), stand for the proposition that an employer may simply ignore an accommodation request when unaccompanied by medical evidence the employer never requested (and may not need). In Wells, the plaintiff’s accommodation claim failed because she did not sufficiently “link” her accommodation request “to a qualifying disability,” not because she failed to provide corroborating medical evidence. 820 F.3d at 867 (plaintiff requested a partition and mentioned anxiety but did not make clear that anxiety was a disability or link anxiety to her chronic fatigue syndrome diagnosis). And Hedberg, which involved a disparate treatment rather than failure-to-accommodate claim, merely stands for the “straightforward” proposition that “an employer cannot fire an employee ‘because of’ a disability unless it knows of the disability.” 47 F.3d at 932.

Thus, Walmart could not “simply ignore” Stevenson and Spaeth’s “request[s] for an accommodation until [they] figured out that [Walmart] required medical documentation.” Malas v. Hinsdale Twp. Dist. #86, No. 15-cv-10490, 2019 WL 2743590, at *20-21 (N.D. Ill. July 1, 2019) (rejecting employer’s reliance on Ekstrand where employer never requested medical evidence from employee); see also EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., No. 14-cv-3385, 2022 WL 4596755, at *28 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2022) (employer “could have requested a doctor’s note as part of the interactive process” had it “engaged with [plaintiff]” and thus could not simply disregard plaintiff’s accommodation request based on need for medical evidence).

2. Spaeth’s need for an accommodation was obvious.

Even if this Court determines that Stevenson and Spaeth’s repeated requests for accommodation could not suffice to make Walmart aware of the need for accommodation, the jury could reasonably have found that Spaeth’s “need for an accommodation [was] obvious.” EEOC-App.272. Walmart agrees that no medical corroboration is required when the need for accommodation is obvious. Walmart Br. 21. And the district court determined that EEOC presented sufficient “evidence that Spaeth’s limitations and need for an accommodation were obvious.” SA.4. Walmart has not met its “herculean burden” on appeal to show that no rational jury could reach this conclusion based on the evidence presented. Gile, 213 F.3d at 372.

To the contrary, there was a plethora of evidence that the link between Spaeth’s Down syndrome and her difficulty adjusting to the new schedule was obvious to Walmart’s managers based on their observations and experience working with her. First, the store managers not only knew of Spaeth’s Down syndrome but also knew of the connection between her prior schedule and her disability. See EEOC-App.22-23 (Becker knew Spaeth’s original work schedule was limited by her inability to drive due to Down syndrome and the resulting need to rely on public transportation); EEOC-App.20, 46, 98; Walmart-App.243 (Spaeth’s Down syndrome immediately obvious).

Second, as the district court pointed out, Walmart managers knew that Spaeth “needed extra support when changes were made to her routine.” SA.4. For example, Becker recounted an instance where managers changed Spaeth’s routine by asking her to fold bath rugs. Spaeth’s mother had to call Becker because Spaeth “misunderstood” and became upset, thinking “we wanted her to clean the bathrooms” instead of just organizing the bathroom section of the store. EEOC-App.32. Walmart managers also noted Spaeth’s difficulty with unfamiliar tasks or changes in direction. EEOC-App.245 (Castro indicating that Spaeth “has not liked new managers asking her to do tasks she is not used to doing”); EEOC-App.252-53 (Ohlsen recounting that Spaeth “did not talk to me for weeks after I gave her a change in direction to put returns away”). As the district court noted, Walmart managers also had to “work[] alongside [Spaeth] when she learned new tasks,” SA.4, shadowing her when she learned to process returns. Walmart-App.113; EEOC-App.103-04. Indeed, Becker selected specific managers she thought would be patient with Spaeth and “take the time and teach” her how to perform the relevant tasks. EEOC-App.20.

Third, Spaeth’s behavior following the schedule change put Walmart on notice of her need for accommodation. Castro agreed that soon after the schedule change, it became apparent that Spaeth was not “doing well with the new schedule.” EEOC-App.50. She was regularly clocking in early but leaving prior to 5:30 p.m., and she incurred several attendance infractions in a short period of time. EEOC-App.50; Walmart-App.179-80, 338-41. Contrary to Walmart’s argument, Walmart Br. 7, this behavior was uncharacteristic for Spaeth. While it is true that Walmart’s attendance logs reflect three discrete unauthorized absences in January 2012, the purported incomplete shifts Walmart relies upon consist either of Spaeth working her precise 12:00-4:00 p.m. shift (making it unclear why these shifts are incomplete), or simply clocking in roughly ten minutes before the start of her scheduled shift and clocking out roughly ten minutes before the end of her shift. See Walmart-App.333-34 (listing several “unauthorized incomplete shifts” where Spaeth clocked in at 11:48 or 11:49 and clocked out at 15:49). Under Walmart policy, associates were allowed to clock in up to fifteen minutes early and leave their shifts up to ten minutes early. Walmart-App.244; EEOC-App.126-27. Thus, while Spaeth may have technically clocked out one minute early under this policy on some days (at 3:49 rather than 3:50), this hardly amounts to the “serious attendance issues” that Walmart claims. Walmart Br. 7. Indeed, there is no indication that Walmart considered Spaeth’s attendance to be a problem at the time, given that Spaeth’s 2012 and 2013 performance evaluations reflect no concerns with attendance and in fact indicate that “[s]he is here when scheduled,” EEOC-App.182; see EEOC-App.181-86. Spaeth’s behavior following the 2014 schedule change—regularly leaving her scheduled shift well in advance of completion—was thus out of the norm and should have put Walmart on notice that she needed an accommodation. See, e.g., Lawler v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, 837 F.3d 779, 787 (7th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (Rehabilitation Act) (“school district surely was on notice” that employee needed accommodation where employee’s “job performance . . . decline[d]” absent accommodation); Taylor, 184 F.3d at 314 (where “successive disciplinary meetings began to mount for an employee who had previously performed very well,” it “hardly should have come as a surprise” that employee might want accommodation).

Indeed, while Walmart managers testified at trial that they perceived no connection between Spaeth’s attendance issues and her disability, the contemporaneous evidence reflects the opposite. At the time, Walmart managers expressed concern that Spaeth might not be understanding her schedule change. EEOC-App.243 (Castro indicating she “wanted to make sure [Spaeth] was understanding her [new] schedule” because she “ha[s] a special needs son [her]self” and knew this could be a concern); Walmart-App.63 (Becker often asked Spaeth “do you remember how long you’re supposed to stay today?” following schedule change). Spaeth’s behavior during Walmart’s coaching sessions about her attendance also suggested a lack of understanding. Spaeth would “kind of shut down and wouldn’t talk back” and would sit and stare at the counter in front of her, with her head down, like she might be crying. Walmart-App.187; EEOC-App.99; see Walmart-App.322 (Spaeth “did not say one word the entire time I talked to her—not even a nod.”). Spaeth also exhibited an inability to process the instructions given to her during these discussions. For example, during one discussion, immediately after being reminded that “she is scheduled 1-5:30,” Spaeth responded that “she only works 12-4.” Walmart-App.322. Based on this evidence, the jury easily could have rejected Walmart’s claim that it “had no reason to think” Spaeth’s “attendance issues had anything to do with her disability,” Walmart Br. 8, and found that the need for accommodation was instead obvious to Walmart.

Nor is Walmart correct that Dr. Smith’s testimony somehow defeats a finding that Spaeth’s need for an accommodation was obvious. Walmart claims that Dr. Smith testified that “most people, and ‘most’ members of ‘the medical profession,’ have ‘no idea’ that individuals with Down syndrome have difficulty adapting to change.” Walmart Br. 24-25 (quoting Walmart-App.152-53). But Dr. Smith’s testimony was to the contrary. He agreed that most members of the medical profession have limited knowledge of Down syndrome and “have no idea” about “the many medical problems” and “strengths and . . . weaknesses” associated with that diagnosis generally. Walmart-App.152. But when asked about the specific “tendency of those with Down syndrome to rely [on] routine and repetition,” Dr. Smith identified a specific term that the medical field uses to describe this trait (“groove theory”) and explained that “hundreds of providers of health care for people with Down syndrome will either use the term or something similar to that.” Walmart-App.151-52. In any event, the relevant question here is not what facts any given medical professional can recite about Down syndrome in the abstract but instead what common-sense observations ordinary people could make about the limitations of Down syndrome based on close personal interactions with their colleague over her fifteen-year period of employment. And, with respect to that issue, Dr. Smith agreed that the desire for routine in individuals with Down syndrome is something a person could notice by spending a lot of time with someone with that disability. EEOC-App.76. Dr. Smith’s testimony thus supports rather than undermines the jury’s finding that Spaeth’s Down syndrome-related difficulty with adjusting to her new schedule was obvious to those who worked closely with her at Walmart, triggering Walmart’s duty to engage in the interactive process.

B. The district court correctly sustained the jury’s award of punitive damages.

The jury determined that Walmart acted with reckless disregard to Spaeth’s rights under the ADA and imposed a punitive damages award of $125 million, which the district court reduced to comply with the statutory cap. EEOC-App.277-78, 283. The court denied Walmart judgment as a matter of law on the availability of punitive damages, concluding that “the evidence presented at trial and the jury’s determination that Walmart was aware of Spaeth’s disability but refused her numerous requests for a disability accommodation, terminated her, and declined to reinstate her after Spaeth’s sister referred to the ADA,” entitled the jury to find that “Walmart acted ‘in the face of a perceived risk’ that its conduct would violate federal law.” SA.6 (quoting Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999)). Walmart fails to show that no rational jury could reach this conclusion.

Walmart’s argument that EEOC failed to establish the requisite mental state for punitive damages rests on a refusal to “come to terms with the facts as found by the jury.” Gracia v. SigmaTron Int’l, Inc., 842 F.3d 1010, 1024 (7th Cir. 2016). Walmart insists that it had no idea that Spaeth needed an accommodation and thus, at most, made an “honest mistake about its obligations under the ADA.” Walmart Br. 30-31. But this argument “was soundly rejected by the jury,” and this Court must assess the propriety of punitive damages “by viewing the facts as the jury found them” and determining whether “that version of the facts adequately supports the jury’s award of punitive damages.” Gracia, 842 F.3d at 1024-25. Viewing the facts as the jury found them, Walmart knew that Spaeth needed an accommodation due to her disability and knew that she made repeated accommodation requests, yet denied these requests and then fired her and refused to reinstate her. EEOC-App.282-83 And, as discussed above in Section I(A), ample evidence supported that finding, including the fact that Walmart had a chance to reconsider its actions after Stevenson requested Spaeth’s reinstatement, but instead doubled down on the termination. See EEOC-App.81-82 (confirming that Walmart considered whether to grant an accommodation following meeting with Stevenson but instead decided to refuse reinstatement). Given these facts and the evidence that Walmart’s managers knew of the ADA’s requirements, e.g., Walmart-App.93, 97, 173-74, 241; EEOC-App.95-96, 132-33, 149-50, a reasonable jury could find that these managers “must have been aware of the possibility” that their actions “would violate [the ADA].” Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 860 (7th Cir. 2001); see also AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 837 (explaining in case where plaintiff “repeatedly” requested accommodation that while “[f]ailing to follow up on an accommodation request might only be negligence if it occurs infrequently, . . . an employer’s response sinks from negligence to reckless indifference when it repeatedly fails to accommodate an employee’s disability”).

Further support for the jury’s reckless indifference finding stems from the fact that Walmart “ignored [its own] established procedures for handling accommodation requests.” AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 837. Walmart’s policies make clear that once an employee requests an accommodation—which can be done “by casually mentioning that some medical condition or limitation impacts [the associate’s] ability to perform her job,” EEOC.App.197—the manager must immediately take certain steps in response. The manager must “provide the associate a request for accommodation packet as soon as reasonably possible, certainly within two days” and forward the packet to a higher-level HR manager “within 24 hours.” EEOC-App.222. No accommodation request can be denied at the store level; instead, only Walmart’s Accommodations Service Center can deny a requested accommodation. EEOC-App.47, 97, 118, 154-55, 217, 226.

Here, Walmart failed to follow these procedures. Despite Spaeth and Stevenson clearly referencing a “medical condition or limitation impact[ing] [Spaeth’s] ability to perform her job,” EEOC-App.197, no one ever offered Spaeth a reasonable accommodation packet, EEOC-App.35-36, 47-48, 98; Walmart-App.255-56. Nor did Walmart ever escalate Spaeth’s request to the Accommodations Service Center before rejecting it. EEOC-App.48, 66-67, 117. The fact that Walmart managers knew of these policies but nonetheless disregarded them in handling Spaeth’s repeated accommodation requests further supports the jury’s reckless indifference finding.

Contrary to Walmart’s claim, Walmart Br. 32-33, the district court did not treat the mere existence of Walmart’s ADA trainings and policies as a sufficient basis for the imposition of punitive damages. Instead, the court relied on this evidence to establish that Walmart was not “unaware of the relevant federal prohibition[s],” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 537, when it engaged in the relevant conduct. The district court’s reckless indifference analysis rested not only on awareness of the ADA’s requirements but also on the jury’s finding that Walmart, despite this awareness, chose to refuse Stevenson and Spaeth’s repeated accommodation requests, terminate Spaeth, and decline to reinstate her. SA.6. Nor did the district court improperly rely on evidence that Walmart “cut off communications with Spaeth’s family,” SA.6, as Walmart asserts, Walmart Br. 34. The jury was entitled to reject Spude’s claim that his instruction to cease communication rested on the lack of “any official documented legal guardian” for Spaeth, Walmart Br. 34 (quoting Walmart-App.279-80), especially given Spude’s testimony that Walmart policies permit communication with family members regarding accommodation requests irrespective of guardianship status. EEOC-App.148-49; see also Walmart-App.100 (Castro testimony that she understood Stevenson to be someone acting in Spaeth’s interests).

Walmart misstates the law by next arguing that punitive damages are unavailable because “EEOC offered no evidence that any Walmart associate exhibited animus or ill will toward Ms. Spaeth.” Walmart Br. 5. Neither animus nor ill will are requirements of a punitive damages award. Punitive damages can be sustained by showing that the employer acted either “with malice or with reckless indifference,” 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1), and “do[] not require a showing of egregious or outrageous discrimination,” Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 535. Thus, “lack of ill will is not sufficient, in and of itself, to bar punitive damages.” EEOC v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 611 (11th Cir. 2000); Hubbell v. FedEx SmartPost, Inc., 933 F.3d 558, 571-72 (6th Cir. 2019) (employer’s argument that “punitive damages can only be sustained in cases involving egregious conduct” “misstates the legal standard”).

Nor, contrary to Walmart’s assertion, is the notion that Walmart “took steps to help Spaeth succeed as an associate” or did not actively “want[] to see Spaeth lose her job” in any way inconsistent with a reckless indifference finding. Walmart Br. 32 (quoting SA19). The ADA’s reasonable accommodation mandate imposes an affirmative duty on employers to grant “preferences in the form of ‘reasonable accommodations’” that enable disabled individuals to “obtain the same workplace opportunities that those without disabilities automatically enjoy.” US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002). An employer may truly wish for a disabled employee to succeed but still be unwilling to grant the employee the sort of exceptions or preferences the ADA often requires. There would be nothing inconsistent about finding that Walmart managers generally enjoyed working with Spaeth but nonetheless disregarded the ADA’s requirements by refusing to grant her an exception to the computer-generated shift-scheduling policy based on the belief that it “would not be fair to adjust shift times for [Spaeth] and not for other associates.” Walmart-App.322. And the fact that store-level managers may have felt fondness for Spaeth has no bearing on the mindset of regional or national-level managers like Spude and Morgan who lacked any personal familiarity with Spaeth and chose to uphold the termination. EEOC-App.152, 235.

C. The district court properly denied Walmart’s motion to remit compensatory damages.

The jury determined that $150,000 was the sum of money that would “fairly and reasonably compensate Marlo Spaeth for her emotional pain and mental anguish.” EEOC-App.283. The district court found the award to be rationally connected to the evidence of Spaeth’s depression, distress, and confusion caused by Walmart’s firing, and to be roughly comparable to awards in similar cases. SA.7-8. The district court acted well within its discretion in so concluding.

First, the district court correctly concluded that “ample evidence” of Spaeth’s emotional pain and mental anguish supported the jury’s award. SA.8. As the district court noted, Spaeth “experienced distress and confusion immediately following her termination” from Walmart. SA.7-8. During the termination itself, Spaeth broke down crying and Castro and Stern had to call another manager to soothe her. Walmart-App.213, 251-22, 256. Stevenson testified that Spaeth was distraught and crying the weekend after her termination and also confused, “talking about not having her job but still wondering where her schedule was for that next week.” EEOC-App.15; Walmart-App.22. And Spaeth “was like that for years.” Walmart-App.22. She testified that, six years later, she is still sad when she thinks about her discharge. Walmart-App.130-31. Barnes testified that Spaeth covers her face when she sees a Walmart commercial because it reminds her of her termination. Walmart-App.169-70.

Spaeth also exhibited symptoms of memory loss, anxiety, and depression following her termination. Walmart-App.23, 140-43. Dr. Smith diagnosed Spaeth with depression and prescribed anti-depressant medication, which she continued to take at the time of the trial. Walmart-App.24, 140-43. Dr. Smith determined that Spaeth’s depression stemmed from “[w]hat occurred at Walmart,” namely, “the disciplinary action and then being fired.” Walmart-App.143. He explained: “This was her life. She had done it for 15 years. And that was taken away. And she kept talking about it. Even a few years later she was still talking about it.” Walmart-App.143. Stevenson explained that the termination robbed Spaeth of an important part of her identity because her job “was her life. She identified ‘I’m Marlo, I work at Walmart.’ . . . She was proud of her blue vest.” Walmart-App.24. When Walmart took this away, Spaeth became “a shell,” exhibiting “[i]ncreased dependence on her stepsister” and “[r]esistance to mak[ing] her own decisions.” Walmart-App.22.

Walmart’s claim that the evidence “does not come close to supporting” the jury’s award is puzzling. Walmart Br. 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). Walmart attempts to discount the foregoing testimony as “brief” and “limited,” Walmart Br. 36-37, but this detailed testimony from Spaeth, her family members, and a physician cannot fairly be characterized in this manner. And “the jury obviously did not perceive it this way considering the award they granted [Spaeth].” Tullis v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 243 F.3d 1058, 1068 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting employer’s effort to discount plaintiff’s testimony as “relatively meager and scant” given that jury “apparently found his testimony to be sincere and sufficient to convince them that he merited the award they gave him”).

Walmart next seeks to discount Spaeth’s depression by asserting that Dr. Smith testified this condition “coincid[ed] with her mother’s illness and subsequent passing,” rather than her termination. Walmart Br. 36 (quoting Walmart-App.146-48). But this quote is attributable to Walmart’s attorney rather than Dr. Smith. Walmart-App.148. Dr. Smith instead testified that he considered whether the onset of Spaeth’s symptoms coincided with her mother’s illness and death but ultimately “did not think” the two were related based on “information [about] how [Spaeth] responded to the death of her mother.” Walmart-App.148-49. Instead, as noted, Dr. Smith determined the cause of the depression to be “what occurred at Walmart.” Walmart-App.143. The jury was entitled to credit that testimony. See Deloughery v. City of Chi., 422 F.3d 611, 620 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining in denying further remittitur on appeal that “[t]he jury was informed of the other possible causes of [plaintiff’s] emotional distress but believed that the defendant’s actions nevertheless caused her significant trauma”).

Finally, Walmart argues that the award here exceeds those in similar cases. The four cases Walmart cites for this proposition are inapposite. Walmart Br. 36-37. In Marion County Coroner’s Office v. EEOC, 612 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 2010), this Court found remittitur appropriate because “[t]he testimony on [plaintiff’s] suffering was extremely brief,” elucidating only the bare fact of “weekly therapy sessions . . . for situational depression,” contrasting the case with Deloughery, where testimony by plaintiff and a co-worker of the “devastat[ing]” and “demoralizing impact” of the employer’s actions properly supported a $175,000 damages award. Id. at 931 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (citing Deloughery, 422 F.3d at 615). Here, Spaeth, her family members, and a physician testified in detail about the long-lasting devastating and demoralizing effect of Walmart’s actions, bringing this case much closer to Deloughery than to Marion County. This Court’s remittitur of damages in Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park District, 634 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2011), and Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219 (7th Cir. 1995), are equally inapposite because, unlike here, the plaintiffs in those cases “did not testify to any lasting emotional or physical ill-effects,” Schandelmeier-Bartels, 634 F.3d at 389, or “deep upset,” Avitia, 49 F.3d at 1229, resulting from their job loss. Finally, in Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2004), this Court did not affirm a reduction of compensatory damages based on insufficient evidence of emotional distress, as Walmart claims. Walmart Br. 36. Instead, in that case the district court reduced the compensatory damages award using a neutral formula to comply with the statutory cap. Lust, 383 F.3d at 589. And this Court in fact declined to remit that award further, given the plaintiff’s “nontrivial symptoms of anxiety and other forms of emotional distress.” Id. These cases thus do not demonstrate that the award here “grossly exceeds” those in comparable cases. Walmart Br. 37.

Instead, the evidence of emotional distress here is akin to that supporting even higher compensatory damages awards affirmed by this Court. See Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Trust of Chi., 433 F.3d 558, 563, 566-67 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding a $200,000 award where plaintiff “lost self-esteem, . . . changed demeanor, and became nervous” following discrimination); Deloughery, 422 F.3d at 614-15, 620-21 (declining to further remit on appeal a $175,000 award where denial of promotion had “demoralizing” and “devastat[ing]” impact on plaintiff); see also Martyne v. Parkside Med. Servs., No. 97 C 8295, 2000 WL 748096, at *8, 11 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 2000) (approving $300,000 award in failure-to-accommodate case, observing that plaintiff’s “work was a very large part of her life; when she became unable to work, she was cut off from one of the major defining aspects of [her] life”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Walmart claims these cases are inapposite, but the factual details it emphasizes are either present in Spaeth’s case or were irrelevant to the remittitur analysis in those cases. Walmart fails to explain why the “repeated physical and verbal harassment” that the plaintiff in Farfaras experienced, Walmart Br. 38 (internal quotation marks omitted), is so different in kind from Walmart’s repeated refusal to accommodate a cognitively impaired individual as to make the cases incomparable. And the “child care issues” and “sexual abuse” that the plaintiffs in Deloughery and Martyne experienced, Walmart Br. 38 (internal quotation marks omitted), were irrelevant to the remittitur analysis because they did not stem from the employer’s discriminatory conduct. See Deloughery, 422 F.3d at 615, 620 (relying on “frustrat[ion]” plaintiff experienced due to promotion denial, rather than “child care issues” which stemmed from her divorce); Martyne, 2000 WL 748096, at *7-8 (focusing not on root cause of plaintiff’s depression but on fact that employer’s actions caused her depression to deteriorate). This Court need not “fit this case into a perfect continuum of past harms and past awards” but need only ensure the award is “not so beyond the pale as to constitute an abuse of discretion.” Farfaras, 433 F.3d at 567. The award here easily clears that bar.

II. The district court abused its discretion by denying almost all of EEOC’s requested injunctive relief.

Under the ADA, if a “court finds that the [employer] has intentionally engaged in . . . an unlawful employment practice,” it “may enjoin the [employer] from engaging in such unlawful employment practice” and order “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); id. § 12117(a) (incorporating this provision in ADA). Courts exercising this equitable authority must do so in light of the important objectives of the statute, including preventing future discrimination. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416-17 (1975). Because EEOC “seek[s] to vindicate a public interest, not simply provide make-whole relief for the employee” when it litigates claims, EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 (2002), it aims through injunctive relief to protect not just the individual claimant but also other employees by preventing future discrimination, see EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).

Once a statutory violation is established, injunctive relief is warranted if “the employer’s discriminatory conduct could possibly persist in the future.” Bruso, 239 F.3d at 864 (citation omitted). To avoid an injunction, the employer must “prove that the discrimination is unlikely to continue” or that “the claimant’s case is somehow different from the norm.” AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 840 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court denied nearly all the requested injunctive relief, granting only limited relief applicable to Spaeth. This constituted an abuse of discretion because the court’s ruling was based on an “erroneous view of the law” and a “clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Highmark, 572 U.S. at 563 n.2 (citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court should reverse the denial of injunctive relief and remand for entry of an appropriate injunction.[5]

A. The district court improperly shifted the burden to EEOC to show likelihood of recurrence and ignored evidence that Walmart’s violations are likely to persist absent injunctive relief.

1. Walmart bore the burden to show the violations were unlikely to persist.

The district court committed legal error by placing the burden on EEOC to show that the violations here were likely to recur without injunctive relief. SA.18. As noted above, this Court’s precedent makes clear that once a violation is established “[t]he burden . . . falls on the employer to prove that the discrimination is unlikely to continue” to avoid an injunction. AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 840 (emphasis added). By denying injunctive relief because “EEOC ha[d] not shown that the proven illegal conduct may be resumed,” SA.18 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted), the district court improperly reversed the burden and thus abused its discretion.[6]

2. Walmart’s formal policies are insufficient to prevent violations from recurring.

The district court also abused its discretion by ignoring abundant evidence that Walmart’s violations are likely to recur. The evidence at trial established a pervasive and ongoing belief by senior Walmart managers that the company’s policies forbid the sort of long-term schedule accommodations that Spaeth needed and that the ADA contemplates. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (listing “modified work schedules” as example of reasonable accommodation and imposing no time limit on provision of such accommodations). Walmart’s policies list “modified work schedules” as a potential reasonable accommodation, EEOC-App.212, but Walmart managers insisted that this language encompassed only short-term schedule adjustments. Spude, who at the time of trial served as Regional People Director of Walmart’s Region 53, overseeing approximately 114 stores and 30,000 employees, EEOC-App.140, 149; Walmart-App.264, claimed that Walmart’s policies “contemplate offering short-term minor changes or adjustments to availability or preferences, but in no way are we obligated in any way to offer permanent long-term scheduling changes.” EEOC-App.153 (emphasis added). Spude repeatedly maintained that long-term schedule accommodations are contrary to Walmart’s standard processes and never occurred in practice. EEOC-App.130 (“providing accommodations or anything that would be on a permanent basis” is “against our normal processes” and “is not common. I can’t think of a specific example at all.”); EEOC-App.153 (“I think I can further clarify that I’ve never seen a long-term permanent scheduling accommodation, yes.”). Other managers similarly testified that they had never seen a fixed permanent work schedule in practice. EEOC-App.86, 127; Walmart-App.238. And Walmart’s counsel confirmed as much during closing argument, stating: “The idea that Walmart is going to give somebody a permanent fixed schedule is not something that they do.” EEOC-App.172.

Senior Walmart managers also expressed their understanding that Walmart’s company-wide scheduling directive required them to obey the shift schedules generated by the computer, with no exceptions for associates’ individual circumstances. Stern testified that the 2014 “directive . . . from the home office” meant that “we were to allow the schedules to be generated and run them as they were generated and not make adjustments to them unless it was a specific business need.” Walmart-App.177. Ohlsen expressed a similar understanding. EEOC-App.114 (“Q: [B]ased on this directive that came from the home office, it was your understanding that when associates asked to change the schedules that were generated by the system that you were to say no[?] A: We would not edit the schedules, yes.”). The fact that Walmart’s managers continued even at the time of trial to insist that Walmart’s policies precluded compliance with the ADA strongly suggests that violations are likely to recur absent injunctive relief.

Nor were the individuals responsible for the illegal conduct low-level managers whose conduct can be dismissed as an aberration. Instead, Walmart ignored the ADA’s requirements repeatedly, at various levels of management extending all the way to corporate headquarters. It was not just Spaeth’s immediate supervisor Stern who ignored her repeated accommodation requests. Instead, Stern documented those requests in emails to more senior managers—HR coordinator Becker, co-managers Castro and Ohlsen, and former store manager Radue, Walmart-App.322—but none of those managers took any steps to consider an accommodation, EEOC-App.35, 47-48, 54. Nor was it a low-level supervisor who made the decision to terminate Spaeth. Instead, that decision was made with the authorization of Ohlsen and Castro, store manager Abitz, and Spude, who at the time was a Market Human Resources Manager overseeing more than 20 stores and charged with “ensur[ing] that [Walmart is] effectively following [its] processes.” Walmart-App.108-09, 264-65, 329; EEOC-App.234. And, after Stevenson specifically invoked Spaeth’s right to a reasonable accommodation and requested her reinstatement, Spude and Morgan, an even higher-level manager at Walmart’s national headquarters responsible for investigating allegations of disability discrimination company-wide, refused to provide an accommodation and instead upheld the termination. EEOC-App.71-72, 152, 235. Almost all these managers remain employed by Walmart, EEOC-App.65, 71, 85-86, 100, 122, and Walmart never criticized Spude for his handling of Spaeth’s case and in fact promoted him, Walmart-App.264; EEOC-App.152. The fact that Walmart’s “upper echelon of management felt free to ignore [Walmart’s] policies in the past” should raise doubt that “those same members of management will abide by them in the future.” Bruso, 239 F.3d at 864.

The district court nonetheless believed that the mere existence of Walmart’s formal policies regarding ADA compliance sufficed to prevent future violations. SA.18. But the court nowhere acknowledged the foregoing evidence that Walmart managers understood these policies in fact to forbid the very type of permanent schedule accommodation Spaeth needed. This Court’s case law establishes that a district court’s reliance on the mere existence of formal policies as a basis for denying injunctive relief—without considering the employer’s actual compliance with these policies—constitutes an abuse of discretion. For example, in reversing the denial of injunctive relief in Bruso, this Court rejected the district court’s conclusion that it was “of no moment” whether United’s “formal policies for reporting and addressing harassment” were “100% effective.” 239 F.3d at 864 (citation omitted). “Contrary to what the district court thought,” this Court emphasized, “it is of every moment that United’s reporting policies are not 100% effective,” because this bears directly on likelihood of recurrence. Id.; see also AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 844 (existence of formal ADA policy would not insulate employer from injunction given “systemic failure to properly implement AutoZone’s established procedures”); EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244, 1254 (11th Cir. 1997) (district court abused its discretion in denying injunctive relief where “[t]he discriminatory conduct . . . was primarily that of [two individuals], both of whom remain[ed] in the same supervisory positions . . . without . . . having been disciplined for their behavior” and “no one at the company seem[ed] to have admitted to any wrongdoing”). Here, as in Bruso, “there is no reason to believe” that Walmart’s managers “will abide by [the company’s policies] in the future,” given that they not only “felt free to ignore [those] policies in the past” but continued to misapprehend them at the time of trial. Bruso, 239 F.3d at 864.

The district court’s reliance on Walmart’s formal ADA policies suffers from a further flaw: several of the policies the court cited are completely unrelated to the violations at issue here and thus have no bearing on the likelihood that those violations could recur. For example, the district court emphasized that Walmart’s “policies and procedures inform its employees of their rights under the ADA.” SA.18 (emphasis added). But EEOC’s claim was not that Walmart failed to inform Spaeth of her right to request an accommodation under the ADA. Instead, EEOC argued (and the jury agreed) that Spaeth did request an accommodation and Walmart impermissibly ignored that request. EEOC-App.282 (Questions 2-3). For this same reason, it is equally irrelevant that Walmart “provides training that is intended to encourage management . . . [to] recognize that a request for a reasonable accommodation may be made even though [that] phrase . . . is not used.” SA.20. The jury found not that Walmart failed to recognize Spaeth’s accommodation requests but that it rejected her requests. EEOC-App.282 (Questions 2-3). These policies thus have no bearing on the specific violation here—Walmart’s improper denial of Spaeth’s accommodation requests—and so do not make similar violations less likely to recur.

B. The district court ignored evidence of the broad geographic scope in which the illegal conduct could recur when declining to impose company- or region-wide relief.

The district court also concluded that injunctive relief aimed at Walmart as a whole and Walmart’s Region 53 were too “expansive and wide-reaching” because the violation at issue was a “unique incident involving one store.” SA.17-18. But the evidence at trial showed that Walmart’s refusal to consider Spaeth’s accommodation requests stemmed in large part from its company-wide policy precluding exceptions to computer-generated shift schedules. See EEOC-App.252 (Ohlsen explained to Spaeth’s family that “Marlo’s hours were changed because of our system needing to fill the shifts we had open and not creating a shift as we could do in the past. They did not see that our system generated shifts and we could not adjust them.”); EEOC-App.14-15 (when Stevenson asked Walmart about the reason for termination, Stern “told [her] that the computer generates the schedules and there’s nothing they can do about it”); EEOC-App.115-16 (Ohlsen explaining that “[w]e followed the direction from the home office” in declining to adjust Spaeth’s shift). And there is no dispute that this policy requiring compliance with computer-generated shifts extends well beyond the Manitowoc store and applies to the company as a whole. Walmart managers testified that the Manitowoc store received a “directive . . . from the home office” that applied “all across the company” to obey computer-generated shifts. Walmart-App.177; EEOC-App.113 (directive came “from the home office”); EEOC-App.134 (directive came from “the company”).

Moreover, EEOC submitted evidence of complaints that other Walmart stores—both within and outside Wisconsin—have denied scheduling accommodations to disabled individuals following this transition to a purely computerized scheduling system. EEOC-App.289-91 (declaration from Wisconsin disability rights attorney discussing clients whom Walmart denied scheduling accommodations after transition to computerized scheduling system); EEOC-App.298-310 (lawsuit filed in Maine alleging that Walmart refused schedule accommodation for longtime employee “because of a new computerized scheduling system” under which “set schedules are not permissible”);[7] see also EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 38 F.4th 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2022) (affirming jury verdict against Walmart for ADA reasonable accommodation violations in case involving another Wisconsin Walmart store); EEOC-App.311-24 (lawsuits filed in Maine and Oklahoma alleging Walmart’s refusal to grant scheduling accommodations); EEOC-App.325-37 (lawsuit filed in South Dakota alleging Walmart revoked accommodation for disabled employee); EEOC-App.338-59 (report by advocacy organization regarding Walmart’s failure to accommodate medical absences nationwide).

Injunctive relief beyond the Manitowoc store is also warranted because “the violation occurred with the knowledge of management and HR persons well above the store level.” EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 824, 841 (C.D. Ill. 2011) (imposing regionwide injunction), aff’d in relevant part, 707 F.3d 824, 844 (7th Cir. 2013) (magistrate judge “appropriately crafted the scope of the injunction” because evidence showed “intransigence at quite senior levels of management” that was “not limited to just [plaintiff’s] store”). Spude—who at the time was a manager overseeing more than twenty stores and has since been promoted to Regional People Director of Region 53, overseeing 114 stores and more than 30,000 employees—signed off on the decision to terminate Spaeth and upheld the termination. Walmart-App.109, 264-65; EEOC-App.140, 149, 152. And Morgan, an ethics manager at Walmart’s national headquarters charged with investigating allegations of disability discrimination reported company-wide through Walmart’s Global Ethics hotline, EEOC-App.71-72, also upheld the termination, deeming the only necessary remedial action to be counseling managers on the need to be more stringent in enforcing Walmart’s attendance policies, EEOC-App.235. Many of the store-level managers involved in the illegal conduct have been transferred to different Walmart stores in Wisconsin, underscoring the need for region-wide relief. EEOC-App.85-86, 102. Because “[t]he evidence presented at trial indicates that several of defendant’s employees outside the [Manitowoc] store either engaged in or ratified discriminatory conduct,” there is ample “support [for] implementing a geographic scope for the injunction that goes beyond the [Manitowoc] store.”[8] EEOC v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 277 F. Supp. 3d 932, 958-59 (E.D. Tenn. 2017) (approving regionwide relief where evidence showed involvement of a district manager responsible for seventeen or eighteen stores, and an employee relations manager charged with “handling employment-related disputes for the entire corporation”), aff’d on other grounds, 899 F.3d 428 (6th Cir. 2018).

The district court acknowledged EEOC’s argument that “Walmart’s actions are not unique to the Manitowoc store” but rejected that argument without explanation, stating merely that “this unique incident involving one store does not warrant the far-reaching injunction the EEOC seeks.” SA.17. This conclusory statement fails to provide any explanation for why the court rejected EEOC’s argument and supporting evidence and thus amounts to an abuse of discretion.

C. The district court improperly subjected all of EEOC’s requested relief to the more stringent standards applicable to obey-the-law injunctions and then failed to analyze whether those heightened standards were satisfied.

1. Only one of the provisions EEOC pursues on appeal is an obey-the-law injunction.

In denying injunctive relief, the district court characterized EEOC’s requested measures as “for the most part, directives that Walmart obey the law,” and emphasized the disfavored nature of such relief. SA.17-18. But the district court was incorrect to characterize EEOC’s requested relief as equivalent to an obey-the-law injunction. An obey-the-law injunction is one that “d[oes] nothing more than duplicate the company’s existing obligation[s] under law.” AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 843 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the requested provision instead fleshes out these legal obligations by detailing with “greater specificity what [the employer] must not do,” it is not an obey-the-law injunction. SEC v. Goulding, 40 F.4th 558, 563 (7th Cir. 2022), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 20, 2023) (No. 22-687).

Here, with the exception of one request, see infra at 86, the provisions EEOC pursues on appeal are not obey-the-law in nature because, rather than simply restating the relevant legal obligations, they articulate granular measures Walmart must take to implement these obligations and permit EEOC to monitor its compliance. For example, EEOC requested that Walmart be required to notify EEOC of employees seeking accommodations and of Walmart’s response to those requests in order to monitor the company’s compliance with the ADA. EEOC-App.286 (Request 5). This Court has approved nearly identical provisions without deeming them obey-the-law injunctions. See AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 844 (approving provision requiring employer “to notify the EEOC of employees seeking accommodations and to record its responses to these requests in writing”); EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1578 (7th Cir. 1997) (approving provision requiring employer “to provide periodic reports detailing employee requests for time off for religious reasons and its efforts to accommodate those requests” in order to “enable [EEOC] to monitor [employer’s] compliance” with legal obligations); Gurnee Inn, 914 F.2d at 817, aff’g, 1988 WL 129329, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 1988) (injunction requiring employer to “report to [EEOC] any sexual harassment grievance”).

EEOC also sought other specific measures such as clarification of company policies (Request 2), providing notice to employees of the verdict and injunction (Request 4), training (Request 6), and documenting adherence to company policies during the annual review process for certain supervisors and managers (Request 7). EEOC-App.286. These provisions again do not simply duplicate existing statutory obligations but instead impose specific measures intended to promote actual compliance with these obligations. They serve this goal by, for example, educating managers about the specific ADA obligations violated here through training and clarification of company policies (Requests 2, 6); deterring further discrimination by making Walmart employees aware of the verdict and injunction and their right to contact EEOC free from discrimination (Request 4); and incentivizing managers’ compliance with EEO policies by considering such compliance as part of performance reviews (Request 7). Indeed, this Court and others have regularly imposed or upheld similar measures without considering them to be obey-the-law in nature. See Gurnee Inn, 914 F.2d at 817, aff’g, 1988 WL 129329, at *1-2 (injunction ordering employer to, among other measures, adopt training program, post notice of the judgment, and adopt a policy barring sexual harassment); EEOC v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 470 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (affirming injunction ordering modification of company policies, training, and posting notice of verdict, finding such measures to be “reasonably tailored to address deficiencies in [employer’s] sexual harassment policies, inform and train employees regarding the relevant law, and prevent similar conduct from recurring”); EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., No. 12-cv-214, 2014 WL 282026, at *5-6 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 27, 2014) (injunctive provisions requiring training and modification of policies not “obey the law”; these measures were instead “limited injunctive relief . . . tailored to the deficiencies identified in [the employer’s] operations”), aff’d on other grounds, 777 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2015); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1331 (D.N.M. 1998) (requiring Walmart to conduct ADA compliance training and post notice to employees), aff’d, No. 98-2122, 1999 WL 1244485 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 1999) (unpublished table decision).

Moreover, these requested measures pose none of the “overbreadth” concerns that often characterize obey-the-law injunctions. AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 841 (noting concern that obey-the-law injunctions can extend beyond “the violation established in the litigation or similar conduct reasonably related to the violation”). These measures pertain not only to the type of violation committed here (a failure to accommodate under the ADA) but also to the root cause underlying the violation, namely, Walmart managers’ understanding that the company’s policies do not permit long-term scheduling modifications. Supra at 69-71. For example, EEOC’s request to enjoin Walmart from denying reasonable accommodations “on the ground that the accommodations . . . are indefinite, long-term, or permanent,” EEOC-App.285 (Request 1), addresses this precise issue by preventing Walmart from erroneously relying on the long-term nature of the accommodation as the basis for denial. Similarly, EEOC’s requests to require Walmart to “modify its accommodation policies to clarify that indefinite, long-term, or permanent disability accommodations are available,” and to provide training directed specifically at “the obligation to grant schedule accommodations under the ADA,” EEOC-App.286 (Requests 2, 6), seek to correct Walmart managers’ incorrect understanding that the company’s policies permit only short-term scheduling accommodations.

2. The district court failed to consider whether the circumstances this Court has said warrant obey-the-law injunctions were present here.

Only one of the requested provisions EEOC pursues on appeal is obey-the-law in nature: Request 3 to enjoin Walmart’s Region 53 stores from failing to provide reasonable accommodations to disabled employees in violation of the ADA. EEOC-App.286. Obey-the-law injunctions, however, “are not forbidden.” Goulding, 40 F.4th at 563; see also Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 2000) (obey-the-law injunctions can constitute “proper relief” that “add[s] contempt to the other sanctions” available for violations and “prevent[s] the defendant from repeating his violation in slightly different form”). Indeed, in AutoZone, this Court upheld (subject to imposition of a time limit) an obey-the-law injunction nearly identical to Request 3 here, which required AutoZone to “make reasonable accommodations to the known physical limitations of any qualified employee with a disability who is working at an AutoZone retail store within the Central District of Illinois and who requests an accommodation or whose need for an accommodation is otherwise known to AutoZone.” 707 F.3d at 841. This Court and others have approved other obey-the-law injunctions that reiterate existing federal anti-discrimination obligations, including those that—unlike Request 3 here—go beyond the specific category of violation at issue. See Ilona of Hungary, 108 F.3d at 1578 (approving in religious accommodation case a provision enjoining employer from “engaging in any practice that discriminates on the basis of religion”); Gurnee Inn, 914 F.2d at 817, aff’g, 1988 WL 129329, at *1 (enjoining employer in sexual harassment case “from conducting its employment practices in a manner which violates Title VII”); EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539, 1544 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that district court abused its discretion in denying “injunction against retaliation” and rejecting notion that such an injunction “was superfluous because Title VII already prohibits that conduct”);Wal-Mart Stores, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 1331 (enjoining Walmart store from “failing or refusing to hire a qualified individual with a disability because of his or her disability”), aff’d, 1999 WL 1244485, at *6 (finding that “the scope of the injunctive relief ordered is neither overly broad nor impermissibly intrusive”).

To determine whether an obey-the-law injunction is warranted, this Court considers whether certain circumstances are present, namely, whether “the victorious employee remains at the company or has been reinstated,” “the particular employees or supervisors responsible for the illegal conduct remain at the company,” and/or “the employer has taken some particular action . . . that convinces the court that voluntary compliance with the law will not be forthcoming.” AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 842-43 (collecting cases); see also Wal-Mart Stores, 38 F.4th at 662 (looking to whether the “example situations listed in AutoZone” were present in determining propriety of obey-the-law injunction). Here, however, the district court failed entirely to consider whether these circumstances were present, so as to justify the one obey-the-law provision in question (or the other relief discussed above that the court mistakenly characterized as obey-the-law in nature).

Had the district court conducted this analysis, it would have seen that each of these circumstances is present. First, although Spaeth declined it, the district court ordered her reinstatement. SA.25. Second, Walmart continues to employ nearly all the supervisors responsible for the illegal conduct. Supra at 16-17, 72-73; see Ilona of Hungary, 108 F.3d at 1579 (upholding obey-the-law injunction where “the individuals who were found to have discriminated remain the defendant’s primary decision-makers”); Gurnee Inn, 914 F.2d at 817 (same where defendant continued to employ manager who failed to rectify discriminatory conduct). Third, Walmart’s actions demonstrate the sort of “intransigence at quite senior levels of management” that suggests that “voluntary compliance with the law will not be forthcoming.” AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 843-44. Walmart’s managers continue to believe the company’s policies do not permit the sort of scheduling accommodations at issue here. Supra at 69-71. And Walmart appeared to adopt this litigation position as well. EEOC-App.172 (arguing in closing that Walmart had no obligation “to give somebody a permanent fixed schedule”); EEOC-App.171 (district court criticizing Walmart’s position “that there’s never a need for a change of schedule as an accommodation” as “fl[ying] in the face” of legal authority); Ilona of Hungary, 108 F.3d at 1579 (obey-the-law injunction warranted where defendants “insisted throughout th[e] litigation that they in fact never discriminated”). The district court’s failure to consider the circumstances relevant to the propriety of obey-the-law injunctions constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion

This Court should affirm the district court’s verdict and award of compensatory and punitive damages but reverse as to the denial of injunctive relief and remand for an appropriate injunction.

Respectfully submitted,

GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS

Acting General Counsel

JENNIFER S. GOLDSTEIN

Associate General Counsel

ANNE NOEL OCCHIALINO

Assistant General Counsel

s/ Chelsea C. Sharon

CHELSEA C. SHARON

Attorney

Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission

Office of General Counsel

131 M St. N.E., 5th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20507

(202) 921-2889

chelsea.sharon@eeoc.gov

[1] Citations to “R._” refer to entries on the district court’s docket. Citations to “EEOC-App._” refer to EEOC’s separate appendix. Citations to “Walmart-App._” refer to Walmart’s separate appendix. Citations to “SA._” refer to the short appendix attached to Walmart’s brief.

[2] Walmart claimed in its position statement to EEOC submitted during the agency’s investigation that Spaeth’s availability form “had always indicated that she was available between the hours of 12 p.m. and 6 p.m.” EEOC-App.143. However, Walmart managers admitted at trial that this statement was incorrect. EEOC-App.57, 142-43.

[3] Spude contradicted this testimony at trial by asserting that Walmart “at no point” in time “interpreted” the discussion with Spaeth’s family “in any way to be an accommodation [request].” EEOC-App.162.

[4] This Court’s precedent is consistent with the text of the ADA, which allows an employer to make medical inquiries of an employee and request medical corroboration only if “such . . . inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4). And it may well be job-related and consistent with business necessity for an employer to request “reasonable documentation about [an employee’s] disability and its functional limitations” as part of the interactive process. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 2000 WL 33407181, at *9 (July 27, 2000). But the ADA does not countenance an across-the-board rule that employees must provide such corroboration in the first instance, regardless of whether the employer needs the medical information or not. See id.

[5] As noted, EEOC is not challenging the denial of injunctive relief pertaining to Spaeth or pertaining to retaliation against other employees. EEOC-App.286-87 (Requests 8, 10).

[6] To the extent the district court’s reversal of the burden rested on a belief that all of EEOC’s requested provisions constituted obey-the-law injunctions, that belief is mistaken for the reasons explained below in Section II(C)(1).

[7] In this Maine lawsuit, the district court subsequently denied Walmart’s motion to dismiss, noting testimony by Walmart’s HR manager that deviating from computer-generated schedules violates company policy. Me. Hum. Rts. Comm’n ex rel. Champagne v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., No. 21-cv-00050, 2021 WL 6064020, at *2-3 (D. Me. Dec. 22, 2021).

[8] At minimum, the evidence supports injunctive relief at the Manitowoc store. Abitz—who authorized Spaeth’s termination and upheld it—remains store manager there. EEOC-App.122, 129; Walmart-App.329. And Spude continues to oversee the Manitowoc store. Walmart-App.264.