Table of Contents

Table of Authorities........................................................................... iii

Statement of Interest.......................................................................... 1

Statement of the Issues...................................................................... 2

Statement of the Case........................................................................ 2

1. Statement of Facts.............................................................. 2

2. District Court Decision....................................................... 9

Argument............................................................................................ 10

I. The district court erred in its analysis of whether Garcia could

establish that he is disabled for purposes of ADA coverage. 10

A. The district court relied on incorrect legal standards in

concluding that Garcia did not have an actual disability.............................................................................. 12

B. The district court erroneously failed to consider Garcia’s

argument that he could establish regarded-as coverage............................................................................... 18

II. The district court erred in curtailing Garcia’s discovery..... 21

Conclusion.......................................................................................... 27

Addendum

ADA Amendments Act of 2008,

Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).................. A-1

42 U.S.C. § 12102................................................................. A-6

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (excerpts).............................................. A-8

Certificate of Service

Certificate of Compliance

Table of Authorities

CasesPage(s)

Blanchard v. Bergeron,

489 U.S. 87 (1989).................................................................. 21

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &

Human Res.,

532 U.S. 598 (2001)................................................................ 22

Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp.,

483 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973).......................................... 23, 24

Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.,

798 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2015).......................................... 19, 20

Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc.,

813 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2016)......................................... passim

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,

434 U.S. 412 (1978)................................................................ 21

Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co.,

647 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2011)................................................. 23

Dean v. Riser,

240 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2001)................................................. 21

Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc.,

415 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2005)................................................. 23

Flowers v. S. Reg’l Phys. Servs., Inc.,

247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001)................................................. 24

Fox v. Vice,

563 U.S. 826 (2011)................................................................ 22

Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc.,

488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)................................................. 21

McCoy v. Energy XXI GOM, L.L.C.,

695 F. App’x 750 (5th Cir. 2017)................................... 24, 25

Miller v. Sam Houston State Univ.,

986 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2021)............................. 22, 23, 25, 26

Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P’ship,

735 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 2013)................................................. 10

Newman v. Piggie Park Enters.,

390 U.S. 400 (1968)................................................................ 22

N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

898 F.3d 461 (5th Cir. 2018)................................................. 23

Skerce v. Torgeson Elec. Co.,

No. 19-3244, 2021 WL 1541506 (10th Cir. 2021).............. 17

Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC,

985 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2021)................................................. 20

Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp.,

719 F.3d 424 (5th Cir. 2013)................................................. 15

Trevino v. Celanese Corp.,

701 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1983)................................................. 23

United States v. Lee,

966 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2020)................................................. 26

Vantage Deepwater Co. v. Petrobras Am., Inc.,

966 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2020)................................................. 22

Williams v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist.,

717 F. App’x 440 (5th Cir. 2018).......................................... 15

Statutes

ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,

122 Stat. 3553 (2008)............................................................. 10

- § 2(b)(5).................................................................................. 11

- § 2(b)(6).................................................................................. 12

- § 4............................................................................................ 12

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq......................................................... 1

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).............................................................. 10, 17

42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C).................................................................... 10

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)....................................................... 12, 13, 17

42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B).............................................................. 12, 13

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)....................................................... 12, 19, 20

42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B).................................................................... 12

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).................................................................... 11

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B).................................................................... 13

42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C).................................................................... 17

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq....................................................... 21

Regulations

29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4).................................................................... 11

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii)................................................................ 13

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2)..................................................................... 11

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)................................................................. 13

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)................................................................ 14

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv)............................................................... 14

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v)................................................................ 14

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2).............................................................................................................. 20...................................................................................................................

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l)(1)..................................................................... 20

Rules

Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2)...................................................................... 1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).......................................................................... 22

Statement of Interest

Congress charged the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC” or “Commission”) with enforcing federal prohibitions on employment discrimination, including the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”). In this suit, the district court concluded on summary judgment that the plaintiff could not pursue his ADA termination claim because he had not shown he had a disability. In so ruling, the court disregarded the proper standards for determining whether an individual is disabled for purposes of the ADA, and ignored the plaintiff’s additional argument that the defendants “regarded him as” disabled within the meaning of the statute. The court further erred by imposing extremely restrictive discovery limitations on the plaintiff without explanation, which curtailed his ability to present his case or to respond meaningfully to the defendants’ summary judgment motion.

Because of the importance of these issues to the effective enforcement of the ADA, the EEOC respectfully offers its views to the Court. As a federal agency, the EEOC is authorized to participate as amicus curiae in the courts of appeals. Fed. R. App. P. 29(a)(2).

Statement of the Issues[1]

1. Whether the district court erred in its analysis of whether Garcia could establish that he is disabled for purposes of ADA coverage.

2. Whether the district court abused its discretion by severely restricting Garcia’s ability to conduct discovery.

Statement of the Case

1. Statement of Facts

Plaintiff Richard Garcia worked for defendant International Construction Equipment, Inc. (“ICE”) as a Territory Sales Manager/Sales Representative for the company’s South Central region. District Court Docket Number (“R.”) 17-1 at 3. ICE manufactures and markets pile driving and drilling equipment, and Garcia’s job was to sell and rent ICE’s equipment to companies within his designated territory. Id. at 2-3. Defendant T. Richard Morris is the President of ICE, defendant Christian Cunningham is ICE’s principal owner and Chief Executive Officer, and defendant Kevin Kane is ICE’s National Sales Manager and was Garcia’s supervisor. Id. at 2-3; R.1-2 at 6. Though ICE has a Houston office, it permitted Garcia to work from home and to set his own hours; he did not have any set work schedule. Id.; R.17 at 8; R.17-2 at 5.

On August 3, 2016, Garcia slipped and fell from the bed of his truck and landed on a rock with his left elbow. R.17-2 at 13. Garcia drove to the hospital, where the doctors confirmed that he had fractured his arm and dislocated his elbow, and that he would require surgery; Garcia called Kane from the hospital and related this information. R.17-2 at 14-16. The surgeon attached a permanent metal support rod to the arm bone, but he was not capable of performing the necessary surgery on the elbow, so he referred Garcia to another physician, Dr. Gabel, to address his elbow injury. Id. at 15-17. After the arm surgery, Garcia spoke to Kane and informed him about the metal rod in his arm and that there was also a problem with his elbow. Id. at 17.

A short time later, Garcia met with Dr. Gabel, who informed him that he would need elbow replacement surgery. R.20-3 at 25. After notifying Kane about the upcoming procedure, on or around August 23, 2016, Garcia had “total replacement” surgery on his injured elbow. Id. at 26-27.

Because Garcia was able to perform his job from his desk at home, he did not request any accommodations after his arm surgeries. Id. at 23-24, 28. Nonetheless, he did not return to work immediately, but attempted to “work around” the surgeries, working as much as he could in August. Id. at 23-24. Garcia’s recovery also affected the number of hours he worked: whereas, before his injury, he had worked on average from twelve to fourteen hours a day, between August and December 2016 he only worked four to five hours per day. Id. at 60. During this period, Garcia was required to perform two daily one-hour home therapy sessions, which limited the amount of time he could devote to work each day. Id. at 59-60. The parties do not dispute that, as compared to his performance in 2014 and 2015, Garcia’s sales production decreased during 2016, both before and after his injury recovery period. See R.20-3 at 16-17.

Initially, Dr. Gabel authorized Garcia to return to work after the August 23 surgery without formally restricting any of his work-related activities, but he did restrict Garcia from driving and from using his injured arm. R.20-1 at 2; R.20-3 at 26. These restrictions lasted until December 27, 2016, when Dr. Gabel cleared Garcia to return to work without any restrictions.^{^[2]} R.20-1 at 2; R.20-2 at 15. As Dr. Gabel explained, he understood “that Mr. Garcia’s job at that time [was] at ‘more or less desk level,’” and he “believed that Mr. Garcia could effectively monitor his left arm and elbow and remove himself from any situation which would call [for] him to lift more than 5 to 10 pounds.” R.20-1 at 2. Since Garcia’s “activities at work were within that range,” Dr. Gabel related, he “did not, officially, place any restrictions upon Mr. Garcia returning to back to work in January, 2017” and “did not write specific restrictions.” Id. at 1-3. As a consequence of Garcia’s arm injury and surgeries, Dr. Gabel concluded, he “has a permanent impairment of his arm and elbow and must keep lifting to ‘within a range’ [of] no more than … 5 to 10 pounds,” in his personal life as well as at work. Id. at 2-3.

On January 5, 2017, Cunningham telephoned Garcia and informed him that he was being terminated, focusing the conversation on Garcia’s low sales numbers for December 2016. R.20-3 at 40-41. Garcia ultimately filed suit, alleging violations of the ADA and state disability discrimination law against ICE, Cunningham, Kane, and Morris. R.1-2 at 4.

During the district court litigation, the parties submitted a joint discovery plan that identified various categories of evidence each side expected to request and noted that the parties expected to seek depositions as well as other forms of discovery. R.8 at 2-4. Subsequently, the district court ordered the defendants to provide Garcia eleven categories of information; it ordered Garcia to provide the defendants with a summary of the discrimination he alleged to have suffered, corroborating witnesses, similarly situated employees who received better treatment, and other information. R.10 at 1-3. The defendants complied in part, but responded to over half of the ordered categories only by stating that they were in the process of obtaining the documents and would supplement production accordingly.[3] See R.20-6 at 1-3 (ICE’s response to the court’s disclosure order). The court then ordered the defendants to provide Garcia with “the data on the five lowest sales performers between 2014 and 2017,” and ordered Garcia to give the defendants his medical records and to be deposed by the defendants. R.13. Garcia complied with this order and the defendants deposed him, but their production to him failed to include the sales data. R.15 at 1; R.20 at 4.

After the parties filed a joint status report, the district court issued several orders that effectively precluded Garcia from deposing any witnesses. See R.15, R.16; R.19. Garcia had sought to take a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of a corporate representative of ICE, plus depositions of five individuals the defendants had designated as having discoverable information regarding this case, including Cunningham, Kane, and several of Garcia’s coworkers. R.20 at 5; R.20-10 at 4-5. The court offered no explanation for its decisions, nor did it place any similar limitations on the defendants’ ability to conduct discovery. See R.16; R.19; R.26.

In his response to summary judgment, Garcia argued in part that the court’s orders and selective enforcement regarding his discovery limited his ability to respond fully to the defendants’ motion. See generally R.20 at 16-20; see also R.20-10. Shortly thereafter, Garcia filed a motion for a continuance of the summary judgment proceedings in order to complete discovery. R.23. In his motion, Garcia explained in detail why the information he hoped to collect from the denied depositions and defendants’ incomplete document production was important to his ability to make his case—in particular, to discover “if the legitimate reason advanced by ICE … is the real reason for his termination.” R.23 at 4. Three days later, without waiting for a response from the defendants, the court denied Garcia’s motion, again offering no explanation. R.26. The court added, “Garcia may not take any depositions until otherwise ordered by the court.” Id.

On summary judgment, the defendants argued that Garcia could not establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination—in relevant part, that he was not disabled when he was released to return to work, and that he was terminated because of his low sales, and he could not show that this reason was pretextual. See R.17 at 9-13. In response, Garcia argued that he had presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case, including evidence that his impairment substantially limited the major life activities of musculoskeletal function and lifting, and that the defendants regarded him as disabled. R.20 at 13-14. As for pretext, Garcia asserted that there was some evidence indicating pretext despite the “limited discovery produced by ICE in this case thus far,” and added that further discovery could reveal evidence supporting his claim. R.20 at 16-21.

2. District Court Decision

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants,

ruling that “[n]o fact indicates that Garcia’s impairment is severe enough for him to be disabled under the ADA.” R.28 at 2. The court cited no authority in support of this conclusion. See id. at 2-3. Instead, the court stated that while Garcia had been fired on January 5, 2017, he had been medically cleared to return to work on December 27, 2016; that “even before then, Garcia’s inability to lift more than 10 pounds did not limit his ability to work”; that Garcia “worked full time after his surgeries and requested no accommodations, medical leave or short-term disability leave”; and that in his deposition Garcia had stated that “his injuries—and related surgeries and related physical therapy—did not prevent him from selling equipment.” Id. at 3. The court added, without further discussion or explanation, that “[n]o fact indicates that [Garcia’s] inability to lift more than 10 pounds limited other major life activities.” Id. From this, the court summarily concluded, “Garcia has a permanent impairment without being disabled.” Id. The court then added that even if Garcia were disabled, “no fact shows that he was fired for a reason other than his low sales.” Id. The court did not address Garcia’s regarded-as coverage argument or his arguments regarding the need for additional discovery. See id. at 1-3.

Argument

I. The district court erred in its analysis of whether Garcia could establish that he is disabled for purposes of ADA coverage.

In 2008, Congress amended the ADA to broaden the coverage provided by the statute’s definition of “disability.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“ADAAA”) (attached at Addendum A-1); see also, e.g., Neely v. PSEG Tex., Ltd. P’ship, 735 F.3d 242, 245 (5th Cir. 2013) (recognizing same). Post-amendment, the ADA continues to define “disability” to include “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual” and “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(1)(A), (C) (attached at Addendum A-6). However, Congress altered the standards for each type of coverage.

First, because “courts had previously too heavily focused their inquiries on the question of coverage,” Congress specified that “the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the [post-amendment] ADA should not demand extensive analysis.” ADAAA § 2(b)(5) (attached at Addendum A-2). Second, because courts had “created an inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage under the ADA,” Congress provided that the definition of disability “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (attached at Addendum A-6); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(2) (new ADA coverage standards are “not … demanding”) (attached at Addendum A-8); Cannon v. Jacobs Field Servs. N. Am., Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that the 2008 amendments to the ADA “make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA,” and that “[a] principal way in which Congress accomplished that goal was to broaden the definition of ‘disability’” (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4))).

As explained more fully below, to achieve this goal, Congress redefined several key terms, including “substantial limitation,” “major life activity,” and “being regarded as having such an impairment.” See ADAAA § 4 (attached at Addendum A2-A3); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A)-(B), (3)(A)-(B) (attached at Addendum A-6), (4); Cannon, 813 F.3d at 590-91 (recognizing that “[a] principal way in which Congress accomplished that goal was to broaden the definition of “disability,” in particular substantial limitation and being regarded as having such an impairment); see also ADAAA § 2(b)(6) (ordering EEOC to revise its regulations accordingly) (attached at Addendum A-2). These new definitions expand the scope of coverage provided by the statute.

In this case, Garcia argues that he is covered under the ADA both because he has an actual disability and because his employer regarded him as disabled, within the meaning of §§ 12102(1)(A) and (C). In its ADA coverage analysis, the district court failed to analyze whether Garcia had an actual disability under the proper standards, and its analysis on that point cannot be reconciled with those standards. In addition, the court failed to address whether Garcia’s employer regarded him as disabled.

A. The district court relied on incorrect legal standards in concluding that Garcia did not have an actual disability.

Garcia presented evidence that as a result of his 2016 elbow injury, he has “a permanent impairment of his arm and elbow” and his ability to lift is limited to no more than five to ten pounds. See supra pp. 3-5. The evidence of Garcia’s medical condition is sufficient to support a reasonable jury finding that his physical impairment satisfies the ADA’s definition of an actual disability under § 12102(1)(A).

The amended statute explicitly provides that “major life activities include, but are not limited to, … lifting.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (attached at Addendum A-6); see also Cannon, 813 F.3d at 591 (recognizing same). In addition, the statute more broadly states that “a major life activity … includes the operation of a major bodily function.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (attached at Addendum A-6). The revised regulations define “major bodily function[s]” to include “musculoskeletal” functions. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(ii) (attached at Addendum A-8).

The amended ADA also revised and relaxed the standards for establishing whether an impairment constitutes a substantial limitation, providing that the “substantially limits” requirement “shall be interpreted consistently with the findings and purposes of the [ADAAA].” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B) (attached at Addendum A-7); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (phrase “substantially limits” is to be “construed broadly in terms of extensive coverage”) (attached at Addendum A-8). The revised ADA regulations similarly provide that the term “substantially limits” “shall be interpreted and applied to require a degree of functional limitation that is lower than the standard for ‘substantially limits’ applied prior to the ADAAA.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv) (attached at Addendum A-8); see also Cannon, 813 F.3d at 590-91 (same). Post-amendment, “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (attached at Addendum A-8).

As this Court has recognized, the correct coverage inquiry is “whether [the plaintiff’s] impairment substantially limits his ability ‘to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.’” Cannon, 813 F.3d at 591 (quoting in part 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). This comparison of an individual’s performance of a major life activity to the performance of the same major life activity by most people in the general population “usually will not require scientific, medical, or statistical analysis.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(v) (attached at Addendum A-8); see also Williams v. Tarrant Cnty. Coll. Dist., 717 F. App’x 440, 448 (5th Cir. 2018) (so recognizing).

In this case, there was evidence that would support a jury finding that, at the relevant time, Garcia’s arm impairment substantially limited the major life activity of lifting, and this was sufficient for him to establish actual-disability coverage. The evidence on summary judgment includes Dr. Gabel’s statement that as a result of Garcia’s 2016 elbow injury, he has “a permanent impairment of his arm and elbow” and must keep his lifting to “‘within a range’ which involve[s] lifting no more than … five to ten pounds.”[4] R.20-1 at 2-3. This is evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Garcia’s impairment substantially limits his ability to perform a major life activity (lifting, or musculoskeletal function) as compared to most people in the general population.

This is the same result this Court reached in Cannon. In that case, the plaintiff suffered from an inoperable rotator cuff injury that resulted in a ten-pound lifting restriction and other limitations. 813 F.3d at 588. The district court judge—the same judge who presided over Garcia’s case—held on summary judgment that Cannon had not shown that he was disabled because his “‘injured shoulder did not substantially impair[] his daily functioning.’” Id. at 590.

This Court reversed, holding that “[w]hatever merit that finding of no disability may have had under the original ADA, it is at odds with changes brought about by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.” Id. Observing that “[t]he inquiry in this post-amendment case is … whether Cannon’s impairment substantially limits his ability ‘to perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population,’” the court found that there was “ample evidence to support a conclusion that Cannon’s injury qualifies as a disability under the more relaxed standard.” Cannon, 813 F.3d at 591 (quoting in part 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii)). In so holding, this Court emphasized that “the ADA includes ‘lifting’ in its list of major life activities.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)); see also Skerce v. Torgeson Elec. Co., No. 19-3244, 2021 WL 1541506, at *5 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpubl.) (holding that evidence of the plaintiff’s elbow injury and resultant ten-pound lifting restriction was sufficient to survive summary judgment as “a physical impairment that substantially limits a major life activity”).

This Court also rejected the district court’s reliance on Cannon’s statements that he could climb a ladder and “need[ed] no accommodation” to perform his job as suggesting there was no evidence that his shoulder impairment substantially impaired his daily functioning. Cannon, 813 F.3d at 591 n.3. To the contrary, “these statements do not undermine the evidence indicating that his injury substantially limits his ability to lift, which is all that is required to establish a disability.” Id. Working and lifting are separate major life activities, and the ADAAA clarified that a plaintiff need not prove a substantial limitation in more than one major life activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(C) (“An impairment that substantially limits one major life activity need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.”) (attached at Addendum A-7); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (defining disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual” (emphasis added)) (attached at Addendum A-6).^{^[5]}

This Court’s analysis in Cannon applies with equal force here, where the district court reasoned that, since Garcia testified he was able to work full-time and perform his job duties, he could not show actual disability because there was no evidence that his “inability to lift more than 10 pounds limited other major life activities.” R.28 at 3. Notwithstanding this Court’s correction of the same error in Cannon, the district court appears to have repeated it here with respect to Garcia.

B. The district court erroneously failed to consider Garcia’s argument that he could establish regarded-as coverage.

As part of his ADA coverage argument on summary judgment, Garcia asserted that he satisfied the requirements for showing that the defendants regarded him as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. See R.20 at 13-14. However, the defendants did not directly address that basis for coverage under the ADA, and the district court wholly ignored it. See R.17 at 9-13; R.28 at 1-3. The district court erred in failing to consider that alternative argument.

After the 2008 amendments to the ADA, to establish regarded-as coverage a plaintiff need only show that the employer took action against her because of an actual or perceived impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (attached at Addendum A-6). The level of perceived limitation is irrelevant. Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 230 (5th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that “[t]he ADAAA overrules prior authority ‘requiring a plaintiff to show that the employer regarded him or her as being substantially limited in a major life activity’”). The definition for regarded-as coverage now provides that “[a]n individual meets the requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (emphasis added) (attached at Addendum A-6); Cannon, 813 F.3d at 591; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2), (l)(1) (same) (attached at Addendum A-9, A-10); Burton, 798 F.3d at 230 (“This ‘whether or not’ language was enacted as part of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.” (citation omitted)).

We note that the district court’s erroneous restriction of Garcia’s ability to conduct adequate discovery, discussed more fully in section II below, may have hindered his ability to collect evidence relevant to his regarded-as argument. For example, to satisfy the correct regarded-as coverage standard there must be evidence that the employer took action against the plaintiff “because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (attached at Addendum A-6). Such evidence of motivation—why the employer took the contested action—is the type of evidence one could reasonably expect to uncover through depositions of the company officials involved in the decision. See, e.g., Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509, 523 (6th Cir. 2021) (assessing on summary judgment contradictory testimony by employee and her superiors as to the defendant’s awareness of her medical condition, and concluding that a genuine dispute exists on the question of regarded-as coverage). But here, Garcia was denied the opportunity to depose any company officials, including those the defendants themselves identified as potentially having information regarding his termination, such as Cunningham and Kane. See infra p. 26.

II. The district court erred in curtailing Garcia’s discovery.

The ability of private individuals to prosecute claims of employment discrimination under the antidiscrimination statutes is of the utmost importance. This Court has long “recogniz[ed] the importance of private enforcement of civil rights legislation.” Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted) (employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”)), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). “Congress consider[s] vigorous enforcement to vindicate civil rights a high priority and entrusted plaintiffs to effectuate this policy.” Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 2001) (Title VII case) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978)).

To that end, “[w]hen a plaintiff succeeds in remedying a civil rights violation … he serves ‘as a “private attorney general,” vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.’” Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 833 (2011) (quoting in part Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam); see also Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 635-36 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing that “civil rights statutes vindicate public policies ‘of the highest priority,’ yet ‘depend heavily upon private enforcement’”; and “[p]ersons who bring meritorious civil rights claims, in this light, serve as ‘private attorneys general’” (citations omitted)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense or proportional to the needs of the case,” considering factors including “importance of the issues at stake in the action, … the parties’ relative access to relevant information, … [and] the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.” This Court reviews a district court’s discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Sam Houston State Univ., 986 F.3d 880, 891 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Vantage Deepwater Co. v. Petrobras Am., Inc., 966 F.3d 361, 373 (5th Cir. 2020)). “Generally, broad discretion is afforded to the district court when deciding discovery matters.” Id. (citing Crosby v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 647 F.3d 258, 261 (5th Cir. 2011)). Reversal is appropriate “only if [the decision] affected a party’s substantial rights.” Id. (quoting N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 898 F.3d 461, 476 (5th Cir. 2018)). “Substantial rights are affected if the district court’s decision was ‘arbitrary or clearly unreasonable.’” Id. (quoting Fielding v. Hubert Burda Media, Inc., 415 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2005)).

We note that this Court has been particularly protective of the breadth of discovery—and critical of abusive discovery rulings—in Title VII cases. See Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1983) (“The imposition of unnecessary limitations on discovery is especially frowned upon in Title VII cases.”); Miller, 986 F.3d at 891 (same). As the Miller court observed, “[t]h[e discovery standard of Rule 26] is broad, especially when viewed in the context of Title VII.” Miller, 986 F.3d at 891 (citing Trevino, 701 F.2d at 405). Accordingly, when district courts “fail[] to adhere to the liberal spirit of the [discovery] [r]ules,” courts of appeals “must reverse.” Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Miller, 986 F.3d at 891 (same). “And this is especially true in Title VII cases where courts [of appeals] have refused to allow procedural technicalities to impede the full vindication of guaranteed rights.” Burns, 483 F.2d at 305.

These observations about the breadth of discovery rules, and the particular problem unwarranted discovery limitations pose to Title VII enforcement, are equally applicable to the ADA. This Court has long recognized the ADA and Title VII as analogous in regard to their purposes as well as their enforcement and remedial provisions. See, e.g., Flowers v. S. Reg’l Phys. Servs., Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Both Title VII and the ADA are aimed at the same evil—employment discrimination against individuals of certain classes. Moreover, this court has recognized that ‘the ADA is part of the same broad remedial framework as … Title VII, and that all the anti-discrimination acts have been subjected to similar analysis.’”) (citations omitted).

In accordance with these discovery standards, this Court has recently reversed restrictive discovery orders under circumstances strikingly similar to those present here. In McCoy v. Energy XXI GOM, L.L.C., 695 F. App’x 750, 753 (5th Cir. 2017), a negligence suit, the district court “denied most requests for discovery.” While it permitted the defendant to depose the plaintiff, “[a]t no point did the district court permit [the plaintiff] to take the deposition of any party”; nor did it permit much of the other discovery requested by the plaintiff. McCoy, 695 F. App’x at 753. This Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion.^{^[6]} Id.

Subsequently, in Miller, a Title VII and EPA sex discrimination and retaliation case, the district court “repeatedly denied Miller’s requests for discovery, including her requests to depose witnesses with knowledge material to her claims.” 986 F.3d at 891. This included not permitting the plaintiff to depose anyone until after summary judgment briefing had already ended—and even then, the court only permitted her to depose one individual, and only for two hours. Id. at 888. In reversing the district court, this Court recognized that with this issue and this particular judge, “[w]e have a sense of déjá vu. The district court’s discovery restrictions in the instant cases are strikingly similar to those in McCoy.”^{^[7]} Id. at 891. “To put it simply,” this Court stated, “the court’s discovery restrictions suffocated any chance for Miller fairly to present her claims.” Id.

The district court’s discovery orders here should “give[] [the Court] déjà vu all over again.” United States v. Lee, 966 F.3d 310, 323 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The discovery limitations this Court criticized in McCoy and Miller are materially indistinguishable from the limitations imposed here. As Garcia explained to the district court, these discovery restrictions interfered with his ability to discover “if the legitimate reason advanced by ICE … is the real reason for his termination.” R.23 at 4. It is also possible that, as discussed previously, the requested discovery into the defendants’ motive for the termination could yield information relevant to the question of whether the defendants regarded Garcia as disabled. See supra pp. 20-21.

The district court’s inappropriate and unexplained discovery rulings adversely affected Garcia’s substantial rights and his ability to respond to summary judgment. Accordingly, the discovery limitations here amount to an abuse of discretion requiring reversal, just as they did in McCoy and Miller.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Commission respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

Respectfully submitted,

GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS

Acting General Counsel

JENNIFER S. GOLDSTEIN

Associate General Counsel

ELIZABETH E. THERAN

Assistant General Counsel

s/ James M. Tucker

JAMES M. TUCKER

Attorney

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of General Counsel

131 M St. NE, Rm. 5NW10P

Washington, D.C. 20507

(202) 921-2554

James.Tucker@EEOC.gov

[1] We take no position on any other issue in this appeal.

[2] In his declaration, Dr. Gabel occasionally mistakenly referred to actions he took in 2016 as happening in 2017. See R.20-2 at 15; R.20-1 at 1-2. However, the parties did not dispute that Dr. Gabel released Garcia to return to work without restriction on December 27, 2016. See R.17 at 12.

[3] The parties do not appear to have disputed that Garcia complied fully with the district court’s order.

[4] On summary judgment, the defendants contested whether there was evidence that Garcia’s limitation on lifting existed at the time of his termination in January 2017. See R.17 at 9 (defendant’s summary judgment motion). But Dr. Gabel stated, without any qualifications, that Garcia was permanently restricted from lifting more than five to ten pounds as a result of his injury. See supra p. 5. Nevertheless, if there is any ambiguity regarding whether Garcia’s lifting restrictions were present in early 2017, any such ambiguities must be resolved in favor of Garcia as the nonmovant. See, e.g., Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 2013) (recognizing that, in reviewing a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “we must resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving party” (citation omitted)).

[5] In Cannon, this Court concluded that the plaintiff’s shoulder impairment substantially limited a second major life activity: reaching. 813 F.3d at 591. However, as stated above, this Court recognized that Cannon’s evidence regarding his lifting limitations was itself enough to establish actual-disability coverage. See id. at 591 n.3.

[6] While this Court held that the district court’s discovery limitations amounted to reversible error, it also noted that the discovery dispute was “essentially moot” because the court of appeals had already decided to reverse on other grounds. McCoy, 695 F. App’x at 759.

[7] The district court judge in the instant case is the same judge whose discovery rulings this Court overturned in McCoy and Miller.